SCALING UP CTP IN SOMALIA:
REFLECTING ON THE 2017
DROUGHT RESPONSE

REPORT FROM AN INTER-AGENCY REFLECTION WORKSHOP

Report by CaLP, September 2017.
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1 Acronyms

CaLP Cash Learning Partnership
CTP Cash Transfer Programme
CWG Cash Working Group
DRC Danish Refugee Council
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit
ICCG Inter Cluster Coordination Group
IDP Internally displaced person
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MEB Minimum Expenditure Basket
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN United Nations
WFP World Food Programme
2 Introduction

This report summarises discussions that took place during a half-day workshop in September 2017. It built on issues identified as needing action in May, as outlined in the ‘Looking back to move forward: Building on learning from 2011 to strengthen the 2017 drought response in Somalia learning report’.

More than 40 people from national and international NGOs, the UN, and donors came together to discuss progress, reflect on whether cash transfer programming (CTP) is helping to reach marginalised communities and identify priorities for collective action.

The workshop was convened by CaLP and the Somalia Cash Working Group (CWG). It involved presentations by Sulieman Ahmed of DRC, Karen Peachey of CaLP, Sophie Tholstrup of OCHA and Delphine Dechaux of WFP. Group discussions were facilitated by Alex Woelkers of the Catholic Relief Service, Charles Hopkins of the Food Security Cluster, Sophie Tholstrup of OCHA, Isabella Hayward of the World Bank and Simon Makono of World Vision. The plenary discussions and overall event was facilitated by CaLP.

The report was prepared by Karen Peachey (CaLP) and reviewed by Sophie Tholstrup (OCHA), Isabella Hayward (World Bank), Nynne Warring (WFP) and Simon Makono (World Vision). The meeting was hosted by IFRC.
3 Highlights

a) Overall, CTP coordination has improved. The cash working group has been active; links with the Drought Operations Coordination Centre in Mogadishu have strengthened; the creation of regional focal points has been beneficial; and engagement with local administrations has improved. But more work is needed to increase the involvement of national actors and encourage more consistent cluster engagement.

b) The CWG has developed guidance and information related to MEBs, markets, risk and M&E. It has engaged with mobile operators to explore how ways of working can be enhanced.

c) Some donors have helped foster improved coordination among the implementing agencies they support. But, many agencies feel that while operational coordination has improved, coordination among donors has been lacking.

d) Beneficiary feedback systems have been strengthened but it is unclear how well the data is being used to strengthen the overall response. Multiple systems exist, some of which are not fully understood or trusted by all agencies.

e) Early pressures to ‘get money out of the door fast’ compromised targeting. Some agencies have since adjusted targeting and response design, helping increase reach and the use of unconditional cash. In contrast, some find it difficult to change and have not adjusted beneficiary lists since January 2017.

f) The targeting of marginalised groups remains a challenge. Whether cash could have been used differently to reach the marginalised groups has not been well explored.

g) There have been some improvements in the analysis and use of data. The inclusion of the work of clusters in cash related information products has been positively. There is need for more forward-focused data to assist planning.

h) Some agencies have undertaken training on gender and many target women as cash recipients. However, no clear evidence has been shared of differential impacts on men and women.

i) The need to improve collaborative working, including common or interoperable platforms, was agreed as a priority for action.

j) Given changes in the operating context, there is increasing need to link CTP with discussions about social protection and state building in Somalia.

k) Multiple opportunities for improvement were identified including the need to continue efforts to strengthen coordination, improve collective risk management and engage with mobile operators.

l) New priorities for collective action include the need to use lessons from the CWG to inform 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan; work on common cash delivery approaches; explore the idea of a single registry; discuss the changing funding landscape and implications for transfer values and targeting; improve coordination among donors; undertake a collective impact evaluation; analyse the role of the private sector; and build linkages between CTP and state building discussions.
4 Background

A few points about the drought response in 2017:

- Parts of Somalia were responding to the drought in 2016 and in a few areas as far back to the post-Gu of 2015.
- The gravity of the deteriorating situation became clear in late 2016 and crystalized in January 2017 when FSNAU published its post-Deyr assessment, which indicated that the number of people in IPC\(^1\) phases 3 and 4 had increased from 1.1 million to nearly 3 million within 6 months.
- Many agencies had on-going programmes in Somalia, some involving cash transfer programmes (CTP).
- The first cash transfers using ‘new’ humanitarian funding started in February 2017.
- Although there had been active CWGs in the past, there was no functioning CWG in 2016. WFP and CaLP initiated the formation of a new CWG which met for the first time in mid-February 2017.
- In March 2017, CaLP produced a review of lessons from evaluations of the use of CTP in the 2011 drought response.
- In a May 2017 workshop, differences between the 2011 and 2017 responses were discussed. Key findings included:

  **Compared to 2011, much had changed.**
  - The case for cash had been made and few contend the appropriateness of using CTP.
  - The response was faster and at greater scale.
  - CTP capacities had increased at various levels.

  **However, challenges remained including:**
  - The risk of famine remained and new risks were emerging, there was need to adjust plans.
  - The use of mobile phones for CTP had reduced some risks but added new risks and opportunities.
  - A lot of data was being gathered via the 3W but it was unclear if it was being used to inform decisions.
  - Risks related to diversion, targeting and exclusion remained.
  - Accountability had improved but with a heavy focus on feedback mechanisms.
  - The presence of consortia had helped with the rapid scale-up but may have distorted targeting.
  - Targeting was largely informed by IPC and some groups were not being reached.

  **In summary, it was agreed that there was need to:**
  - Invest in local as well as national coordination.
  - Work together to improve economies of scale.
  - Harmonise M&E.
  - Agree minimum standards, where appropriate.
  - Strengthen accountability to affected populations.
  - Strengthen analysis and the use of data.
  - Plan for on-going sharing of lessons.
  - Increase engagement with clusters.
  - Improve targeting of vulnerable groups.
  - Improve gender analysis and planning.
  - Adjust plans to meet emerging needs/risks and better reach marginalised groups.
  - Develop a collective approach to managing risk.
  - Feed lessons into the development of standards.

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\(^1\) Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
5 Perspectives on progress – OCHA, WFP and DRC

5.1 OCHA presentation

- Lots of data has been captured through the 3Ws, infographics produced and shared on a regular basis.
- The data provides a good overall picture and helps identify trends but does not support granular analysis e.g. it is not possible to make much comment on targeting beyond the geographic level.
- The analysis of CTP in isolation from the rest of the response means we may be missing some broader trends.
- The 3W data has improved but challenges remain. Some issues are the same as for in-kind assistance (e.g. double-counting of beneficiaries) but others are cash specific (e.g. reporting of multipurpose cash). Some clusters are not using the standard reporting format and so the use of cash for some purposes may be under-reported.
- Efforts have been made to improve local coordination with focal points in South Central, Puntland and Somaliland.
- Important trends related to CTP include:
  - Transfer values have changed over time. Broadly this has been in line with fluctuations in the MEB but there is some divergence. As one donor rolled out a flat rate, average transfer values started to decline but, in most cases, they remain higher than recommended values.
  - The use of mobile money has increased during the course of response.
  - The use of unrestricted cash has increased over time.
  - The use of cash outside the food security cluster has increased from 5% in March to 24% in July. Vouchers are used at scale in the WASH cluster. Cash is used as part of the shelter, education and protection responses.
  - Cash forms part of the response in all regions. The number of people receiving cash as a proportion of the number of people in need is uneven across the country.
  - The use of CTP has not been very flexible in responding to changing needs in different locations. For example, the Humanitarian Country Team recently recommended that the response should prioritize Galmudug and urban refugees but reporting suggests that CTP has not scaled up in these areas. It is unclear if this is a CTP issue or if the cash response serves as a proxy for the response overall.

5.2 WFP presentation

- WFP targeting focuses on IPC 3 and 4 areas, partners then undertake community targeting within these areas.
- When WFP started to respond, it had 1.2 million people registered on SCOPE. This allowed it respond immediately while new beneficiaries were being registered. 2.5 million people are now registered - 68% female and 29% IDPs.
- WFP has transferred $100 million in cash since the start of the drought response.
- Targeting is not an issue limited to cash and has been discussed at cluster level. SCOPE has been used to capture vulnerability information.
- The call centres have helped provide regular feedback, which has informed some changes to response plans.
- With needs continuing and the risk of reduced funding, a key question is whether to reach more people with lower transfer values or to adjust targeting and give higher transfers to fewer people.

5.3 Danish Refugee Council (DRC) presentation

- DRC has worked with village relief committees to target the most vulnerable.
- The culture of sharing has affected what individual households receive.
• The use of SCOPE means the head of the household goes to a shop to redeem the transfers. This has helped with vulnerability verification and reduced the risk of village relief committees including people who do not meet agreed vulnerability criteria.
• Overtime, negative coping mechanisms have reduced.
• Improved beneficiary feedback, such as information from the ECHO call back system, has helped inform planning.
• Gatekeepers remain an issue, but authorities are getting stronger.

5.4 Plenary - questions and answers

Some discussions are summarised below, with others integrated into section 6 as relevant.

What factors are driving changes in the cash response?

• WFP is currently increasing its use of unrestricted cash. This process has been driven by:
  o A long-standing plan by WFP to scale-up the use of cash.
  o Work with Standard Chartered Bank regarding agreements for secure transfers. With better systems, scale-up has become possible.
  o ECHO has pushed strongly for the use of multipurpose cash.
  o Post-distribution monitoring shows people are using cash for multiple purposes, not just food security needs. This suggests unrestricted cash may better fit the priorities identified by crisis-affected people.
• The role of some donors has been influential in relation to targeting and transfer values:
  o One group of agencies was reportedly: “put in a room and told to sort out targeting”.
  o The ECHO cash alliance has helped achieve a more joined-up approach to targeting.
  o The influence of donors was felt to have had both positive and negative effects.
  o To some degree, donor interventions reflect weaknesses in coordination.

Is CTP a pull factor? Is it always the right modality?

• In some instances CTP seems to have been a population movement ‘pull factor’ e.g. Somali refugees in Ethiopia have reportedly crossed the border to get cash in Dolo. It may be that cash is attractive or that beneficiaries are ‘double-dipping’. Population movement related to in-kind support has also been observed. Whether or not cash is more of a pull factor than in-kind support is unclear.
• WFPs geographic access has increased but some areas remain inaccessible. Compared to other issues in the response, WFP currently considers concerns about pull factors as a relatively minor issue.
• OCHA is advocating that responding agencies should move out of hubs and get closer to different communities in order to mitigate the risk of pull factors.
• In very remote areas cash may not the best modality, as limited goods are available to buy. Robust and up-to-date market assessments are needed to establish where the use of cash is appropriate.
• WFP is working with about 800 retailers across Somalia. The use of SCOPE is no longer limited to areas where cards are issued - this allows beneficiaries move without the risk of losing support. The expansion of the retailer network may have help reduce pull factors and may make it easier for IDPs to return.
6 Progress since May 2017

The reflections below combine thoughts from both group and plenary discussions.

6.1 Accountability to affected populations

- Feedback systems have been strengthened and the number of systems has increased. Feedback systems include third party monitoring, call centres, the use of radio phone-ins and face to face feedback.
- A common system could help increase reach, reduce confusion and be easier to promote. In addition, data would be more comparable and trends easier to identify.
- It is unclear if the increase in the amount of beneficiary feedback is being used to drive action.
- As feedback varies depending on the mechanism used for gathering information (e.g. phone or face-to-face), there is need to explore how households are best reached.
- When calls are made, beneficiaries often say they don’t have enough money and then expect to receive more.
- The different post distribution monitoring systems are not fully understood and not always trusted by agencies.

Opportunities for collective action

- Share experiences of the different feedback systems and increase understanding the data being generated.
- Link feedback from cash beneficiaries into the new common feedback mechanism which will be launched by OCHA in October (for the whole of the response).
- Collectively discuss and use information from feedback mechanisms.
- Build organisational capacity to utilize feedback information collected.

6.2 Adjusting plans

- Fast support by donors enabled rapid scale-up.
- Pressure from donors, local governments and communities to ‘get money out of the door fast’ may have compromised targeting – as it reduced the time available to identify and register new households.
- As new funding became available, new areas have been reached.
- The geographic flexibility of some donors made some re-targeting possible.
- It is perceived that some agencies have remained in ‘comfort areas’ when the response scaled-up and some have maintained beneficiary lists which were generated in early 2017.
- Some organisations have adjusted their response plans. For example:
  - Food for Peace (FFP) support was originally 80% conditional versus 20% unconditional cash. This pattern changed as the crisis worsened.
  - FAO did not do any unconditional support initially but started to do so.
  - Some agencies have shifted from conditional to unconditional transfers based on vulnerability.
- As there is not a strong baseline it is difficult to say where/what impact has been achieved.
- Many agencies find it is difficult and time consuming to change response plans.
- Barriers to change include:
  - High costs for the first movers.
  - New security and corruption risks.
6.3 Coordination – local and national, operational and strategic

- Good progress has been made in several areas including:
  - The national CWG has been active. Progress has been made on specific issues including setting transfer values; markets information; engagement with mobile money providers and so on.
  - Linkages between the DOCC and the CWG have increased, but need to improve further.
  - The establishment of the regional focal points has been beneficial but the level of engagement remains mixed.
  - Engagement with local administration has improved.
  - Integrating cash into the 3Ws has been a big step forward. Showcasing the work of clusters in cash related information products has been helpful.
- At the same time, there are examples of where coordination is not working:
  - There are gaps between national and international actors, in some areas they are not speaking to each other.
  - The participation of national actors in cash coordination is limited. The CWG does not regularly engage with nationally-led coordination groups.
  - Subnational coordination is mixed - there is a need to further strengthen field level coordination.
  - Government is participating in coordination discussions at higher levels but this is not felt at all levels.
  - Some donors are duplicating actions in the same location.
  - Coordination needs to move from information-sharing to joint action, especially at local level.
  - Cluster engagement has improved, not all clusters are engaged nor on a consistent basis.
  - Use of 3W information could be improved.
  - There is no way of completely avoiding duplication at present.
  - Despite efforts, transfer values and ways of working have not been harmonised.
- There were mixed views about the role of donors, for example:
  - Dialogue with donors has improved and there is now a better joint understanding of expectations.
  - Donors have pushed coordination and there are examples where this has had a positive impact.
  - Operational coordination has improved, but coordination among donors is lacking and this has affected overall coordination efforts e.g. discussions about the MEB and transfer values.
  - There has been a strong emphasis on cost effectiveness, but less focus on other issues.

Opportunities for collective action

- Improve coordination at all levels by:
  - Moving from information sharing to more action-orientated coordination.
  - Working together to undertake joint/coordinated assessments.
  - Taking steps to reduce duplication in targeting.
- The CWG should continue to highlight the value of cluster engagement and avoid the work being too food security focused.
- The Inter Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) should increase efforts to include non-food security cash in reporting and discussions, including creating space for multipurpose cash and better capturing the impact of cash assistance in meeting needs across sectors.
- The Resilience Working Group, Humanitarian Coordination Centre, and National Humanitarian Forum are new and evolving structures. Stronger links with cash programming and cash coordination should be promoted.
- The CWG should build on what has already been done and create linkages with systems building and social protection issues.
- Increase use of the work which has been developed by the CWG e.g. markets dashboard, risk, M&E.
• Explore joint or interoperable registration and beneficiary management systems.
• Encourage a more harmonised approach between donors e.g. related to transfer values.
• Donors and implementers should agree an approach to changing funding levels.
• Explore opportunities for collective advocacy.
• Use lessons learned to date to inform the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
• Explore opportunities for collective cash delivery and harmonised processes, start by anchoring work already done on MEBs and by the work-streams. Get ahead of the discussion on single providers i.e. get ready for the ‘Lebanon discussion’.

6.4 **Data analysis and use**

• There has been improvement in the analysis and use of data:
  o 3W data has been received from agencies more consistently.
  o Information products have been regularly generated and shared.
• Barriers to progress include:
  o Short-term projects have been detrimental to the collection of accurate data.
  o Challenges related to reporting multi-purpose cash, with some inconsistent categorisation.
  o Sharing of detailed data is limited and considered difficult.
  o The 3W explains events that have taken place; more forward-focused data is needed to assist planning. Since consortia are doing joint planning, it suggests that data sharing issues may be surmountable.

**Opportunities for collective action**
• Change attitudes to sharing information and data.
• Explore a “forward looking” 3W that maps planned and funded interventions to identify overlap and emerging gaps.

6.5 **Gender analysis and planning**

• Some agencies have undertaken training on gender and GBV issues.
• Women may be less susceptible than men to clan dynamics in terms of manipulating targeting and registration.
• The SCOPE card may help women and marginalized groups retain control, as they have to be present to redeem cash or other support.
• Many agencies are targeting women but clear evidence of differential impacts on men and women has not been shared.

**Opportunities for collective action**
• Explore how to better support women, including opportunities to enhance entrepreneurship capacities.
• Explore concerns about whether specific needs are being met through multipurpose cash e.g. nutrition and WASH.

6.6 **Guidance and standards**

• Progress has been made in a number of areas including:
  o MEB guidance completed and further updated during the response. There is a now a rational way for reaching a transfer value.
  o Markets Dashboard developed and produced monthly, providing an overall analysis of market performance.
  o Work on risk and M&E (see related sections for more information).
- Barriers to progress include:
  - Limited engagement by some of the CWG.
  - Lack of clarity regarding how much people are using the data to inform planning and decision making.

**Opportunities for collective action**
- Strengthen the use of the CWGs products so they become part of the cash infrastructure moving forward.
- Agree how to use common frameworks e.g. risk and M&E.

### 6.7 Looking ahead — after this response

- The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs is working with UNICEF to develop a social protection strategy. This process will help sketch the social protection system envisaged by government and provide guidance on how the transition from emergency response to long-term programming may transpire.
- Donors want to move towards more harmonized systems for the delivery of cash assistance in Somalia. This may include separating targeting and monitoring functions from cash delivery.

**Opportunities for collective action**
- Discuss and take action to harmonize systems to avoid a “Lebanon-like” situation where changes are imposed.
- Plan for recovery, while exploring links to social protection and inputting to national strategy development.
- Explore how cash should be used in recovery, including possibility of cash for work.
- Document and use lessons.
- Consider opportunities to link cash assistance to longer-term financial inclusion, including encouraging savings as part of CTP.

### 6.8 Monitoring and evaluation

- The availability of the OCHA 3W mapping has helped increase understanding of what is being done where.
- An M&E work group has met several times since May 2017 but progress has been slow as it has been difficult to consolidate thinking and develop one framework.
- Common evaluation questions have been prepared to encourage and support joint evaluations.
- Barriers to progress include:
  - A fear among agencies of being ‘stuck’ with standards they cannot use.
  - Difficulties in getting timely feedback from CWG members.
  - Difficulties in getting clusters on board.

**Opportunities for collective action**
- Develop a common understanding of what post distribution monitoring findings mean.
- Support common M&E e.g. joint assessments and evaluations.
- Strengthen M&E by addressing barriers to collective action and improving information-sharing.
- Undertake collective impact evaluation of cash in the drought response.
- Undertake an assessment to understand the multi-sectoral impact of cash e.g. has cash delivered by the food security cluster improved WASH outcomes?
6.9 **Private sector engagement**

- Mobile money operators could play a wider role in supporting communities and sharing data on beneficiaries’ use of cash.

**Opportunities for collective action**

- Increase understanding of the role of the private sector and explore ways of improving cooperation.
- Engage with mobile money operators to explore opportunities for collective bargaining.
- Continue the work of the mobile sub group.

6.10 **Risk management**

- There have been more conversations about risk with donors.
- The risk work group has prompted discussion about risk in the CWG and awareness of risks has increased since May.

**Opportunities for collective action**

- Continue to share examples of CTP risks and how agencies mitigate them.
- Continue to promote improved risk management through collective analysis.

6.11 **Targeting and marginalised groups**

- There has been progress in some areas but not others:
  - Geographic targeting has improved since May 2017.
  - More efforts have been made (cash and in-kind) to reach satellite towns and create conditions for return.
  - Efforts have been made reach less-served areas but it remains challenging.
  - Technology, such as mobile money and SCOPE, is helping reaching the most vulnerable.

- Approaches to targeting include:
  - IPC provides an overall assessment which helps to broadly direct the response. It is supplemented with other approaches that support targeting at community and household level.
  - Targeting is a process not an event, with M&E continually used to inform targeting.
  - Hotspots are monitored and information used to review targeting.
  - The effectiveness of community targeting was hotly debated. It was suggested that:
    - Marginalized individuals are often invisible during community visits.
    - Most vulnerable groups are excluded from community-based targeting.
    - Vulnerable people could be approached and asked to identify others facing similar conditions. This cascade approach could improve targeting and allow better understanding of vulnerability.
    - Clear and widely understood criteria, shared with the community, can assist with targeting.
  - When using community targeting approaches there is need to recognize that:
    - There is a need to invest in understanding the political economy of communities in which we operate.
    - Village leadership plays a role even if they are not officially involved in the Village Relief Committee.
    - The meeting convener has power in controlling who has a say.
    - Corruption can be reduced by:
      i. Chipping away at the ‘knowledge monopoly’ and understanding the social dynamics in a given location.
      ii. Agreeing clear criteria to help limit the discretionary power of the gatekeeper.
      iii. Developing protocols and recommendations.
Challenges to reaching the most marginalised include:

- The speed of the response may have compromised targeting.
- Given the scale of need, the idea of marginalization is difficult to define.
- As the response progresses, some who were marginalised before are no longer. New elites are emerging, making the assessment of marginalisation all the more complex.
- There is no common understanding of what is meant by marginalised and excluded groups in this crisis. What do we really know and how much are we assuming based on previous experience?
- It is assumed that by reaching more people in more places the response has been successful but this does not necessarily mean we are reaching the most vulnerable.
- There are no common targeting criteria. Work is underway by the food security cluster to provide updated guidance on targeting. Somalia’s ‘sharing culture’ impacts targeting and some people feel that humanitarian standards should be interpreted in light of local cultures and social behaviours.
- Some donors require verification criteria at household level using measures such as food consumption scores and coping mechanism. But these are difficult to verify.

Some donors require verification criteria at household level using measures such as food consumption scores and coping mechanism. But these are difficult to verify.

- Whether cash could have been used differently to reach the marginalised groups has not been well explored.

Opportunities for collective action to improve

- Work towards improved registration and interoperable/common databases. This will help reduce the risk of duplication and allow better tracking and targeting of vulnerable groups.
- Work towards agreeing a joint definition of marginalised communities through the ICCG.

7 Next steps

The following actions were identified as priorities for collective action. The points are not listed priority order and need further discussion/prioritization by the CWG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>To be taken forward by</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New actions:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1) Utilize the work done on coordination to plan and improve next year.</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>2) Undertake collective impact evaluation.</td>
<td>CWG M&amp;E sub group</td>
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<td>3) Push for improved coordination among donors.</td>
<td>Donors</td>
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<td>4) Collectively discuss the changing funding landscape and agree how to proceed re transfer values. Ensure this is linked with strategic discussions at the HCT level.</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>5) Use lessons from the CWG to feed into 2018 HRP planning.</td>
<td>CWG and OCHA</td>
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<td>6) Work on common cash delivery approaches e.g. building common understanding and approach, build on and utilise joint work done on joint risk analysis and M&amp;E</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>7) Collectively discuss the idea of a single registry between implementing agencies (prepare for discussions along the lines of Lebanon).</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>8) Analyse the role of the private sector and opportunities for collective bargaining.</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>9) Consider how to link CTP to social protection and state building discussions.</td>
<td>CWG</td>
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<td>Continue or enhance on-going work to:</td>
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<td>10) Further strengthen coordination at local level.</td>
<td>OCHA and agencies</td>
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<td>11) Engage in collective discussion with mobile operators to seek better transfer rates and a more harmonized approach to interfacing with the operators.</td>
<td>CWG mobile work group</td>
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<td>12) Continue to share lessons learnt.</td>
<td>CWG and CaLP</td>
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<td>13) Strengthen collective risk management.</td>
<td>CWG risk sub group</td>
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# Annex 1: Participants

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Baptiste Heral</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
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<td>Joy Maangi</td>
<td>CARE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sahara Dahir</td>
<td>CARE Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Woelkers</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juergen Feldmann</td>
<td>Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH)</td>
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<td>Suleiman Ahmed</td>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>Judith Munyao</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
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<td>Quentin Le Gallo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordi Casafont Torra</td>
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<td>Lokuju Peter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marcel VAESSEN</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max Schott</td>
<td>OCHA-Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ayo Ajayi</td>
<td>OCHA-Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lewis Karienyeh</td>
<td>Save the Children International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Maumo</td>
<td>STREAM Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Shumila</td>
<td>Tearfund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lilian M Mutiso</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Acaye</td>
<td>UNICEF - Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiza Hassan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicoletta Buono</td>
<td>VSF Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rispa Were</td>
<td>WASH Cluster / Norwegian Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphine Dechaux</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Odongo</td>
<td>WFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nynne Warring</td>
<td>WFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nimo Amin</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isabella Hayward</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tendai Chigavazira</td>
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<td>Simon Makono</td>
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<td>Philip Ndekei</td>
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<td>Mackey Kevin</td>
<td>FSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Ngari</td>
<td>DFAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Kamau</td>
<td>SQuid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph K. Chege</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Teti</td>
<td>Givedirectly</td>
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</table>
Those who registered but were unable to attend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winfred Mbusya</td>
<td>ACTED - Stream Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deqa Saleh</td>
<td>Adeso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filson Mire</td>
<td>African Disability Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partha Moman</td>
<td>Africa’s Voices Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Hailey</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Thomas</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachid Moujaes</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Usman</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiarnach Mooney</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Laichenia</td>
<td>GiveDirectly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Kenny</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Mohamed</td>
<td>International Relief Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Grazda</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leila Kibet</td>
<td>Kenya Red Cross Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnabas Asora</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose Foran</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigel Tricks</td>
<td>OXFAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Slowey</td>
<td>REACH Initiative/ IMPACT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wycliffe Ngwabe</td>
<td>UNCDF</td>
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<td>Geraud DEVRED</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liljana Jocceva</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chana Opaskornkul</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cash response in Somalia
March – July 2017

What does the data show us?

14 September 2017

Note on origins and methodology

- All data collected through standard 3W template. Cash-specific fields added:
- Outreach efforts but... are we reaching everyone?
- Supported/verified by local cash focal points
- Partners have struggled with format and categorization.
- Not all clusters have adopted this format – significant follow up needed
- No "home" for multipurpose cash, and categorization of unrestricted cash fairly random
- Data only goes so far – frustrating lack of data at the granular level. Who are we missing? Who are we reaching more than once? Common interoperable beneficiary databases should be explored more seriously
By cluster/objective

Cash assistance by cluster over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>76%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multipurpose</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transfer values in most cases exceed the recommended values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual average</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>% recommended</th>
<th>Actual average</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>% recommended</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awdal</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>128%</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banadir</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>143%</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>110%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>110%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>72%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>120%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Niran</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>113%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Juba</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>93%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Shabelle</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle Juba</td>
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<td>107%</td>
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<td>Middle Shabelle</td>
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<td>115%</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mudug</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nugal</td>
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<td>141</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanaag</td>
<td>117</td>
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<td>Togdheer</td>
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<td>115%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woqooyi Galbeed</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>143%</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: the analysis below uses the pre-adjustment MEB costs from June and the old transfer value guidance (current when June interventions were planned) of 80% food basket for FS and 80% MEB for multipurpose.
NB HCT recommendation that response prioritizes Galmudug and urban IDP populations for the next 6 months of the response. Are we flexing the response as needs change?
Summary of the interventions

- 6 main Offices and 18 sub-offices.
- Over 300 Staff
- DRC target 49400HHs (296400 Ben) via Cash/Voucher/SCOPE (Smart card).
- Target area is SC/PL/SL
Key DRC approach

- **Village committees**: The use of local institutions especially the Village Relief Committees (VRC) for registration.

- DRC Ensured 85% of the Head of HHs are Vulnerable women & Marginalized-Registration records

- SCOPE registrations(Bio-metric)-WFP
Key DRC approach

- The FSL Team works closely with DRC protection/WFP Gender team –DRC/WFP.
- Through the cash injection other negative coping mechanism by women and girls.FFP Evaluations
- Through water trucking access to water by the women in IDPs has been increased.

Key DRC approach

- DRC Feedback Mechanism:
  Incorporation of a complaint and feedback mechanism from the beneficiaries-PDM

- DRC is working with Women capacity built through SME in the stocks supply for Voucher projects. But they have long way to go.-Tracer study-DANIDA

- DRC engaged the gatekeeper and slowly reduced their influence in decision making-LA/Elders.
WFP Somalia drought response 2017
Reaching food insecure populations through Cash Based Transfers and SCOPE

Focusing on the most vulnerable

• Geographical targeting
  o Focus on IPC 4 and 3
  o Feedback from WFP field staff in 5 Area Offices as well as partners
  o Hotspots monitoring (30 hotspots called each month) to gather information on food security and general situation in the area
  
  allows for dynamic info flow and regular addition new caseloads.

• Household targeting
  o Community targeting using criteria such as newly arrived IDPs, women headed HH with no income, chronically ill, etc.
  o Feedback from the call center on targeting

• Strengthening of FSC and focus on targeting criteria and processes
SCOPE as key tool for proper targeting, distribution and tracking

- Use of biometric recognition
- Collection and registration of HH and vulnerability characteristics
- Importance of preparedness – over 1.2 million registered in SCOPE before drought response started

Rapid scale of cash response

Number of beneficiaries reached with CBT by WFP under the drought response in 2017

- Graph showing the increase in the number of beneficiaries reached from January to September 2017.
Way forward

- Cash shortfalls for WFP intervention from October onwards – discussion for all actors on how to prioritize