The online version of this study
If you are reading the online version of this study, clicking on any of the blue links will take you to a web page. The text in the table of contents, above, is linked to its respective page. At any point in the document, please click on the ‘C’ in the top left hand corner and this will take you straight back to the contents page.
CASH COORDINATION IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE RESPONSE TO SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN

GABRIELLE SMITH

March 2015

About the author
Gabrielle Smith is a cash transfer specialist with over ten years experience in social and economic development and humanitarian programming. She was formerly technical adviser for cash transfers and safety nets at Concern Worldwide.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Trends in cash transfer programming and implications for the</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordination of aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 The humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 METHODOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 STUDY APPROACH</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF CASH TRANSFERS</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 THE ROLE AND ADDED VALUE OF A DEDICATED OCHA CASH COORDINATOR</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Background</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Experiences of cash coordination through the OCHA Cash Coordinator</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 ROLE AND ADDED VALUE OF THE CASH WORKING GROUP</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Background</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Experiences of the Cash Working Group</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 CASH PROGRAMMING AND THE CLUSTER SYSTEM</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Background</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Experiences of cash coordination in the cluster system</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 LESSONS EMERGING FROM CASH COORDINATION DURING HAIYAN</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 Added value of the Cash Coordinator and Cash Working Group</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 The need for resources</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3 Clarity on roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4 The importance of preparedness</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.5 Linking with actors outside the traditional humanitarian sphere</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.6 The potential of and barriers to MPCG and implications for the cluster system</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 COORDINATING EMERGENCY RESPONSE WITH THE 4PS PROGRAMME</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING AND COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR

### 5.1 PARTNERSHIPS WITH FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
- **5.1.1 The services for cash transfer available in the Philippines**
- **5.1.2 Experiences of partnering with financial service providers in the Haiyan response**
- **5.1.3 Lessons learned for coordination in future emergencies**

### 5.2 THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S ROLE IN RESPONSE AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
- **5.2.1 Private sector experiences with humanitarian coordination after Haiyan**
- **5.2.2 Potential added value of coordinating humanitarian and private sector responses**
- **5.2.3 Implications**

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD WITH CASH COORDINATION

### 6.1 IMPROVING CASH COORDINATION IN THE PHILIPPINES DISASTER RESPONSE
- **6.1.1 Emergency Preparedness**
- **6.1.2 Response and Early Recovery Phase**

### 6.2 IMPROVING CASH COORDINATION GLOBALLY
- **6.2.1 Building OCHA’s cash coordination role in contexts where OCHA leads coordination**
- **6.2.2 Develop mechanisms for inclusion of the private sector in cash coordination**
- **6.2.3 Actions to move towards greater use of Multi Purpose Cash Grants**

## ANNEXES
- **ANNEX A: REFERENCES**
- **ANNEX B: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS**
- **ANNEX C: MAP OF CTP AND MARKET ASSESSMENTS**
- **ANNEX D: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CASH COORDINATOR**
- **ANNEX E: GUIDANCE ON CASH FOR WORK STANDARDS INTER-CLUSTER COORDINATION OPERATIONAL GROUP ON CASH**
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to present this review of the lessons learned on cash coordination during the response to Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. This work is the product of the efforts and contributions of a great number of people and organisations.

OCHA’s country office in Manila, particularly Agnes Palacio and Mayen Olmedo provided logistical support to the country visit, contacts with the government of the Philippines and helpful feedback on the draft report. Thanks go to the interim Cash Coordinator Edwina Thompson and the OCHA Cash Coordinator Fe Kagahastian as well as to the Steering Committee members, Rebecca Vo (CaLP) Nadia Zuodar (CaLP) and Kerren Hedlund (UNHCR) for their help and guidance throughout the study.

The author is indebted to the many key informants in the Philippines and globally including contributions from UNICEF, OCHA, ILO, WFP, UNHCR, CaLP, ECHO, DFID, USAID, Save the Children, CRS, Oxfam, ADRA, Mercy Corps, IRC, Philippines Red Cross, IFRC, CARE, ACF, Plan International, Tzu Chi Foundation, LBC Remittance, ML Huillier Remittance, BPI Bank, Card Bank, BangKO, Philpost, Philippines Business for Social Progress, Visa, Philippines Disaster Recovery Foundation, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Philippines Chamber of Commerce, and several freelance consultants. Full details of participants can be found in Annex B.

This is an independent report and does not necessarily reflect the views of CaLP and UNHCR. Any errors are on the part of the author.

This research was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the generous support of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA).

Disclaimer: This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union and the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. The views expressed herein should not be taken, in any way, to reflect the official opinion of either parties, neither of which are responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
# ACRONYMS

| ACF | Action Contre le Faim |
| ADRA | Adventist Development and Relief Agency |
| BSP | Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas |
| CaLP | Cash Learning Partnership |
| CBI | Cash Based Interventions |
| CBO | Capacity Building Organisation |
| CCT | Conditional Cash Transfer |
| CoC | Chamber of Commerce |
| CRS | Catholic Relief Services |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CTP | Cash Transfer Programming |
| CWG | Cash Working Group |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DOLE | Department of Labour and Employment |
| DSWD | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| DTI | Department of Trade and Industry |
| ECHO | European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department |
| EFSL | Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods |
| ERC | Enhanced Response Capacity |
| ERL | Early Recovery and Livelihoods |
| FSAC | Food Security and Agriculture Cluster |
| FSP | Financial Service Provider |
| GSMA | GSM Association |
| HC | Humanitarian Coordinator |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| ICC | Inter Cluster Coordinator |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| KYC | Know Your Customer |
| LGU | Local Government Unit |
| MFI | Micro Finance Institution |
| MIC | Middle Income Country |
| MOU | Memorandum of understanding |
| MPCG | Multi-Purpose Cash Grant |
| NAC | National Advisory Committee |
| NDRRMC | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organizations |
| OCD | Office of Civil Defense |
| OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| PBSP | Philippines Business for Social Progress |
| PDRF | Philippines Disaster Recovery Foundation |
| PPPP (4Ps) | Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme |
| SCI | Save the Children International |
| SCUK | Save the Children UK |
| SIMM | Scaling Innovations in Mobile Money |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UCT | Unconditional Cash Transfer |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United National Children's Fund |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WVI | World Vision International |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

In the last five years there has been a growing trend towards the use of cash transfer programming (CTP) as a response modality in emergencies across the humanitarian sector. The fungibility of cash, when provided without restrictions, offers increased choice for affected populations to meet cross-sectoral needs according to their priorities. There is consequently a growing interest in the mainstreaming of CTP in response, recovery and rehabilitation and in the potential of so called Multi-Purpose Cash Grants (MPCG) within some international NGOs (INGOs) and donors (notably DFID and ECHO). The effective and appropriate use of CTP requires strong intra and inter-agency coordination and communication between various actors across sectoral divisions, which poses particular challenges as well as opportunities for aid coordination efforts.

On 8th November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, the most powerful storm to make landfall ever recorded, caused flooding, landslides, and widespread damage across nine provinces of the Philippines. The Government of the Philippines estimates that 16 million people were affected, 4.1 million people were displaced and 6,300 people lost their lives. The cash transfer components of the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan comprised some 40% of the entire relief response and totaled approximately USD $845 million. At least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented cash transfers. Other actors both linked to and outside of the humanitarian coordination system including government agencies, private companies, civil society organizations and individuals, including the Filipino diaspora, also distributed cash to affected communities.

In recent years, humanitarian actors have formed an ad hoc Cash Working Group (CWG) to help coordinate their activities in response to several natural disasters. In the first week after Typhoon Haiyan hit, the Cash Learning Partnership’s (CaLP’s) Asia Regional Focal Point arrived in Manila to re-activate and support the CWG. Additionally, for the first time UN OCHA deployed a position dedicated to cash coordination, funded by DFID and hosted by UN OCHA. The role sat within the Inter Cluster Coordinator’s (ICC) office, reporting to the OCHA Head of Office. The remit was to provide oversight, coordination support and technical and strategic inputs to different actors responding through CTP.

CaLP and UNHCR commissioned this review in order to document lessons learnt on the effectiveness of cash coordination during the initial three to four months of the response to Typhoon Haiyan, and to provide recommendations on inter-agency and cross-sectoral coordination. The objectives of this study are to:

1. Identify cash coordination mechanisms and tools in the Typhoon Haiyan response that effectively facilitated and streamlined decision-making and implementation across agencies.
2. Define what coordination elements contributed to or didn’t contribute to the use of multi-purpose cash grants.
3. Build evidence on optimal coordination models that can create an enabling environment for CTP – and especially multi-purpose cash grants – where appropriate in future humanitarian interventions.

A total of 58 respondents from 34 organisations participated in the study.

FINDINGS: INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Section Three of this report details the experiences of three inter-agency coordination mechanisms for CTP within the humanitarian coordination system during the response to Typhoon Haiyan. This includes the dedicated OCHA Cash Coordinator, the Cash Working Group and cash coordination within and between the clusters. It discusses what worked well with these mechanisms, the constraints limiting their potential added value and generates a number of lessons for future cash coordination in the Philippines.
### Added value of a dedicated Cash Coordinator to CTP

- Full time focal point to raise CTP as a strategic issue in the Inter Cluster Coordinator (ICC) group meetings.
- Coordination with the government and involvement of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) led to discussions and actions for linking emergency response to the longer term social protection programmes.
- Linked the humanitarian sector to financial service providers for the delivery of cash.
- Connected the UN to the private sector, raising awareness amongst the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) of the power of the private sector to support market recovery.
- Supported the discussion, finalisation and dissemination of government regulations, standards and guidelines across the sector, including transfer values and standards for cash for work.
- Support for operational coordination (later in the recovery/rehabilitation stages) including setting up of regional CWGs.
- Linking together forums for coordination on CTP including channelling information between clusters and the CWG.
- Generating broader awareness amongst agencies of the need to coordinate.
- Positioning within OCHA meant the cash coordinator had an impartial position able to set strategic and operational directions and neutralize conflict of interest and mistrust usually borne out of institutional rivalry.

### Factors limiting potential added value of the role

- Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities between CaLP and OCHA created confusion.
- This was a new post meaning there were some challenges with buy in within OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team.
- Difficulties in the present OCHA reporting structure to accurately manage useful CTP information.
- Whilst coordination and consensus building skills are important, given the emerging and evolving nature of CTP, agencies considered there is also a need for (additional) technical expertise to be built into or complement cash coordination.
- This was too broad a role for one person therefore focusing on strategic elements was at the expense of operational coordination support in the early months.
- There was no dedicated coordination position in the response hubs.
- Confusion in lines of communication, staff rotation and lack of preparedness meant some ideas with real potential for improving strategic and operational coordination could not be realised in practice.

### What worked well about the Cash Working Group

- 3W helped to avoid duplication.
- Circulating the standards for cash-for-work for harmonisation of approaches.
- Some harmonisation of other grant sizes in neighbouring barangays\(^1\) through engagement of local government.
- Circulating information on market assessments.
- Sharing experiences on delivery mechanisms and challenges of implementation.
- Introductions to service providers which opened eyes to the possibility of e-transfers.
- Having clear group leadership and secretariat support.

### Challenges identified with the CWG

- Still some duplication as not all organisations attending regularly.
- Limited harmonisation of operational approaches between agencies (monitoring; targeting; market assessments, approaches to service providers), which require time to develop.
- Some disconnect/miscommunication between national and sub-national CWGs.
- Staff turnover and lack of agency focal points limited decision making and progress on actions as a group and connection with the cluster system. This also led to delays in setting up regional CWGs and lack of dedicated resources at hub level limited the CWGs utility and longevity.
- Lack of common voice for influencing.

### What worked well about cash coordination in the clusters

- Standardising approaches to CTP design and transfer values within sectoral areas.
- Sharing information and tools.
- Identifying gaps and duplications.

### What were the challenges

- Challenges of reporting CTP, especially when designed to meet multiple needs and/or without enforceable conditions.
- Lack of accountability of Cluster leads to ensure appropriate or joint response analysis within and between clusters.
- Inherent barriers of the system to use of cash as a cross-sectoral tool.

---

\(^1\) Barangays are the smallest administration divisions in the Philippines.
Key Takeaways of the review

1. The Cash Coordinator position and Cash Working Group forum both demonstrated added value that contributed to greater streamlining of decision-making and implementation of CTP across agencies. Several factors during the Haiyan response limited the full potential of these coordination mechanisms including lack of resources, preparedness, attitudes, exclusion of ‘non-traditional actors,’ and lack of clarity on the structure and functions of these mechanisms.

2. Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT) made up a significant portion of the cash based response to Typhoon Haiyan. In most cases these interventions and the cash values provided were still aiming to achieve sector-specific objectives and were not designed to cover all of an affected household’s needs. There remain a number of barriers to overcome for agencies to move towards the use of more flexible cash grants. Some barriers are internal, including structures and mind sets. The sectoral structure and other limitations of the cluster coordination system created barriers to the analysis, design and monitoring of integrated programmes and flexible cash grants. A CWG has the potential to bridge some of these barriers.

3. Better cash coordination in future humanitarian interventions allowing cash to bridge sector divides requires investments throughout the disaster management cycle. A focus should be on disaster preparedness, development of capacities and tools, coordination with non-traditional actors and a change of mindset.

FINDINGS: LINKING WITH THE NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMME

Section Four summarises the positive experiences and challenges faced by WFP, UNICEF and DSWD in linking emergency CTP to the national social protection programme (Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program or 4Ps) for the first time.

Factors enabling coordination of humanitarian aid through the 4Ps programme
- UN agencies had a longstanding relationship with DSWD and previous due diligence to draw upon.
- Using the lists of existing beneficiaries meant that a significant portion of disaster-affected households could be identified and verified quickly.
- Using an existing distribution system that reached rural areas prevented the need to set up a parallel delivery system in the affected areas which would have been time consuming and costly.
- Beneficiaries were familiar with the system and did not require training.
- The 4Ps’ platform of parent’s associations proved a useful conduit through which to locate and inform beneficiaries.

Challenges faced by aid agencies and government
- Coordination with other actors delivering cash in the affected areas.
- Some difficulties for the FSPs to manage the additional monthly payment (liquidity; branch capacity).
- WFP requested hard copy receipts for reconciliation.
- The 4Ps programme was not designed to serve both developmental and humanitarian objectives. This meant that the support was limited to 4Ps participants only, which are not the only chronically vulnerable families, and therefore excluded the new ‘transient poor’ created by the disaster.

Key Takeaways of the review

1. The delivery of emergency aid (as cash transfers) to disaster affected households who were beneficiaries of the national social protection programme (4P), as a cash top up to their usual social protection benefit and delivered through the usual 4P payment mechanism, was the first time such an approach had been adopted in a rapid onset emergency. The mechanism was coordinated through UN agencies that had established partnerships with the government, which facilitated decision making. Using the 4P programme’s existing targeting system (i.e. existing social protection programme beneficiaries) enabled WFP to identify a large number of disaster-affected households very rapidly. Meeting the needs of those who were 4Ps beneficiaries through this mechanism also supported coordination of WFP’s cash interventions through implementing partners – who focused their response on those households who were affected by the disaster but who were not 4P beneficiaries. The relationship between WFP and DSWD was essentially bi-lateral and therefore transfer values were not informed by joint needs analysis across sectors.
2. The 4Ps programme provides cash grants to households (rather than restricted vouchers). The coordination of WFP’s emergency programme team with this programme therefore contributed to the provision of WFP’s food assistance as unconditional cash transfers. The relaxing of the usual 4Ps programme conditions by DSWD also ensured that the funds provided were fully fungible. Two factors limiting the use of the mechanism for providing multi-purpose cash grants as part of the response to Typhoon Haiyan were the non-participation of other cluster leads/organisations and WFP’s decision to set the transfer value based on the value of the food basket only. In future, however, this mechanism could accommodate more cross-sectoral approaches.

3. Whilst it will be important to reflect on the evidence generated through WFP’s independent evaluation\(^2\), evidence collated from this review suggests that the ‘piggy backing’ of emergency aid onto the national social protection programme has the potential to provide financial assistance to a large cohort of the disaster-affected efficiently and effectively. The expansion of the coordination mechanism to include other actors – whether donors or other cluster leads – should be investigated. Future use of this coordination mechanism should include the establishment of pre-identified trigger mechanisms and linkages to the national disaster early warning systems.

\(^2\) This is expected to be published in May or June 2015 (WFP pers. Comm.)
FINDINGS: PRIVATE SECTOR COORDINATION

Aid agencies coordinated with financial service providers (FSPs) for the delivery of cash transfers to affected populations. In the MIC context of the Philippines, where a vibrant private sector exists that is well versed in disaster response and business continuity, there are further questions on the potential benefit of coordination with the private sector for humanitarian response and CTP, in the area of supply chain recovery and market assessments. Section five explores the coordination between the humanitarian sector and the private sector during the Typhoon Haiyan response and presents a number of lessons to inform future coordination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What worked well about aid agency engagement with FSPs</th>
<th>Challenges experienced by FSPs and aid agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation and contracting</strong></td>
<td>• Humanitarian organisations did not completely understand the need for, or the process for complying with KYC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contracting was relatively smooth, especially for remittance agencies – average of 3 weeks.</td>
<td>• Contracting was stringent for formal banking which led to delays in establishing partnerships for e-transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pre-existing relationships greatly simplified and speeded up the process.</td>
<td>• Each agency approached FSPs separately, for very similar information and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information sharing</strong></td>
<td>• The initial ACF assessment of FSPs was not updated during the response and early recovery stage so information on service recovery was not centrally available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The initial assessment circulated by ACF was appreciated.</td>
<td>• Some FSPs felt that their inclusion in the CWG came too late to influence agencies' choice of provider for the response phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sharing of agencies' experiences with service providers influenced decisions of other agencies later in the recovery phase.</td>
<td>• The interim Cash Coordinator had requested FSPs to submit proposals to her and the CWG. FSPs reported that they then received no further feedback on these.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FSPs' attendance to the CWG meetings was useful to give agencies an overview of the options available and provided FSPs with information on the scale of the need and agencies' requirements.</td>
<td>• The lessons learned sessions with FSPs were also appreciated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The lessons learned sessions with FSPs were appreciated.</td>
<td>• FSPs experienced some difficulties in ensuring liquidity in the earliest weeks, and some FSPs had difficulty with electricity supply. Some affected areas were a long distance from cash out points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
<td>• There was no standard way of working across agencies (e.g. different requirements for beneficiary identification).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Registration and delivery was relatively smooth.</td>
<td>• Delivery plans were not harmonised between agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• KYC challenges were overcome for over-the-counter services.</td>
<td>• Agencies faced barriers to using e-transfers consistently despite the high development of this sector (contractual delays; KYC barriers; lack of prior experience of agencies and beneficiaries; concerns about infrastructure recovery; service coverage in rural locations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Central Bank relaxed KYC requirements for Typhoon affected households, enabling the use of alternate IDs such as Barangay certificates and NGO provided IDs.</td>
<td>• The use of e-transfers (mobile money) during the recovery phase allowed for flexibility in setting the transfer value, provided automatic reconciliation and offered potential added value in terms of financial inclusion and resilience building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The use of e-transfers (mobile money) during the recovery phase allowed for flexibility in setting the transfer value, provided automatic reconciliation and offered potential added value in terms of financial inclusion and resilience building.</td>
<td>• FSPs reported that they then received no further feedback on these.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Takeaways of this review

1. The Cash Coordination role, and the CWG forged links between implementing agencies and some private sector actors – namely the financial service providers – within the response period. This contributed to improved coordination of cash delivery through raising awareness of available services and of the humanitarian communities’ requirements. More active coordination at earlier stages, ideally as part of the preparedness phase, would improve the use of CTP in rapid response and certainly encourage a widespread adoption of e-transfers.

2. Communication between OCHA's private sector adviser, cash coordinator and business networks highlighted the extent of the engagement of the private sector in emergency response and recovery. Although this was not the case during the response to Typhoon Haiyan, improving coordination with the private sector could be of great added value to aid agencies’ decision-making on CTP. In areas such as market assessment and recovery, this could be particularly appropriate to identify whether the market can respond to the demand and certainly for any move towards more flexible use of cash grants.

3. Partnerships with the private sector for aid coordination are emerging – in the Philippines and globally. There are no ‘optimal’ coordination models – however lessons from this review identified a number of areas for future coordination that could support CTP. This includes building formal linkages between the government and the private sector for coordination of humanitarian interventions, and coordination between OCHA or the CWG and business membership bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce, to inform response analysis.
Section six presents a number of recommendations for improving future coordination of CTP in disasters, both in the Philippines and globally. These include recommended actions for preparedness, response and early recovery, for UN OCHA and international organisations, NGOs and donors. These are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency preparedness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalising an active cash working group in a non-emergency setting</td>
<td>A Philippines Cash Working Group should be set up and institutionalised as a permanent coordination structure with clear and agreed terms of reference, secretariat, leadership and membership, including representation of DSWD.</td>
<td>OCHA Philippines, CaLP Asia, CWG steering committee agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing OCHA’s role in supporting cash preparedness</td>
<td>OCHA to support cash coordination through a Cash Coordination function, institutionalised within OCHA Philippines and with the possibility of a dedicated surge role being deployed in the event of an L2 or L3 emergency. OCHA to develop a national HCT strategic preparedness plan for Philippines. CaLP to support OCHA and other actors such as the government to build their internal preparedness on cash through capacity assessment and training.</td>
<td>OCHA Philippines, CaLP (capacity building officer in the Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve preparedness planning between aid agencies and FSPs</td>
<td>Aid agencies to establish pre-agreements/service level agreements with financial service providers. OCHA and CWG to undertake regular mapping of FSPs services and coverage. CWG to develop guidance on minimum standards for contracting to guide future contractual negotiations during emergencies. Defining any relaxation of regulations for Know Your Customer requirements during large scale emergencies with the central bank.</td>
<td>FSPs, OCHA Philippines, implementing agencies in the CWG, BSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up mechanisms for coordination with the private sector during emergencies</td>
<td>The HCT (OCHA and NDRRMC) to initiate the formal inclusion of the business sector within the humanitarian coordination structure. OCHA to develop a strategy for coordination of economic recovery and cash transfer programming.</td>
<td>OCHA, CWG, NDRRC, PDRF, Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Develop mechanisms to ensure further coordination between the social protection system and humanitarian aid during emergencies | Cluster leads, DSWD and humanitarian donors to discuss the learning from this Philippines pilot and explore ways to build capacity of the 4Ps programme for vertical expansion during emergencies. The strategy should include:  
- Identifying actions that are needed as part of preparedness to transform or adjust a development programme to better accommodate humanitarian needs in a disaster (programme design, staff training, and operating procedures).  
- Defining terms of engagement with Cluster leads and donors to ensure rapid response through the 4Ps programme to meet needs across sectors.  
- Identifying trigger indicators to activate the mobilisation of emergency responses through the 4Ps programme, as well as for exit/scaling down. Assess the feasibility of horizontal expansion of the 4Ps programme in emergencies to include non-beneficiaries. | Cluster leads, DSWD, donors |
| Define how to operationalise standards for cash-for-work activities during emergencies | Cluster leads supporting cash-for-work should work with government counterparts in the DSWD and DOLE and the CWG core group to define mechanisms to coordinate the effective application of these standards in a disaster – including relaxation of these standards where and when needed. | ILO, UNDP, CWG, DSWD, DOLE |
### Improving Cash Coordination in the Philippines Disaster Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ensure both operational and strategic coordination of CTP</strong></td>
<td>Following an emergency the CWG to continue to meet at a Manila level but to immediately activate plans (developed in a non-emergency setting to establish a CWG, or groups, within the affected region(s)). OCHA to mobilise to ensure that the role and functions of a Cash Coordinator are adequately covered at national and sub-national levels. OCHA to enlist support on operational elements of cash coordination from a technical partner of the CWG and/or CaLP.</td>
<td>OCHA Philippines, CWG, CaLP Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Develop and disseminate tools for harmonising approaches on CTP</strong></td>
<td>Development of such tools should be an activity of the CWG Steering Committee in a non-emergency setting. In the response phase, the CWG with support from the OCHA cash coordinator should prioritise the dissemination of these tools and getting agreement from all members on their use.</td>
<td>CWG, OCHA Philippines, DSWD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Improve information sharing with the private sector**                       | Through OCHA and the CWG, more formal and consistent ways of sharing information between the humanitarian sector and the private sector (planned for in a non-emergency setting) should be put into practice from early in the response phase.  
- Sharing the 3W for CTP with financial service providers  
- Information sharing for market recovery  
- Coordination on cash disbursement plans between agencies with financial service providers | OCHA Philippines, CWG, FSPs, Chamber of Commerce, PDRF                                   |
| **Building links to non-traditional humanitarian actors working on CTP**      | Engagement of OCHA and the CWG with the registered umbrella bodies and networks that represent faith based organisations, such as the ACT Alliance.                                                             | OCHA, CWG                                         |
| **Developing clear coordination between the CWG and other coordination structures** | Gain endorsement from the HCT on the importance of the CWG (and other working groups) to strategic response planning and their position and decision-making role in the humanitarian coordination structure.  
All Cluster leads to be members of the CWG or within each cluster a CWG steering committee member to be defined as the ‘cash champion’ for the cluster. | OCHA, HCT                                         |
## Improving Cash Coordination Globally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building OCHA’s cash coordination role in contexts where OCHA leads coordination</td>
<td>OCHA to invest in the development of an organisational policy and guidelines on CTP and in training for ICCs, Heads of Office, resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators and other strategic positions within OCHA to inform their engagement in cash coordination.</td>
<td>OCHA, donors, CaLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Build OCHA’s internal capacity to support inter-cluster coordination of CTP</strong></td>
<td>OCHA to build internal capacity to support inter-cluster coordination of CTP, by: • Defining and disseminating procedures to guide OCHA ICCs in coordination of CTP. • Developing key competencies in CTP and cash coordination, for deployment in emergencies – perhaps through a broader ‘Cash CAP’ facility. • Develop a cash coordination toolkit.</td>
<td>OCHA, donors, CaLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA to develop technical partnerships to support operational coordination</td>
<td>OCHA to identify a technical co-lead/co-leads on cash coordination, enabling OCHA to focus on strategic elements and the technical co-lead to focus on operational coordination between agencies (at least in the short term whilst OCHA’s capacity in cash coordination is developing).</td>
<td>OCHA, CaLP, INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanisms for inclusion of the private sector in cash coordination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify clear asks for how the private sector could support CTP response analysis and implementation</td>
<td>These can be identified by OCHA with CaLP, cluster leads and others in advance of a disaster and then shared with the private sector in an effort to mobilize support.</td>
<td>OCHA, CaLP, Cluster leads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop SOPs for OCHA to coordinate private sector response in disaster-prone countries</td>
<td>To include preparedness planning between the HCT and business community, the deployment of a private-sector focal point and updating and communicating with relevant business platforms.</td>
<td>OCHA, members of the global business community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and analysis of ways to harmonise cash delivery with FSPs</td>
<td>More investment and coordination between the private sector, UN, donors and implementing partners on initiatives to overcome the barriers to coordination with FSPs.</td>
<td>Humanitarian donors, OCHA, cluster leads, global FSPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions to move towards greater use of Multi-Purpose Cash Grants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of disaster affected communities in response planning</td>
<td>OCHA to advocate for such consultations with cluster leads and at the global cluster level. Cluster leads to pilot collective community consultations to inform joint response analysis.</td>
<td>OCHA, cluster leads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and technical support for joint assessments</td>
<td>OCHA to engage with cluster leads and working groups to identify means to coordinate joint assessments and analysis. Donors to support this through provision of funding for coordinating joint assessments and promoting confidence within implementing agencies to share agency-specific assessments.</td>
<td>OCHA, cluster leads, humanitarian donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing sector-focused reporting templates</td>
<td>Global cluster leads and OCHA to discuss and develop reporting templates and financial tracking systems that reflect the reality (processes and outcomes) of response programming across sectors.</td>
<td>OCHA, cluster leads, donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical assessment of the appropriateness of the cluster coordination system</td>
<td>This should be a core agenda of the Humanitarian Summit. From the perspective of CTP coordination and moving towards Multi-Purpose Cash Grants, one alternative for consideration could be if aid were coordinated by process rather than by sector.</td>
<td>OCHA, CaLP, humanitarian donors, UN and other implementing agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

1.1.1 Trends in cash transfer programming and implications for the coordination of aid

Globally, the last five years has seen an increasing trend towards the use of cash transfer programming (CTP) as a response modality in emergencies. Between 2009 and 2013, a total of 53 donors reported to have spent US$692 million on cash transfers. Increasingly, CTP is being used to assist affected populations, rapidly and at scale, with CTP being part of response and recovery efforts in all ‘Level Three’ emergencies since the Haitian earthquake of 2010 – including natural disasters, protracted crises and health epidemics.

The humanitarian community is increasingly using CTP to meet broader humanitarian needs beyond sectoral responses to food and livelihoods insecurity. The fungibility of cash, when provided without restrictions, offers increased choice for affected populations to meet cross-sectoral needs according to their priorities, with the potential to enable a stronger link between humanitarian and development objectives as well as efficiencies for implementing agencies. There is consequently a growing interest in the mainstreaming of CTP in response, recovery and rehabilitation and in the potential of so called Multi-Purpose Cash Grants (MPCG) within some international NGOs (INGOs) and donors (notably DFID and ECHO). This is against the backdrop of the increasing frequency and severity of disasters and protracted crises meaning CTP in humanitarian response will continue to increase.

**BOX 1.1 CASH COORDINATION**

The definition of cash coordination used here is a broad one taken from previous CaLP studies on cash coordination and includes operational functions that focus on process and strategic functions that focus on results and impact. The dichotomy of coordination functions is not strictly defined and some functions may have both strategic and operational values – for example where operational standards are set according to government policy. The categorisation below reflects the context of the Philippines.

**Strategic**
- Influencing standards and transfer values in partnership with national government.
- Joint analysis and decision-making on appropriate types of response, ensuring complementarity between cash transfers and other modalities.
- Coordinating the aid response so as to avoid gaps and duplications.
- Advocacy with host governments, HCT, donors and others as required.

**Operational**
- Joint assessments to make informed decisions on CTP.
- Providing cash grants to cover multiple objectives.
- Harmonising approaches to delivering cash.
- Joint monitoring.
- Using common guidelines and tools.

Emerging global trends have implications for the future of humanitarian action, the humanitarian coordination system and CTP. The Fit for the Future research identifies trends such as the increasing uptake and role of

---


4 Harvey and Bailey (2011).

5 Defined by CaLP as: “a cash grant of a value suitable to meet a variety of needs across sectors. Choice is placed wholly in the hands of crisis-affected households, who are able to use funds provided to meet a range of needs, as they require”. This is compared to a CTP aiming to address needs in a single sector (Campbell 2015).

6 Humanitarian Futures Programme (2014).
national governments in disaster response efforts and provision of safety nets; advances in innovation and technology for information sharing and delivery of CTP; and the emergence of new humanitarian actors and funding streams. Increasingly, financial support to disaster-affected populations is coming from ‘non-traditional’ actors including faith groups, corporations and directly from the diaspora. This assistance may be delivered and these programmes implemented outside of the traditional humanitarian coordination system and may even exceed the volume of aid delivered through the humanitarian system. These trends open up new opportunities for innovative, efficient and effective delivery of aid through CTP though at the same time they raise fundamental questions about the present structure, coordination and indeed the future of the traditional humanitarian system.

The effective and appropriate use of CTP requires strong intra and inter-agency coordination and communication between various actors, across sectoral divisions. CTPs go beyond organisational and cluster mandates because they can be used by beneficiaries to meet multiple objectives. The increasing mainstreaming of CTP as a response modality, particularly where designed to meet multiple needs across sectors, and the global trends above have highlighted particular challenges, as well as opportunities, that CTPs pose for aid coordination efforts, including questions related to the cluster system, strategic coordination, working with governments and the private sector. They highlight the widely acknowledged limitations within the present international humanitarian architecture, designed for the delivery of in-kind assistance, in adapting to these global trends and the changing nature of assistance. This includes the siloing effect of sector-based coordination through the cluster system; ineffectiveness of inter-cluster coordination mechanisms; lack of leadership/strategic coordination; and lack of collaboration across sectors on response analysis, programme design and implementation.

Lessons emerging from reviews of CTP coordination have indicated emerging ‘best practices’ as well as constraints, and the need for much stronger inter-agency/inter-sectoral coordination at both an operational and strategic level. These are outlined in Table 1.1. Given the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA) mandate for information management and facilitation of the cluster approach and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), one recommendation emerging has been for UN OCHA to take on more of an active role in CTP coordination.

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and UN OCHA are part of a consortium of agencies implementing an Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC) project led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Improving cash based programming through elaborating the operational implications of the multipurpose grant and increasing understanding of protection results”. As one element of this work, the consortium seeks to consider cash coordination mechanisms and implications on the scaling up of use of multi-purpose grants.

1.1.2 The humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan

On 8th November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan devastated central Philippines. The most powerful storm ever recorded to make landfall caused flooding, landslides, and widespread damage across nine provinces. The islands of Leyte and Samar were among the hardest hit, and Tacloban City had 90% of its infrastructure destroyed. The Government of the Philippines estimates that 16 million people were affected, 4.1 million people were displaced and 6,300 people lost their lives.

Whilst in-kind relief dominated the early stage of the response by the humanitarian community, as the situation and markets stabilised, numerous aid agencies transitioned at least a portion of their response to cash assistance. The cash transfer components of the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan comprised some 40% of the entire relief response and totaled some USD $845 million. This included cash based interventions designed to meet some of the affected population’s most pressing needs in the areas of food security, livelihoods recovery and shelter.

---

7 Humanitarian Futures Programme (2014); Smith (2014); Hedlund (2013)
8 Bailey (2014) and Harvey et al (2010).
9 Humanitarian Futures Programme (2014); Kauffmann and Collins (2012) – note that for refugee contexts, in line with its General Assembly Mandate, UNHCR rather than OCHA coordinates the refugee response including cash programming for refugees and affected host communities.
10 ERC funding is provided by ECHO, for capacity building projects with a global application designed to enhance the response of the global humanitarian system. Further information is available in the ERC Guidelines.
11 www.unocha.org/crisis/typhoonhaiyan (05 February 2014)
12 UN OCHA Financial Tracking System www.unocha.org/crisis/typhoonhaiyan/funding
Table 1.1 Lessons and recommendations emerging from review of cash coordination mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling factors for effective cash coordination</th>
<th>Constraining factors limiting cash coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Leadership by CaLP and NGOs of operational coordination creates a spirit of partnership and mutual accountability that helps transparent information sharing (sharing of good practice, but also of failures).</td>
<td>• Coordination is not formally linked to the cluster approach, which leads to a lack of recognition and involvement of donors, host governments, UN agencies and the Humanitarian Coordinator and limits the strategic function of coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Good facilitation skills, a high level of CTP expertise, and the commitment of coordinators are important attributes to establish successful coordination meetings and to create a ‘learning’ atmosphere.</td>
<td>• The lack of predictability in leadership can cause confusion and delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dedicated resources and appropriate communication means (e.g. a dedicated webpage) are essential to develop relevant tools and guidelines, conduct well-organised and focused meetings, keep track of discussions and store relevant documents.</td>
<td>• The lack of dedicated human resources as well as the high-turnover of coordinators limits the capacity for external representation and advocacy (to clusters, HCT, host government, donors, businesses).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendations

The place of cash coordination within the aid architecture:

• Operational discussions should be separate from strategic coordination.
• Operational discussions need a cash-specific group; strategic discussions need to be better integrated into existing coordination structures (such as the clusters).
• The role of cash coordination in linking emergency CTP to longer-term social protection programmes should be further explored including the design of adequate triggers for safety nets to ‘scale up’ and ‘scale down’ in emergencies and referral mechanisms during and after emergencies.

Strategic cash coordination:

• The principle of ‘coordinating by objective, not modality’ must underpin the integration of cash into coordination mechanisms.
• Cash can be used to meet multiple objectives and therefore cash coordination should be integrated into a variety of sectoral discussions to improve the mapping of gaps and duplications.
• Cash coordination should focus more on outcome rather than output, to measure not just the quantity of aid, but how needs are being met.

Operational cash coordination:

• The independence of CWGs can create a more informal atmosphere conducive to sharing lessons but can lack decision making power.

Maximising resources for effective cash coordination:

• Sufficient resources are necessary to properly support cash coordination, including human resources and financial support to develop guidelines and information management (IM) tools, etc. Savings can be made by having joint IM tools.
• The number of forums should be kept to a minimum. Where forums overlap in terms of objectives and audiences, they should be merged.

Source: Kauffmann and Collins (2012); Bailey (2014)

The majority (77%) of CTP assistance was reportedly provided as conditional cash transfers (CCT), requiring either that the recipient undertake certain actions before receiving the transfer, such as in the case of cash for work, or spend the cash grant in a certain way (to be verified by the aid agency). CCT was made up of 60% for emergency employment (cash for work) and livelihoods recovery, 20% for meeting food needs and 20% for meeting shelter needs. 23% of CTP assistance was provided unconditionally. The first organisation to launch unconditional cash transfers (UCT) was the Taiwanese Buddhist INGO, Tzu Chi, just two weeks after the typhoon struck. Other aid agencies began CTP in December 2013 and January 2014 (agencies focused on CTP

13 OCHA (2015a)
for recovery and rehabilitation started later)\(^{14}\). Some aid agencies combined cash with in-kind assistance, most notably in the shelter sector.

At least 45 international humanitarian agencies\(^{15}\) implemented CTP. Approximately $36 million of aid was estimated to be transferred as CTP by the four largest humanitarian agencies\(^{16}\), reaching an estimated 1.4 million disaster survivors during response and recovery through a combination of unconditional cash transfers (759,000 people) and cash for work (84,000 people)\(^{17}\). Other actors both linked to and outside of the humanitarian coordination system including government agencies, private companies, civil society organizations and individuals, including the Filipino diaspora, also distributed cash to affected communities.

UN OCHA’s disaster response coordination hub was based in Manila and was supported by seven coordination hubs in the affected areas due to the geographical complexity of the emergency, (see Figure 1.1)\(^{18}\).

**Figure 1.1 OCHA coordination presence in the typhoon Haiyan response**

In recent years, humanitarian actors have formed an ad hoc Cash Working Group (CWG) to help coordinate their activities in response to several natural disasters. In the first week after Typhoon Haiyan hit, the Cash Learning Partnership’s (CaLP’s) Asia Regional Focal Point arrived in Manila to re-activate and support the CWG. Additionally, for the first time UN OCHA deployed a position dedicated to cash coordination, funded by DFID and hosted by UN OCHA.

The position sat within the Inter Cluster Coordinator’s (ICC) office, reporting to the OCHA Head of Office and was designed to work in partnership with the Inter Cluster Coordinator. The Cash Coordinator’s remit was to provide oversight, coordination support – including for inter-cluster coordination – as well as technical and strategic inputs to different actors responding through CTP\(^ {19}\). An interim Cash Coordinator arrived two weeks after the

\(^{14}\) Bailey (2015)

\(^{15}\) Based on 3W data reported by agencies to OCHA between December 2013 and August 2014

\(^{16}\) WFP; UNICEF; ICRC; Oxfam

\(^{17}\) OCHA (2015a)

\(^{18}\) In Western Visayas (Region VI – Iloilo in Iloilo Province; and Roxas in Capiz Province), Central Visayas (Region VII – Cebu in Cebu Province) and Eastern Visayas (Region VIII – Tacloban and Ormoc in Leyte Province; and Guiuan and Boringan in Easter Samar).

\(^{19}\) DFID (2013) Cash Coordinator Terms of Reference
disaster struck and was in post for approximately two months. In January 2014 the full time Cash Coordinator arrived and remained in post until December 2014. Due to the geographic complexity of the catastrophe, the full time Cash Coordinator supported the establishment of CWGs in the response hubs in Region VI (Roxas) and Region VIII (Tacloban and Guiuan).

These and other context-specific factors, outlined in Box 1.2, had a bearing on the coordination of cash based interventions during the Typhoon Haiyan response and recovery.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
CaLP, UN OCHA and UNHCR commissioned this review in order to document lessons learnt on the effectiveness of cash coordination during the response to Typhoon Haiyan – particularly the initial three to four months of the relief response into early recovery – and provide recommendations on inter-agency and cross-sectoral coordination.

This activity falls within the scope of the ECHO-funded ERC grant outlined above and the aim is to create a conducive environment for multi-purpose grants, when appropriate and feasible, in future humanitarian interventions. It complements a parallel review of cash coordination due to be undertaken of the Syria refugee crisis response in Lebanon.

1. Identify cash coordination mechanisms and tools in the Typhoon Haiyan response that effectively facilitated and streamlined decision-making and implementation across agencies.
2. Define what coordination elements contributed to or didn’t contribute to the use of multi-purpose cash grants.
3. Build evidence on optimal coordination models that can create an enabling environment for CTP – and especially multi-purpose cash grants – where appropriate in future humanitarian interventions.

The recommendations will be used by actors such as CALP, UN OCHA, the Global cluster system, other key partners and the larger CTP community of practice to strengthen cash coordination mechanisms and improve cross-sectoral response analysis and coordination in future emergencies.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- Section Two summarises the methodology used during the study as well as the limitations.
- Section Three details the experiences of three inter-agency coordination mechanisms for CTP within the humanitarian coordination system during the response to Typhoon Haiyan. This includes the OCHA Cash Coordinator, the Cash Working Group, and cash coordination within and between the clusters. It discusses what worked well with these mechanisms, the constraints limiting their potential added value, and generates a number of lessons for future cash coordination in the Philippines.
- Section Four summarises the positive experiences and challenges faced by WFP, UNICEF and DSWD who piloted linking emergency CTP to the national social protection programme for the first time.
- Section Five explores the coordination between the humanitarian sector and the private sector during the Typhoon Haiyan response and presents a number of lessons to inform future coordination.
- Section Six presents a number of recommendations for improving future coordination of CTP in disasters, both in the Philippines and globally. These include recommended actions for preparedness, response and early recovery, for UN OCHA and international organisations, NGOs and donors.
BOX 1.2: CONTEXT SPECIFIC FACTORS WITH POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE CASH COORDINATION DURING THE RESPONSE

- The unprecedented scale of the emergency and geographical spread of the damage and affected people (also coming on the back of three other emergencies in the country earlier in 2013)\(^{(20)}\).
- The archipelago characteristics of Philippines, creating particular constraints to the movement of people, goods and money and requiring response coordination across a number of island hubs.
- High exposure of large parts of the country to climatic and meteorological hazards and the predictable and cyclical nature of natural disasters in the country (plus the protracted crisis in Mindanao), contributing to growing interest and investment in disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction. This also means that OCHA has a permanent country presence in the Philippines.
- Previous familiarity of the Government of the Philippines, several INGOs and international organisations with the use and effectiveness of cash and vouchers during emergency response in the Philippines\(^{(21)}\).
- In 2007 the Government of the Philippines, through the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), adopted the cluster system into the Philippine Disaster Management System (see Annex A)\(^{(22)}\). The government’s co-lead on coordination functions alongside OCHA is the Office of Civil Defense.
- The response to Typhoon Haiyan saw a number of firsts; the first time globally that OCHA hosted a dedicated Cash Coordinator; the first time that CaLP deployed people for emergency coordination support; and the first time that an OCHA private sector adviser was deployed during an emergency.
- The focus of aid agencies was very much on cash transfers rather than vouchers since CTP was considered feasible and voucher systems would have been too time consuming to set up\(^{(23)}\).
- There was a proliferation of non-traditional actors taking part in response efforts (outside of the traditional humanitarian coordination structures), injecting cash into communities – particularly faith based groups and corporations.
- An extensive national social protection system, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), has existed in the country since 2008, now covering almost all provinces and delivering CCTs to over 4 million of the poorest and most vulnerable households with children aged 0–14.
- The Philippines is a middle income country (MIC) with an active and coordinated private sector, which has extensive experience in supporting business continuity and supply chain recovery following natural disasters.
- There are a range of financial service providers (FSP) providing money transfer services in the Philippines, through remittances and electronic transfers (debit card and mobile money transfer). A number of these companies had previously partnered with aid agencies on CTP.

\(^{(20)}\) Flooding in Metro Manila; the siege in Zamboanga; and earthquake in Bohol.
\(^{(21)}\) Including responses to Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) in 2009, Typhoon Washi (Sendong) in 2011, the earthquake in 2013, the protracted crisis in Mindanao and localised flooding since 2009.
\(^{(22)}\) NDCC Memo Circular 5: “Institutionalization of the Cluster Approach in the Philippine Disaster Management System, Designation of Cluster leads and their Terms of Reference at the National, Regional and Provincial Levels”.
\(^{(23)}\) Bailey (2015)
2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The project started in January 2015 with a series of inception meetings to enable the consultant to gain a better understanding of CaLP, OCHA and UNHCR’s requirements; the establishment of the Cash Coordinator position under OCHA and coordination of the Philippines Cash Working Group; the expectations and parameters for the assignment; essential key informants based remotely and in country; and ways of working between the various agencies involved and the consultant.

The core focus of the study was around Objective One – coordination mechanisms – and particularly those established for the first time under OCHA with the deployment of a dedicated Cash Coordinator to engage on strategic and operational issues, including coordination of the Cash Working Group. These were to be explored at both strategic and operational levels, taking into account perspectives of a range of stakeholders; implementing agencies and international organisations, those involved in response coordination through the cluster system, CaLP, the private sector, government and donors.

During the inception period the following coordination mechanisms were also identified as potential themes for exploration:

- Coordination of CTP with the private sector (including financial service providers (FSP) and other businesses).
- Coordination of CTP within and between the clusters.
- Coordination of CTP with the government’s national social protection programme.

The aim was also to capture learning on the extent to which Multi-Purpose Cash Grants were or were not used during the response and consider ways in which cash coordination mechanisms can contribute to enabling a move towards greater use of these in future emergencies.

2.2 STUDY APPROACH

Data Collection
The study was qualitative, comprising a document review and extensive in-depth interviews (IDIs) with key informants.

A range of grey and published literature was reviewed comprising programme documents; internal and inter-agency lessons learned documents and evaluations; published articles and research; agendas, minutes and other outputs from the CWG meetings; standards, briefings and tools compiled by the Cash Coordinator and/or CaLP; outputs and information disseminated by UN OCHA; and draft strategies and tools for future cash coordination. This was collated from CaLP, UN OCHA, various organisations that participated in interviews and from an on line document search. A request for supporting documents was also published on the CaLP d-group. Documents are listed in the References section of this report.

A question guide for the different categories of study participant was developed, to be revised and adapted to suit the specific focus of each interview. The primary focus of the research was with representatives of organisations who had a direct role in the coordination of CTP during the Typhoon Haiyan response and early recovery. This included:

- INGOs and Red Cross – technical advisers and programme managers for food security, livelihoods and shelter; area and country coordinators.
- CaLP – ex-CaLP Technical Coordinator and ex-CaLP Asia Focal Point.
- UN – programme managers; cash and voucher specialists; cluster leads; OCHA staff involved in Inter Cluster Coordination and representatives of the HCT; OCHA interim and full time Cash Coordinators; OCHA private sector advisers.
Donors – DFID, ECHO and USAID (through their Scaling Innovations in Mobile Money (SIMM) programme).


Private sector – financial service providers; members of coordination bodies including the Chamber of Commerce, Philippines Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF) and Philippines Businesses for Social Progress (PBSP).

Interviews were arranged with stakeholders based in the Philippines during a ten day country mission to Manila and Tacloban. Other interviews with those no longer deployed in the Philippines took place remotely. For the study as a whole, a total of 58 respondents from 34 organisations participated. Details are provided in Annex B.

Analysis

Notes were transcribed directly during interviews. Transcripts were then reviewed and common themes identified. Findings were triangulated across interviews and where possible with documented evidence. The process followed was to develop case studies around particular coordination mechanisms, illustrating the experiences of a range of organisations and highlighting common perspectives of the enabling factors and challenges faced as well as the lessons for future coordination of cash-based responses. The emerging best practices and constraints and the proposed recommendations were shared and discussed with those interviewees who participated later in the data collection process, to determine shared or different perspectives on key issues. A debriefing in country with UN OCHA’s country representative and the CaLP Asia Focal Point served to further refine emerging findings and the focus of the recommendations.

Development of the recommendations took into account recent work of the departing OCHA Cash Coordinator to improve future coordination of cash based responses in the Philippines and on-going discussions between OCHA and partners on the future of cash coordination in the humanitarian coordination structure in country and globally. This also took into account the lessons and recommendations emerging from complementary work under the ERC project – the review of cash coordination in the Syria refugee crisis in Lebanon.

A draft report was shared with CaLP and partners and the report revised, taking into consideration feedback received.

Limitations

The following factors were noted as limiting factors in the design of the study:

- As many interviews as possible were conducted in the short time available, however there were some agencies and individuals that it was not possible to include in the study within the timeframe for the research.

- The assessment took place 15 months after the disaster and many people involved in the response period had either left the Philippines and/or had moved on to work in other agencies. As many as possible were contacted for interview.

- Since there had also been staff turnover in coordination roles it was necessary to triangulate findings from such interviews with those who were involved in the later stages of cash coordination, since it became evident that some coordination actions identified early in the response were not always carried through to completion.

- The intangible nature of the subject matter, based on people’s experiences and perceptions. The aim was therefore to seek consensus on as many issues as possible from a wide range of participants.
3  INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF CASH TRANSFERS

3.1  THE ROLE AND ADDED VALUE OF A DEDICATED OCHA CASH COORDINATOR

3.1.1  Background

On 9th November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan was declared a Level Three (L3) emergency and the government accepted the UN’s offer of international assistance and activated the cluster system. The crisis was declared a Corporate Emergency for OCHA on 10th November 2013 and from the beginning it was expected that CTP would become a large part of the humanitarian response.

Whilst there had been a recognized need to coordinate between agencies on cash during previous emergencies, coordination through a CWG had always been fairly ad hoc and had not continued outside of an emergency response. CaLP’s Asia Focal Point had been working to reactivate the Philippines Cash Working Group (CWG) into a more permanent institution in the month prior to Typhoon Haiyan and had been engaging with various agencies to determine where it was going to sit and who should chair the group. At the time that Typhoon Haiyan struck, however, there was no one who attended that initial meeting available to coordinate. CaLP therefore seconded the Asia Regional Focal Point (RFP) to the Philippines to activate the group and lead it for an interim period. This was the first time CaLP had supported such a deployment and it was made extremely rapidly.

Reviews of cash coordination in recent emergencies globally have identified a need for formal coordination at operational and strategic levels within the humanitarian system and had identified the added value of OCHA to lead this function. OCHA Philippines agreed to host such a deployment and submitted an emergency surge capacity request for a Cash Coordinator position for a minimum of six months. The Cash Coordinator was to work in partnership with the OCHA Inter-cluster Coordinator in Manila and Cluster Leads, reporting to the OCHA Head of Office.

DFID drafted a terms of reference (see Annex C) which covered a broad range of both strategic and operational coordination functions including at the sub-national level. One component of the role was to set up and facilitate appropriate structures for cash coordination – which in this case was the Manila-based Cash Working Group, one of several working groups established during the Haiyan response under the auspices of OCHA. Other expectations were for the Cash Coordinator to engage strategically with the government on cash issues, standards and ways of working; to engage with and harmonise approaches to CTP within and across clusters; to develop and promote tools and assessments; to support operational coordination as required at the sub-national level especially for multi-sector programmes using cash; and to ensure CTP was included as a strategic agenda in HCT meetings and decisions.

An interim Cash Coordinator arrived in Manila on 25th November for two months and took over the coordination of the CWG from the CaLP Asia RFP, whose mission was extended until January 2014 to provide additional cash coordination support though without a defined TOR. The CaLP Technical Coordinator in the UK was also deployed to Manila for two weeks from 25th November, with a broad mandate to provide support where needed to the CaLP Asia RFP and the OCHA Cash Coordinator, with a focus on markets. In January 2014 a full time Cash Coordinator replaced the interim Cash Coordinator and remained in post until December 2014.

3.1.2  Experiences of cash coordination through the OCHA Cash Coordinator

International organisations, implementing agencies, donors, the government and the private sector shared their perceptions of cash coordination through the OCHA Cash Coordinator. A number of common themes were identified and these are summarised in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Experiences of the Cash Coordination position hosted by OCHA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Added value of Cash Coordinator to CTP</th>
<th>Factors limiting potential added value of the role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A full time focal point to raise CTP as a strategic issue in the ICC group meetings.</td>
<td>• Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities between CaLP and OCHA created confusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordination with the government and involvement of DSWD led to discussions and actions to link emergency response to the longer term social protection programmes.</td>
<td>• This was a new post meaning there were some challenges with buy in within OCHA and HCT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Linked the humanitarian sector to financial service providers for the delivery of cash.</td>
<td>• Difficulties in the present OCHA reporting structure to accurately manage useful information on CTP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Connected the UN to the private sector, raising awareness amongst the HCT of the power of the private sector to support market recovery.</td>
<td>• Whilst coordination and consensus building skills are important, given the emerging and evolving nature of CTP, agencies considered that there is also a need for (additional) technical expertise to be built into or complement cash coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supported the discussion, setting and dissemination of government regulations, standards and guidelines across the sector including transfer values and standards for cash for work.</td>
<td>• This was too broad a role for one person, therefore focusing on strategic elements was at the expense of operational coordination support in the early months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support for operational coordination (later in the recovery/rehabilitation stages) including setting up of regional CWGs.</td>
<td>• There was no dedicated coordination position in the response hubs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Linking together forums for coordination on CTP including channelling information between clusters and the CWG.</td>
<td>• Confusion in lines of communication, staff rotation and lack of preparedness meant some ideas with real potential for improving strategic and operational coordination could not be realised in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Generated broader awareness amongst agencies of the need to coordinate (though perhaps not always in time to have an impact on coordination during the response).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Positioning within OCHA meant it was seen as an impartial position able to set strategic and operational directions, neutralize conflict of interest, and mistrust usually borne out of institutional rivalry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with DSWD, PDRF, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, CaLP, Red Cross, IFRC, Oxfam, ACF, ADRA, Mercy Corps, DFID, ECHO, ILO; email correspondence between the Cash Coordinator and CWG members; supporting documents (CWG minutes; briefings on standards and guidelines issued by the NAC and OCHA).

Added value of a Cash Coordinator

There was agreement across the board that experiences in Haiyan demonstrated the real added value of having a dedicated role (or roles – since CaLP was supporting the Cash Coordinator during the initial weeks) supporting cash coordination at a strategic and an operational level in the early months of the response. It was considered that this created more awareness within the HCT from the early stages of the emergency about the significance of cash based response strategies; provided a high level resource to develop new relationships and joined up ways of working among agencies and between agencies, the government and the financial sector; and provided leadership to the national CWG coordination forum which in previous emergencies has required other agencies to take responsibility for setting up and chairing alongside other duties. There were tangible examples provided that demonstrate the added value – or potential added value – of this role.

1 Infl uencing strategic coordination with the ICC and cluster leads

The strategic role of the interim Cash Coordinator in those early weeks was considered very important in getting the cash discussion on the agenda with key cluster leads and the ICC. In partnership with the CaLP Technical Coordinator, the Cash Coordinator reviewed project proposals submitted for the Strategic Response Plan (SRP), highlighting the extent of CTP planned across sectors including food security, livelihoods, early recovery and shelter and the need for better coordination and information management4. This also identified limitations with the OCHA sector-specific reporting format (Who is doing What, Where (3W)) for CTP reporting particularly given the trend towards agencies considering cash across multiple sectors and unconditional transfers. This

4 OCHA (2013b)
exercise identified omissions as well as duplication of figures across clusters and inconsistent categorisation of CTP modalities and outcomes between agencies. In the first week of December the Cash Coordinator circulated a short online survey to cluster leads to gather information on agencies’ CTP plans, to which 23 agencies responded within 24 hours. This was then mapped (see 2 below).

This exercise also revealed gaps in agency knowledge of, for example, existing government social protection systems and interpretations of cash for work, which informed the other strategic activities of the Cash Coordinator.

2 Communication and information sharing:

The role of the Cash Coordinator in consolidating and sharing information was one of the main added values identified by implementing agencies. Aside from the convening of CWG meetings around particular issues, efforts to share information included the creation and maintenance of a mailing list of 300+ members and setting up of a cash section on the OCHA Humanitarian Response Information website. CTP was reported in OCHA communications including the SitReps. In the first two months the interim Cash Coordinator circulated concise monthly Cash Coordination Updates. Briefing papers on particular strategic issues, such as CTP standards mentioned above, were developed and circulated to mailing list members and to cluster leads, along with minutes from national CWG meetings. This process of circulating regular updates about CTP developments at sub-national and national levels continued under the full time Cash Coordinator, with a broader audience, including those in regional offices in Bangkok.

Early in the response phase, the Cash Coordinator collaborated with the CaLP technical advisers and others to consider ways of coordinating market assessments. Rather than undertake detailed emergency market mapping, as had been CaLP’s original idea, it was collectively agreed that more regionally focused rapid assessments as well as more detailed assessments for critical supply chains (rice, corrugated iron) would be the most appropriate to the context. The Cash Coordinator and the CaLP Technical Coordinator worked together to source existing and emerging market assessments and shared these through the OCHA response site and the CWG. The Cash Coordinator worked with OCHA’s information management team and for the first time in a humanitarian response globally, a 3W map describing CTP implementation location/agencies/amounts/sectors, and where markets had been assessed, was created which could show the major gaps in CTP geographically25 (Annex D). They worked with the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS)26 to create the first stand-alone secondary data review of market assessments in emergencies which was published in January 201427. The Cash Coordinator also linked up with OCHA’s private sector adviser and representatives of the private sector focusing on supply chain recovery, with the aim of identifying possible win-wins for linking together supply chain recovery and cash response strategies. This is discussed further in Section Five.

“The added value in Haiyan was that someone is thinking ahead [on CTP] and sharing information. This led to realisation across agencies of the need to coordinate more”.

Philippines Red Cross

“It has been great having this post, I know I speak for all when I say it has added huge value and is definitely a model that needs to continue.”

Written communication from Oxfam Asia Regional Office

25 CaLP (2014b)
26 ACAPS was set up to improve the assessment of humanitarian needs in complex emergencies and crises, through strengthening humanitarian capacities to carry out better coordinated assessments before, during and after crises.
27 ACAPS (2014)
3 Coordination with national government and setting standards for CTP:
The interim Cash Coordinator was engaged with the government from the early stages in order to raise awareness of regulations and standards for emergency CTP with responding agencies as well as seeking opportunities for strategic coordination of emergency CTP with the government’s social protection programmes. This was appreciated by the government since it streamlined communication with humanitarian actors and a number of examples were given of the added value this provided.

Development of a ‘Joint Statement of Understanding’ for CTP: in early December the Cash Coordinator convened a meeting with CaLP and the main cluster leads engaged around CTP (the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC), Shelter and Early Recovery and Livelihoods (ERL)) and then approached the government’s National Advisory Committee for the 4Ps programme (NAC). This led to the organisation of a Special Session of the NAC focusing on humanitarian CTP on 11th December, and the publication of a government guidance note for CTP in the Typhoon Haiyan response about how to decide on modalities, delivery mechanisms, targeting and calculation of cash grant sizes for UCT and sector specific needs. The Cash Coordinator shared the draft through the mailing list on 24th December and the final version was circulated on 7th January 2014.

Harmonising emergency CTP with the national social protection programme: the interim Cash Coordinator called meetings with DSWD and cluster leads to identify how humanitarian CTP could complement government social protection schemes, particularly the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). Opportunities for coordination that were discussed included:

- Exploring the possibility of ‘topping up’ the amount provided to beneficiary households of the 4Ps programme affected by the typhoon. These initial meetings led to WFP pioneering this approach in a rapid onset emergency (see Section Four). The Cash Coordinator actively raised this opportunity to other cluster leads in WaSH, Shelter and Early Recovery. A summary of the 4Ps programme and the possibility of agencies ‘topping up’ the social protection programme were included in cash coordination updates in December and January.

- Coordinating with the Government’s National Household Targeting Office and OCHA’s Information Management team to create maps of the 4Ps coverage. This demonstrated the density of the chronically poor in the typhoon-affected areas.

- Discussing with DSWD on what can be done to include other affected households in the 4Ps programme, including reviewing a means to align targeting exercises of implementing agencies with the national social protection targeting system. This included the use of National Household Targeting System (NHTS) lists to inform targeting on emergency CTPs and setting up a feedback mechanism for NGOs to refer potential new caseloads in need of long term support for follow up by DSWD.

Harmonising ways of working between the government and the clusters: Respondents explained that the Cash Coordinator was important in developing shared understanding and ways of working between agencies, government and UN cluster leads through development of standards and guidelines. The example most commonly cited was the case of setting standard ways of working on cash for work programmes, highlighted in Box 3.1.

---

28 DSWD
29 NAC (2013)
30 OCHA (2014a), OCHA (2013a)
31 In 2008, with support from The World Bank, the DSWD created the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS) which combines household assessment and geographic targeting to determine eligibility for social assistance programmes based on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (education, occupation, housing conditions, access to basic services, assets, tenure status). It uses the proxy-means testing for consumption and income, utilising data from the two main household surveys conducted in the Philippines: the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS). This database should be updated every four years, in order to capture shifts in eligibility.
Early in the response it became apparent that there was significant confusion between agencies wanting to respond through cash for work:

The Government had national regulations on cash for work and had also recently amended their regulation on wage rates for emergency cash for work to 100% of the minimum wage, but not all agencies were aware of these.

In October 2013 a new MOU between the Government’s Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE), DSWD and ILO had also agreed to the provision of various additional social protection benefits and health and safety measures to emergency employment programme participants. This included the provision of protective clothing and vaccinations for manual labourers, a nurse on site, access to accident insurance, enrolment on PhilHealth, and access to social security. ILO, co-lead of the ERL cluster, was promoting the application of these standards on planned response programmes of cluster agencies. Agencies were in agreement that programmes should seek to minimise risks to beneficiaries and that leveraging developmental goals can be an additional objective of humanitarian programmes where appropriate. However agencies were concerned that some of these principles had not been well thought through for the humanitarian context and also the systems for implementing these standards were not yet developed which would delay essential assistance.

Confusion also remained as to the extent to which all planned cash for work programmes constituted ‘emergency employment’ and the applicability of these standards to those who were informal sector workers.

Discussions were heated and this led to some agencies opting not to implement cash for work.

The Cash Coordinator led discussion between agencies, ILO and DSWD to develop a common understanding of ‘cash for work’ and ‘emergency employment’ and to identify what should be considered mandatory and what should just be additional recommendations based on these definitions. The output was a joint decision between the Government and cluster leads that defined cash for work according to whether it was ‘employment’ on municipal land or was a privately managed activity to restore livelihoods and shelter and set the standards and guidelines accordingly. The Cash Coordinator developed and circulated a briefing (Annex E) to all relevant clusters on the subject.


4 Coordinating with financial service providers:

The Cash Coordinator made initial approaches to several financial service providers (FSPs) on behalf of the CWG members, and invited them to attend CWG meetings in December and January. These served to raise awareness within implementing agencies of the options for cash delivery.

Limitations

This was the first time that such a position had ever been created within the humanitarian system; the first time OCHA had hosted a cash coordination function, and this went on during the biggest disaster ever to affect the country. It is inevitable that there would be challenges. Respondents identified a number of such challenges that collectively can be considered to have limited the impact of the Cash Coordinator position.

1 Confusion in the role and function of OCHA:

What came out clearly in interviews (and from email communication between CaLP and OCHA at that time) was that there was confusion amongst the UN and implementing agencies as to the role and function of OCHA and the new ‘Cash Coordinator’ position in providing coordination support to CTP, and particularly when compared to the role of CaLP. Agencies in the early period of the response were aware that an OCHA Cash Coordinator was in place but were not clear on roles and responsibilities. They were also aware that CaLP had representation in country and several had an expectation that CaLP would be leading the CWG and providing operational coordination support, based on their prior experiences and interactions with CaLP. The lack of a clear terms of
reference for CaLP, or communication on the agreed division of labour between the OCHA Cash Coordinator and CaLP’s Asia RFP did lead to some confusion in the initial weeks about which agency to go to and for which need. It also meant that the activities of CaLP’s RFP during this time providing operational coordination support at the regional level, were not communicated or as visible to the humanitarian community as they could have been. This issue was identified in the IASC Operational Peer Review32 and was not considered specific to the Cash Coordinator but a challenge facing other thematic advisors under OCHA too.

“There was not a clear definition on the Roles and Responsibilities between CaLP and OCHA. This was a shame as CaLP had things to offer. It would have been great to give CaLP a bigger role especially as some actors were new to cash. [These agencies] wanted more advice on the design of CTP”.

WFP

“Everyone [CaLP and OCHA] was there to help but it not always clear in what ways. The Cash Coordinator was pulled in a lot of directions”.

Mercy Corps

“It was never really clear in the early months what the Cash Coordinator’s role was, what support we could expect from her. By the time the full time Cash Coordinator arrived things were more organised and there was more communication”.

Oxfam

“We knew that the Cash Coordinator position existed; we were not clear on exactly what their functions were or their reporting”.

Philippines Red Cross

“The thematic advisors were deployed on communication with communities, private sector, cash, and accountability to affected populations. The utility of their work in supporting field operations varied greatly, and their function, reporting line and convening power was unclear”.

Operational Peer Review 2014

2 Limited timely support for operational coordination and regional coordination of CTP:

From early in the response it was clear to the Cash Coordinator and to others that the role in this context was too broad for one person to undertake. This meant that the Cash Coordinator was required to prioritise her time.

The interim Cash Coordinator elected to focus during the early weeks on where she felt she could make the biggest impact with her resources – i.e. at a strategic, national, level – and particularly on building relationships with DSWD, developing and circulating standards and working with the main cluster leads to discuss CTP issues under the ICC. Whilst the outputs from this were appreciated by agencies, it was felt that there was a gap in the support that they had expected from the Cash Coordinator. This was on coordination of operational issues for implementing agencies, as well as strategic coordination support at a regional level.

After the engagement of the full time Cash Coordinator in January, it was noted that the role’s focus did switch to become more operational and regionally focused. The lack of resources at the regional level however, continued to be an issue.

Early on in the response phase the interim Cash Coordinator had discussed a cash coordination structure at the field level with OCHA’s ICC establishing two national roving cash coordination positions for Regions VI and VIII to complement the actions of the Cash Coordinator in Manila. This was communicated to agencies through the OCHA Cash Updates33, however these positions were never established.

32 IASC (2014)
33 OCHA (2013); OCHA (2014a)
“Cash was very new to OCHA at that time. Had I pushed for those recruitments, my time would have been spent travelling back and forth between Manila and the two hubs to train two nationals. This would not amount to any degree of institutionalization and would have taken a good deal of my time and resources … I felt that my time was better spent providing service directly to CTP actors on the ground, to get their buy-in to coordinate”.

OCHA Cash Coordinator

Part of the reason for this may have been a lack of buy-in from OCHA senior decision makers. An important factor was that the incoming full time Cash Coordinator was already mid-way through the response at this point, and thought that there would not be much added value within the remaining short emergency timeframe, along with the fact that she would have used up much of her time on recruitment and training. Instead the Cash Coordinator did her utmost to support development of institutionalised regional coordination through the establishment of a regional CWG (see Section 3.2), maintaining a roving presence to the response hubs when time allowed and linking up with the OCHA inter cluster coordinators at sub-national level. This was appreciated by implementing agencies though inevitably led to certain disconnects in cash coordination between Manila and the regions and delays in the sharing of information.

“In Haiyan, the cash coordination structures and roles weren't well defined or well resourced”.

ACF

“It was impossible for the Cash Coordinator to meet the needs of everyone. As an implementing agency we had some needs that were not addressed. Coordination also needs to be focused on the actors who are implementing – on the ground – and supporting the design, and transition, of programmes”.

Mercy Corps

“The strategic activities of the Cash Coordinator were useful but time consuming – she had to engage bilaterally with all cluster leads. Coordination needed bodies on the ground – agencies there were disconnected from Manila, and information was not getting through”.

ILO

“The Cash Coordinator was based in Manila so there was no one here full time for cash coordination. I would have liked this. Just like other cross-cutting coordination, cash was such a new thing for OCHA. Our office was not fully accustomed and fully aware of what's needed for cash coordination”.

OCHA ICC Tacloban

3 Early strategic coordination efforts did not fully follow through to coordinated action:

During the course of the study it became apparent that some of the early strategic coordination activities and outputs mentioned, that were led by the interim Cash Coordinator, did not necessarily follow through into coordinated ways of working during the response and early recovery. There are a number of reasons for this:

Timeliness: Some of the outputs, whilst useful, came too late to inform the response. One example of this was ACAPS’ secondary data review of markets, which was acknowledged as potentially useful but which was not circulated until January 2014. Another example was the national government guidance on cash grant sizes which was also provided in January. This was consequently too late to inform response programme design and agencies were already working with LGUs which take the lead on disaster response.

“I don't remember seeing any email updates [on various strategic actions of the Cash Coordinator] or having these discussed in the regional CWG meetings”.

ADRA

“There were still siloed ways of working – communications from the Cash Coordinator didn’t immediately change people’s response planning”.

Philippines Red Cross
Staff turnover: Other guidelines and action points seem to have been lost in communication. This is partly due to the cycling of personnel within implementing agencies, government and the UN and the movement of personnel between Manila and regional response hubs, as well as the amount of information being circulated by email at that time, meaning messages were not picked up on. Another reason is the change in personnel of the Cash Coordinator position and the different emphasis that was placed on different functions of the role by the two post holders.

One example of this is the intention of the interim Cash Coordinator to establish an ‘inter cluster coordination group on cash’ (ICCOG). It seems that whilst these cluster leads did convene on strategic issues relating to CTP during the first month of the response, this never coalesced into a formal group or convene again in 2014. Another is the intention of the interim Cluster Coordinator and early members of the Manila CWG to develop joint monitoring tools for implementing agencies. Draft tools were developed with the input of CWG members in December and handed over in January to the full time Cash Coordinator. These tools were circulated for feedback in the CWG in January – but by this time CWG membership was made up of new people and the understanding, or buy in, of this group of actors was not the same. This tool was therefore not signed off on so was never circulated for use.

Another example is the guidance note on cash for work standards that was circulated by the Cash Coordinator to cluster leads (Annex E). It seems that despite this there were agencies at the sub-national level who did not receive this guidance from the ERL cluster and also that the ERL cluster leads were still promoting the social security standards in early 2015. This led to some confusion for agencies and delays to programming34.

Agency mind-sets and ways of working: Other agencies, whilst acknowledged to be potentially useful, would have required changes to mind-sets, processes and ways of working which take time to develop – something which was not realistic in the short time after the disaster. One example is the attempt by the Cash Coordinator to promote CTP as a tool for use across sectoral divides and develop guidance on a minimum expenditure basket (MEB). Whilst cash did indeed get used as a response modality by agencies in several clusters, and in some agencies across several sectoral programmes, this was predominantly still on a sector-specific basis. The transition of these historical ways of programme development is beginning to take shape, discussed further in Section 3.3, but will take time.

Another example is the early discussions by the interim Cash Coordinator with DSWD on the use of the government’s social protection targeting system to i) inform the identification of households for humanitarian assistance and ii) allow for the referral of newly vulnerable households for verification by DSWD and enrolment on social protection (through an email system to the national 4Ps programme office). Agencies were not familiar with the 4Ps programme and the targeting mechanism employed, – whether it was suited for use in an emergency or to identify particular vulnerable groups that they had a mandate to support. This would have required a level of discussion and coordination of agencies with the government that was not conducive to the phase of rapid response and in the end most organisations used their own targeting mechanisms. Also, agencies were engaging with local government units (LGUs) and other local actors to identify affected households, since LGUs have the mandate for disaster response, and therefore the value of a nationally focused communication and referral system was not understood. This system was never really used35.

4 Lack of understanding of the importance of and/or novelty of the role:

There was consensus from those within the UN system that in the early months the potential added value of the Cash Coordinator was in part limited due to a lack of understanding within the system about the position and a lack of processes and procedures to facilitate cash coordination objectives.

Limited direction from OCHA in the early months – since this was a new position for OCHA to manage – was considered to have played a part in limiting the strategic focus of the Cash Coordinator’s role. The Cash Coordinator had to establish cash coordination processes since this was the first time OCHA had hosted such a position. The Cash Coordinator was also sourced externally and there was therefore an inevitable learning curve to understand OCHA’s organisational ways of working.

Similarly there were some concerns from cluster leads over OCHA’s mandate for involvement in CTP and the overlap with the cluster lead’s functions. It was felt there was a lack of consideration within the HCT for cash

34 Solidarites sought guidance on this from the full time Cash Coordinator in February 2014 after being told security standards were applicable on their planned cash for work programme (pers. Comm Cash Coordinator)

35 Interview with Cash Coordinator based on conversations with Director of the NHTS.
as a strategic issue, which limited the Cash Coordinator’s attendance at meetings and ability to influence ICC meetings, and missed potential opportunities for strategic coordination with and between donors.

“In the HCT and ICC during the Haiyan preparation phase, there was no discussion on cash. It wasn’t on our consciousness. You cannot have direction on this in large scale emergencies if OCHA not ready”.

OCHA

“Over time people began to appreciate the added value of OCHA to cash coordination but this took time”.

Cash Coordinator

3.2 ROLE AND ADDED VALUE OF THE CASH WORKING GROUP

3.2.1 Background

Preliminary meetings of the CWG at the national level were convened by CaLP in the week following Haiyan and were held on a weekly basis. The first meeting chaired by the Cash Coordinator was on November 25th, where the structure of the CWG and the need for sub-national CWGs was first discussed. Thematic agenda points proposed for the Manila CWG included ‘Delivery Mechanisms and Financial Service Providers (FSPs)’; ‘Building on national Safety Nets and the 4Ps’; and ‘Market Assessments’. There was support for groups to be established in Region VI (Roxas) and Region VIII (Guiuan and Tacloban).

The interim Cash Coordinator finalised the Terms of Reference for the Manila CWG that had been drafted prior to Haiyan (see Box 3.2) and engaged USAID-SIMM to chair the meeting (including hosting/secretariat support) from January to March 2014, while a decision was made about the function of a rotating chair. From March onwards the CWG was chaired by the full time Cash Coordinator.

BOX 3.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CWG (DEC 2013)

Objective: to provide a technical platform for collaboration and learning related to multiple sectors’ CTP in emergency preparedness and response activities in the Philippines.

The CWG will:

- Provide peer-to-peer and technical support to key decision-makers.
- Develop, where possible, common approaches and standard procedures as well as minimum requirements.
- Ensure beneficiary accountability and transparency in CTP.
- Support investments in collaborative emergency preparedness activities.
- Collaborate on market assessment, targeting and monitoring.
- Capture lessons of previous, ongoing and future responses.

Source: DFID draft Terms of Reference

The creation of regional CWGs began in the first quarter of 2014 upon the arrival of the full time Cash Coordinator who was able to travel to the regions.

Region VI: The first meeting of the CWG in Roxas was in February 2014 and was mobilised by WFP who led the FSAC. In March, a Terms of Reference was drafted for a co-chairing arrangement with Save the Children and the CWG was linked to the joint FSAC-ERL cluster since most agencies doing cash at that time were members of the cluster. The CWG later absorbed people from the shelter cluster – in the third quarter of 2014 -which coincided with the transition of shelter cluster member’s programming from in kind to cash based programming for recovery.

Region VIII: In Guiuan, Oxfam led the establishment of a ‘Cash coordination group’, hosted in OCHA’s regional sub-office following the ERL cluster meetings, with a rotating chair between agencies. A CWG was also established in Tacloban city in February 2014 with the intention of being linked to the joint FSAC-ERL cluster meetings given that most organisations were considering cash in these two sectors.
Groups at the early stages met every two weeks, later transitioning to once a month. Members of the groups included primarily implementing agencies and international organisations including some cluster leads, donors at the national level, and some non-traditional actors at the regional level including local NGOs.

3.2.2 Experiences of the Cash Working Group

Respondents shared their experiences of interacting with the CWG, which generated consensus on things that had worked well as well as a number of challenges. These are summarised in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Experiences of the CWG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What worked well</th>
<th>Challenges identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 3W helped to avoid duplication.</td>
<td>- Still some duplication as not all organisations attending, or attending regularly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Circulating the standards for cash for work for harmonisation of approaches.</td>
<td>- Limited harmonisation of operational approaches between agencies (monitoring; targeting; market assessments, approaches to service providers), which require time to develop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Some harmonisation of other grant sizes in neighbouring barangays through engagement with local government.</td>
<td>- Some disconnect/miscommunication between national and sub-national CWGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Circulating information on market assessments.</td>
<td>- Staff turnover and lack of agency focal points limited decision making and progress on actions as a group and connection with the cluster system. This also led to delays setting up regional CWGs and a lack of dedicated resources at the hub level limited the CWGs utility and longevity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sharing experiences on delivery mechanisms and challenges of implementation.</td>
<td>- Lack of common voice for influencing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Introductions to service providers, opening eyes to possibility of e-transfers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Having clear group leadership and secretariat support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with the ex-cash coordinators; CaLP; Save the Children; CARE; ADRA; Mercy Corps; Oxfam; CRS; Philippines Red Cross; IFRC; ACF; ILO; WFP; UNICEF; USAID-SIMM; ECHO; DFID; DSWD; documents (email correspondence on the CWG; meeting agendas and minutes).

What worked

Respondents reported that in the initial weeks there had been a strong desire from implementing agencies and others to come together to coordinate on CTP and there was a desire for information. The CWG was considered to have filled a gap in the coordination architecture, providing a forum for information sharing, discussion and action during the early months of the response and recovery. A number of tangible benefits of the CWG to cash coordination were identified and are discussed below. There was also agreement as to the more ‘intangible’ but important benefits – the feeling of ‘being in this together’ and confidence building – that membership of the group instilled. Overall, those attending saw the added value in doing so and this is illustrated by the continued attendance of national CWG meetings at around 20–25 individuals throughout 2013–14, and the continuation of the sub-national CWG in Guiuan to this day.

1 Sharing information for programme harmonisation:

The main added value of the CWG during the Haiyan response and early recovery phase was the opportunity it created for group members to share and discuss strategic information to informed programming.

Sharing of the 3W for CTP: all respondents highlighted the importance of the CWG to share CTP plans between agencies. Whilst CTP was reported on within cluster meetings there were various limitations with this approach which focused on sector-specific outcomes, whereas cash is cross-sectoral (see Section 3.3).

“The early face to face meetings in Manila were always useful and agendas had value. It was invaluable at that stage to find out who is there, and who is planning to do what”. WFP

“In Guiuan the early meeting of what became the CWG found that Oxfam and Plan were in some cases targeting the same barangays. This resulted in Oxfam and Plan coordinating and avoiding duplication. The CWG idea suddenly started to get buy in”. Cash Coordinator
“In previous emergencies there was no lead of the CWG and there were lots of clash and discussion on things like the C4W wage rate. It was smoother here”.  
Plan International

“On average 53% of households were receiving some support from elsewhere. Coordinating down to the Barangays and then sharing this information was important as it meant we could plan this”.  
UNICEF

“We need standards (on CTP) to avoid doing harm. On the C4W standards, the guidelines were progressively developed and the collaboration of agencies supported the development of these compromises. We found out that we could do accident insurance in partnership with Red Cross”.  
ADRA

“I attended the CWG meetings and shared information with the ERL cluster members. This led to other inter-cluster communications and I started attending the FSAC meeting – there was realisation that this was something crosscutting”.  
ILO

“The CWG was effective in providing information about the needs of the population, the requirements set by the government in terms of procedures for Cash for Work, determining the amounts to be provided for Unconditional Cash Grants, coordinating the activities of the different NGOs in the different geographic areas so there would be no overlap, and sharing information on different Market Assessments”.  
Save the Children

The CWG also brought to the table some agencies implementing CTP who were not participating in the clusters, such as ICRC. The CWG was considered an important forum for agencies to coordinate amongst themselves and avoid duplication – this was a key driving force behind the buy in of agencies to lead and coordinate CWGs at the regional level.

**Harmonisation of grant sizes:** at the regional level there was some harmonisation of grant values across different agencies within and in neighbouring Barangays. One benefit cited was to bring the local government on board through the CWG to ensure they were kept abreast of such standards. In Tacloban, the CWG meetings led to a standardisation of the government’s cash for work wage rates between rural and urban areas (using the urban rate across the board) in order to reduce the perceived risk that higher wages in urban areas would attract rural migrants and delay economic recovery in coastal areas.

**Sharing of standards:** respondents mentioned the importance of the CWG in raising awareness of the nationally-agreed standards for CTP. The example most commonly cited was the circulation of guidance concerning the wage rates and standards to be adopted on cash for work programmes.

**Coordination on market assessments:** working as a group in the early months also led to collaboration on market assessments. In late November 2013, CWG agencies discussed existing market assessments and abandoned original plans to do a joint emergency market mapping assessment (EMMA) as it was decided this was too heavy an analysis and the market was recovering and changing rapidly.

**Building linkages with the clusters:** cluster leads attended CWG meetings and information was channelled back to the cluster. This was well coordinated in places where the cluster leads were taking a role in the mobilisation of the CWG. In Roxas, the CWG was linked to the joint FSAC-ERL cluster meetings in order to bring all partners into the room and to understand where the interventions were potentially overlapping.

Cluster leads also felt that the Cash Coordinator helped greatly by attending cluster meetings to share the information from the CWG.

“*The CWG added value to our programming: for example we changed the value of cash for work payment we were originally planning to give*”.  
ADRA
2 Sharing of resources and experiences:
The CWG was considered by the majority of respondents to provide a forum for experience sharing and learning. During the response and early recovery phase this included sharing guidelines and SOPs for CTPs as well as findings from market assessments, which was highly valued. There were also efforts within the group to develop some common tools such as a joint post-distribution monitoring (PDM) (though as mentioned in Section 3.1 this wasn’t followed through).

What was of particular value later in the early recovery phase and beyond was sharing lessons and best practices from implementation, such as experiences with various payment mechanisms and how to manage delays. These findings influenced the (rehabilitation) programming decisions of some agencies.

“The information sharing on ways agencies were managing the payment process informed our programming. Our internal processes for cash for work were very strict but the group talked about the need for flexibility; I proposed some changes to our finance team and this was agreed – payments now took just three days”.

Plan International

“A [Roxas] CWG meeting on post-emergency added value to recovery and rehabilitation planning. We discussed CTP and access to micro finance; follow up interventions; skills training“.

WFP

“We are looking at partnering with Banko now for a rehabilitation project. They worked with Mercy Corps [during recovery] and we learned about it from them during the lessons learned meetings”.

CRS

3 Resourcing and leadership:
Previously agencies have had to take on the mantle of setting up and chairing CWGs. In the Haiyan response, the provision of a high level, dedicated resource at the national level in the form of the Cash Coordinator, taking on this task of coordinated working was appreciated by all respondents. The positioning of the chair of the CWG within the ICC was thought to offer good potential to ensure cash issues were raised with cluster leads and the HCT.

It was considered that the CWG functioned particularly well in the period between January–March 2014 when USAID/SIMM agreed to chair the group. USAID resourced a ‘secretariat role’ to support group administration including minute taking, sending out invitations etc. The agendas developed by the group coordinators at that time, in Manila and sub-nationally, were generally considered to be relevant. USAID also brought their previous project and technical experience with payment systems to bear in the meetings and this was appreciated by those who attended.

There was similar feedback concerning the CWGs developed at the sub-national level, which did not have dedicated resources. In Roxas and in Guiuan the functioning of these groups was attributed to the commitment of agencies who stepped up, chaired and hosted hosting functions with responsibility for designing the agenda, sending invitations, chairing the meeting and drafting and circulating meeting minutes.

“In Guiuan, commitment to chair the CWG was a big challenge since the area was remote and agencies were struggling with human resources. Agencies committed to having a rotating chair. There was demonstrated added value of OCHA in providing secretarial support for the CWG to host these meetings. This model worked and this sub-national CWG is still functioning“.

UNICEF
4 Interaction with other stakeholders:

It was not only coordination among agencies but the fact that the CWG forum enabled the management of new relationships – with the government and the financial sector – that was appreciated by respondents. A major added value from the perspective of the UN and implementing agencies was the presence of the government, who brought their own ideas and information, and the mobilisation of the FSPs to support cash based responses. The experiences of engagement with the private sector are discussed further in Section Five. The value of coordination with the government was understood at national and provincial levels, including the interaction with DSWD, standard setting; linking with regional departments and sharing information such as commodity prices.

Challenges experienced

Respondents identified a number of challenges that were considered to have limited the potential value of the CWG, including communication challenges, limited resources and limited operational focus.

1 Lack of clarity of structure and function:

In the Haiyan response there was an expansion of implementing agencies that were interested in joining the CWG, a number of them without a long-term presence in the Philippines. This, plus the fact that the group did not yet have a clear institutional structure or TOR, created some difficulties for coordination. The CWG structure and role was discussed for the first time on the 25th November. There was some confusion as to the role and key functions of the CWG, compared to the clusters – though understanding grew over time.

“Not everyone understood or appreciated having another group to attend – though this changed over time”. ILO

“It would have been much more effective if the CWG had been an organised, institutionalised group”. ACF

“If there were any emails from the Manila CWG, I wouldn’t have read them at that time. At that time you are prioritising the local information that you need. People were overwhelmed”. CRS

“Organisations sent different people to the meetings so there was no consistency and things didn’t get acted upon”. Plan International

“During Haiyan, the CWG had a massive increase in representation with most organisations new to the country. We were working on that [a TOR] with CaLP but Haiyan overtook us”. Oxfam

“Sometimes there was a disconnect between discussions in Manila level and regional level”. UNICEF

Despite the recommendation of the Cash Coordinator, some agencies did not send dedicated team members to attend CWG meetings due to time constraints. Added to this was the challenge of high turnover across all organisations, as surge positions gave way to longer term positions and those based in Manila passed through to be based in the response hubs. This created some problems for information management and decision making. It meant that cash coordination information from the CWG wasn’t always being passed on through agencies to where it was needed, whilst there were also delays to decision making and implementation of agreed action points within agencies which caused some frustration for the Cash Coordinators and CWG members. Awareness of the CWG also varied within agencies. For example, a WFP staff member based in Region VI Roxas in early 2014 was not aware of the regional CWG meetings, whilst Save the Children’s shelter coordinator, who arrived in January 2014, was not aware of the CWG in Tacloban until just recently, although the FSL coordinator was attending.
2 Lack of coordination on operational issues:

In section 3.1, the focus of the Cash Coordinator on strategic coordination in the early months at the expense of operational coordination was noted by respondents and this same sentiment was echoed here in relation to the limitations of the CWG.

The majority of respondents from implementing agencies and cluster leads considered this to have been something that was expected from the CWG (i.e. coordination on technical issues for programme design and implementation) that wasn’t seen in practice during the response phase – at least to the extent that it is desirable and possible. There were several reasons identified for this.

Lack of resources: as noted in section 3.1, there was a single national Cash Coordinator expected to engage on strategic and operational issues. The strategic added value of some of the national CWG meetings in the early months was appreciated, and their decision to focus efforts was understood in the context of scarce resources, but the feeling was that this had inevitably been at the expense of a focus on operational coordination. Similarly there was a lack of resources forthcoming from CWG members to take on the role of chairing the CWGs.

Additional barriers to collaboration between agencies: it was noted that, whilst the CWG bought together implementing agencies from the beginning of the response and despite the clear appetite for harmonising operational approaches, since this was being tabled in CWG meetings, there remained barriers to realising these aspirations in practice.

The best example given here of where there was a lot of activity but little coordination is the case of market assessments. Despite much discussion on the topic of joint rapid assessments for key commodities within the national CWG in November and December, joint assessments through the CWG did not happen and agencies generally ended up doing their own. The main reasons for this cited by respondents was a lack of resources (though at one stage there was an offer from WFP of $10,000 funding to cover costs of vehicles and enumerators) combined, critically, with a lack of prior working arrangements. The time that it would have taken to get such a joint approach off the ground, including determining which tool would be used, where resources would come from and agreeing upon MOUs, was considered to be too long and thus agencies reverted to doing their own assessments. Some – but not all – of these assessments were shared with the CWG, whilst others were shared but not in a timely fashion. It was noted that in a high profile emergency, with circumstances changing quickly, agencies may have been worried about releasing information publically.

“There was a lack of operational coordination – joined up assessments, setting of transfer values etc – everyone was looking at their own programme”. UNICEF

“CWG meetings in Manila were aimed much more at policy level, rules and guidelines and with the leadership of the key international organisations and government involved. This is all very important – but there were few meetings for the implementers”. WFP

“At the field level the CWG was 80% strategic coordination rather than operational. The joined up ways of working on technical issues were not covered as much”. Cash Coordinator

“We discussed joint market assessments internally and it was decided the results would come too late. We were not against a joint approach, just doing the organisation of this for the first time after the emergency was not the right time”. Philippines Red Cross

“Even though the CWG was formed, functioning, having a voice, the operational side was not done in a very coordinated way. We especially missed an opportunity on markets”. CaLP

The same can be said for harmonisation of other operational approaches, that requires time and dedication that in the early part of a large rapid response isn’t realistic. This meant that the main added value of operational coordination was around sharing implementation experiences after the response rather than harmonisation of approaches. There was general agreement on the need, going forward, to coordinate on more than just the 3W to enable more harmonised ways of working in these critical areas.

There were comparisons made with operational coordination between agencies during the Syria refugee response in Lebanon and the added value of the CWG there. The difference in the timeframe – a rapid onset
emergency in the case of Haiyan compared to the relative luxury of planning a harmonised approach afforded in the protracted crisis in Lebanon, was noted as a major contributory factor.

3 Limitations of strategic coordination:

It was commonly agreed that, whilst coordination on the 3W through the CWG was beneficial there were factors that placed certain limitations on the extent of strategic coordination during the Haiyan response. The consensus among respondents was that the forum was useful for sharing information on agency plans and locations – however this information led to little in the way of joint analysis and strategies.

“The CWG should be a platform for advocacy. The joint positioning and influencing, on things such as cash for work standards, didn’t happen”.

ACF

“Gaps in coverage were identified but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they will be filled. NGOs were reluctant to move”.

Plan International

“Agencies would share information but there was no appetite to digest and analyse this. It was more around splitting of geographical areas, not making strategies. Everyone was doing their own thing. At one point in Guiuan there were 20-30 organisations doing the same thing”.

WFP

“The CWG needed to include more local NGOs, private sector, LGUs, since there were many other actors using CTP and they were not part of the CWG”.

Save the Children

“It was a missed opportunity for advocacy as a group – for example on the C4W standards and insurance issue”.

Philippines Red Cross

Whilst there are clear examples where coordination helped to avoid duplication, implementing agencies also reported that in some instances agencies would share their implementation plans (geographical location, target population etc) but would be reluctant to change these in the event that they overlapped with the plans of others.

Some agencies reported that in a sense strategic coordination on 3W was a challenge from the beginning as many agencies had a number of projects scattered over the entire affected area rather than concentrated activities within a particular geographical location. The comparison was made to coordination of CTP in Lebanon where there was a more defined demarcation of organisations and operational areas (though it should be noted that this has not been without challenges).

Whilst the geography of the Philippines contributed to this to some extent there was agreement that agencies could have tightened their geographical focus had there been more collaboration on strategic positioning from the beginning.

A contributing factor mentioned here was the difference in information on response coverage that could sometimes be found between the CWG and the local government units, meaning that agencies may have preferred to stick to their original assessments and plan. Meanwhile, there were a host of ‘non-traditional’ humanitarian actors including LGUs, private sector and faith based organisations also responding through CTP who were not engaging with the CWG, and this further limited the value of coordination through the CWG – both from the perspective of 3W and standard setting.

Finally, agencies spoke about the added value of coordinating as a group that was not taken advantage of. Some agencies considered that whilst the work on standard setting was very useful, programming would have benefited from further joint analysis. One example given was a lack of a common standard on the type of cash for work participants were doing, with some organisations prohibiting activities like weeding and some allowing it. Another was the challenge of filling the gap in people’s basic needs through cash for work. Agencies agreed on the importance of having a standard wage rate, however it was also noted that the cost of household needs at that time were very often beyond the minimum wage and this was evident from PDM data on expenditure patterns of households.

More joined up thinking, within or between agencies, to ‘top up’ or fill this gap, could have been beneficial. This requires collaborative ways of working across sectors and this wasn’t something that the CWG was able to contribute to in the aftermath of Haiyan. This relates to the realities of the cluster-based coordination system and some of the challenges of coordinating activities across clusters and between clusters and the CWG, which
are the focus of section 3.3. There were also agencies that didn’t undertake cash for work which were a little frustrated at the amount of time given to discuss these issues in the group.

Finally it was considered that acting as a group could have had value in terms of advocacy and influence – something which has been a feature of CWGs in other emergencies\textsuperscript{36} – but that the CWG in the Philippines was too loose a structure to have impact here. This again is something that requires resources and commitment on the part of agencies.

“If these [regional] structures don’t exist or coordination functions are not being fulfilled it becomes ‘coordination for survival: Agencies just get pulled in all directions to muddle through’.”  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{UNICEF}}}}

“One limitation of the regional CWG hubs is the time that they were set up. Another is resources”.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{WFP}}}}

“The [regional] CWGs were supported by the Cash Coordinator. But for L3 emergencies it’s essential to have the resources needed on the ground, today, not to have a request for support from Manila in a week. This needs to change in future”.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{OCHA ICC Tacloban}}}}

“The regional CWGs in Tacloban had no leadership as agencies had no time. Everyone had day jobs and were based in different places. The group shared some information but then it died off”.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{CRS}}}}

“There is value in coordination [through a CWG] but the timeliness and the way it’s being done is not leveraging the most added value”.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{ILO}}}}

“In the first instance the CWG was filling a gap – the first few meetings were very useful. But, there was a question mark on its utility as time went on, as the activity was going on in the hubs”.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{CaLP}}}}

4  \textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{No planned regional focus of the CWG:}}}

The set-up of the regional CWG’s was not a planned directive rather something that evolved as the need was realised. There was consensus that the potential added value was limited by the fact that the operational hubs were not planned for and resourced.

An action point from the CWG meeting of 25\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{th}} November 2013 was to establish CWGs in the field ‘as soon as possible’, however, there were no resources with which to do this, even though the Cash Coordinator looked for support from CaLP, the UN and implementing agencies interested to volunteer to take on a coordination role.

Over the next couple of months, nothing was formalised, however, as the response transitioned away from Manila to the affected regions, the need for more coordination at the sub-national level was realised in order to avoid duplication and to better coordinate with the local government. The establishment of these groups did not take place until the middle of Quarter 1, 2014 and only then because certain agencies assumed the leadership alongside their other duties.

The lack of dedicated resources for CWG coordination proved a challenge. In Guiuan this was solved through the establishment of a rotating chair between member agencies, whilst the OCHA sub-office also provided some hosting support in the form of a venue. This roundtable approach worked and the group is still functioning today. One limitation was that action points could be lost if they were not finalised at the point at which an agency handed over the lead of the group. In Roxas, the solution was to absorb the CWG into the joint FSAC-ERL cluster to relieve the burden of coordination on the chairs, since at the time most (traditional) agencies implementing CTP responses were attending these clusters. However, this led to challenges for organisations working with cash for other needs (unconditional cash and shelter). In Tacloban city the lack of dedicated resources for coordinating the group coupled with the roving nature of a number of agencies’ staff contributed to the demise of the group. For those groups that did continue the functions of the group were limited by these delays and resource challenges.

In this context, respondents agreed on the importance of sub-national groups for response coordination and on the importance of consistency in approach and information dissemination between the national CWG and those in the regions.

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{36} See Kauffman and Collins (2012)}}
3.3 CASH PROGRAMMING AND THE CLUSTER SYSTEM

3.3.1 Background

Approximately two weeks after the emergency the cluster coordination system was functioning in Manila and at the regional level in Regions VI and VIII. Cluster coordination in the Philippines is defined by the TOR of the cluster leads. Prior to the clusters being established in the regions, agencies came together for ad hoc coordination meetings. In Roxas, the FSAC and ERL clusters eventually merged to create one coordination group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Estimated budget USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food/AG</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>165,563,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95,840,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90,137,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16,594,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,892,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>~350 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cash as a response modality was discussed from day one of the ad hoc cluster meetings and this continued in the clusters, though there were concerns and questions about the market’s capacity to recover and respond to the demand created by CTP, particularly in Tacloban.

In the first week of December, CaLP and the Cash Coordinator’s analysis of 52 SRP proposals showed the extent of CTPs being planned within the sectors to meet needs relating to Food Security, Early Recovery, Livelihoods and Shelter, including plans for UCT (see Box 3.3). The earliest CTPs were being implemented in the affected areas by December 2013.

3.3.2 Experiences of cash coordination in the cluster system

Respondents from international organisations, donors and implementing agencies shared their reflections on how CTP was coordinated by the cluster system during the Haiyan response and early recovery period. These are summarised in Table 3.3.

What worked well

Respondents were able to highlight several instances where the cluster system supported sectoral coordination of CTP during response and early recovery. These relate to the FSAC and ERL clusters since programming under the shelter cluster was beset by various delays, and agencies, with some notable exceptions, were mainly focused on in kind delivery during the initial months.

1 Standardising approaches and transfer values:

The FSAC and ERL clusters supported the development of some standard approaches for CTP as well as the dissemination and widespread adoption of these during the response and early recovery phases. In December, the FSAC cluster leads provided guidance to their members on the size of UCTs, based on the cost of the MEB. Meanwhile the FSAC and ERL cluster leads disseminated the guidance note from the Cash Coordinator on the agreed transfer values and standards/guidance for cash for work activity.

---

37 Cluster lead TOR
38 PhP 4300 per month for a family of five.
2 Identification of gaps and duplication:

The coordination of 3W within the clusters was felt to have some added value to cross-agency planning and strategy development and there were examples of where this reduced duplication. For example, overlaps in the city of Ormoc between Save the Children’s and Oxfam’s programmes were identified and avoided through the cluster meetings.

Table 3.3 Experiences of Cash Coordination in the Cluster System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What worked well</th>
<th>What were the challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Standardising approaches to CTP design and transfer values within sectoral areas.</td>
<td>• Challenges of reporting CTP, when provided with the intention of meeting multiple needs and/or without enforceable conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sharing information and tools.</td>
<td>• Lack of accountability of cluster leads in ensuring appropriate or joint response analysis within and between clusters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying gaps and duplications.</td>
<td>• Inherent barriers of the system to use of cash as a cross-sectoral tool.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with Mercy Corps, Red Cross, Plan, Save the Children, IRC, WFP, ILO, UNICEF, OCHA, ECHO, CaLP.

3 Sharing information and tools:

The FSAC cluster meetings provided a useful forum for sharing information and learning between members. The main example given was sharing the findings of market assessments within the clusters as per some of the CaLP and Cash Coordinator’s recommendations for coordination on market assessments (Box 3.4). This included WFP’s analysis of the rice value chain, as well as efforts to reduce duplication between agencies. In the initial response period in Roxas the FSAC organised a markets sub-working group at the end of the cluster meetings and a number of implementing agencies volunteered to lead assessment of particular markets and to share results39.

There were also cases of NGOs undertaking assessments individually in the areas where they worked and then sharing their findings with the cluster lead for distribution.

Agencies appreciated the establishment of a livelihoods sub-working group under the ERL cluster which shared valuable technical information on particular value chains, such as the coconut value chain, to inform cash based interventions. This worked well in Roxas where the CWG meetings had been merged with the joint FSAC-ERL cluster meetings, and where implementing agencies and cluster leads highlighted a number of cash-specific information sharing sessions, as mentioned under section 3.2.

---
39 ACF led on food; IRC on the value chain for fisheries livelihoods; and Save the Children on boat materials (interview with IRC).
BOX 3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CLUSTERS AND CWG ON COORDINATION OF MARKET ASSESSMENTS

1. At a hub/programme level and a cluster level, identify the markets systems that are of most concern – commodities where there is concern that the market may not respond appropriately – for further investigation.

2. There is a need to understand the local (and national) manufacturing and capacity. A number of commodities are produced in the typhoon affected areas – such as CGI sheeting, rice and fresh vegetables amongst others.

3. For commodities that have sensitive market systems, (construction materials and rice) the humanitarian community needs to estimate the aggregate demand that will be placed on the supply chains to see whether or not it can respond within desired timeframes.

4. Agencies can look at market based interventions such as trader support and warehousing support to assist the capacity of the market to respond. This analysis should take place at a regional level with a link to national markets to check national availability of items and to research the opportunity of relocating items with the support of the DTI/ trader and wholesaler networks.

5. Use the CWG and cluster meetings as a platform for these discussions and actions, and harmonise approaches between agencies conducting CTP.

Source: CaLP (2013)

Limitations of the cluster system for cash coordination

There were challenges noted by cluster leads and implementing agencies which limited the ability of organisations to coordinate further on cash within and between the clusters. These highlight the inherent challenges of using a system set up for sectoral programme design and implementation to coordinate interventions that now have the potential to achieve outcomes in multiple sectors.

“We decided to report [UCT programme] to the FSAC – but then monitoring showed that more than 50% of CTP expenditure was on household’s shelter needs. There was also the risk of double counting – initially our shelter team also reported the PDM results to the shelter cluster, though this was then addressed”. — Philippines Red Cross

“We were reporting on our cash for work project to the ERL cluster; then I received an email on the need to also report to the FSAC as some of the work was de-clogging of agriculture drains. We sent our total project targets and numbers to both clusters. We need to know this ahead of time in order to recode internal databases”. — Plan

“I reported all the FSL activities [on their integrated programme providing UCT covering basic needs and CCT for shelter] to the FSAC. I only reported the amounts transferred for FSL”. — Save the Children

“All our cash programmes were reported to the ERL cluster. But, the major expenditure on the early cash for work and the UCT was spent on food”. — Oxfam

“We provided UCT, which we expected to be spent on food and other early recovery needs of the household. We ended up reporting in the early recovery cluster, for consistency. So our outcomes on shelter and food are not included in shelter or food security totals or maps”. — Mercy Corps

“Everyone struggled on the UCT. Some NGO were giving grants double the food basket and reporting it under the FSAC. Cash provided under FSAC projects was having impact on other areas – such as Education. Looking at UCT illustrates the cash coordination issue at large as UCT can be spent on anything.” — WFP
1 Reporting challenges for CTP:
Several challenges identified by the cluster leads, implementing agencies and OCHA were the difficulties that agencies faced firstly reporting on CTP within the cluster system and secondly collating this information to develop an informed, strategic overview.

For agencies providing UCT with the intention of meeting multiple needs, and also in cases where transfers were given with the intention of meeting a sector-specific objective but still provided as a fungible (essentially unconditional) cash grant, there was confusion on how to report on CTP through the cluster system. It was clear from early 3W plans in November 2013 that this was raising risks of duplication of figures or of under-reporting CTP. The Cash Coordinator discussed this with the CWG members. Rather than split reporting between clusters, it was thought more straightforward for agencies to report a programme’s cash activity once, through a particular cluster according to the programme’s primary objective.

Guidance on this was circulated to the cluster leads and through the CWG. However, this was interpreted in different ways and agencies pointed out the challenge of this approach when it comes to reporting on the achievement of sector objectives.

There were challenges in the collation of information by the clusters and OCHA to accurately capture cash activities. One issue was that the SRP targets and related cluster reporting formats were sector rather than modality based, meaning data on funds going towards CTP was not systematically monitored or aggregated. The 3W consolidated by OCHA from the Information Management units of clusters showed that there was no standardized way of reporting cash-based interventions within and across clusters, including in the terminology or categorisation being used.

Another difficulty was that information, when shared, was not always updated and so 3W maps were out of date. Some respondents attributed this to a lack of resources at the sub-national level. As noted in Section 3.1 there were efforts made by the interim Cash Coordinator to make changes to the 3W reporting format used by the cluster leads to give more consistency and accuracy to CTP reporting, however these were not followed through by cluster leads and reporting agencies.

2 Limitations to intra-cluster strategic coordination and response planning:
As with strategic coordination in the CWG in Section 3.2, respondents noted that whilst cluster coordination improved awareness of activities and avoided duplication, various factors limited the potential of such strategic coordination for more effective response planning.

It was generally considered that agencies tended to decide themselves where and how they were planning to intervene and were willing to share information, but not necessarily to readjust programmes. The cluster was seen to perform an information sharing function but not to influence programming decisions. There was a lack of joined up analysis and therefore no consistent rationale for modalities being proposed between agencies – in some cases in the same areas both cash and in kind responses were being proposed and these were not reviewed or changed as a result of discussion in the cluster.

Another limitation mentioned, was that some strategic guidance came too late to inform the design of agencies’ programmes.

---

40 OCHA Cash Coordination Update December 2013: “To increase the accuracy in reporting, please report your cash activity once, through one cluster. In the case of Cash-for-Work, ‘Emergency Employment’ is reported through the Early Recovery-Livelihood and Education Clusters, and ‘Cash-for-Asset Recovery’ is reported through the FSAC and Shelter Clusters. For UCTs, the organisation will need to decide which cluster most suits your programme objectives”.
41 Interviews with OCHA, ILO, UNICEF, Edwina
42 Interviews with WFP and interim and full time Cash Coordinators; Bailey (2015)
43 Interviews with CARE, CRS
44 For example it was reported that neither the ERL cluster, nor the FSAC in Roxas had an information manager.
45 Interviews with WFP, Oxfam, CRS, CaLP
46 Interviews with Red Cross, Mercy Corps, Cash Coordinator
There was no champion of multi-agency market assessments. I would have gladly led this charge but I had a job to do, an agency to represent. Coordination comes down to being someone’s job and having time to do it”.

“There was overwhelming support for the idea of a joint livelihoods assessment – it didn’t get off the ground. Ultimately it’s still easier for each partner to do them and share”.

“In our operational area these places were assessed several times”.

“Everyone did their own coconut market assessments. This risks wasting funds, as well as the time and energy of communities. But there were not personal relationships built at that stage”.

“There is added value of doing this in a more joined up way. There was no one to lead the concept. It was not the right time after emergency”.

3 Lack of coordination on market assessments

Respondents commented on the general lack of coordination on market assessments within the clusters, beyond circulation of assessments by individual agencies. Cluster leads mentioned the lack of funding available for clusters to support more harmonised approaches to such assessments. Agencies felt that this did happen because there was no one taking on the task of coordinating multi-agency assessments and no agreed ways of working.

There was comparison made to an inter-agency Value Chain and Market Assessment currently being undertaken for several agricultural commodities. This was arranged in a non-emergency setting and got off the ground because of inter-agency relationships that developed during the response and early recovery period. Even in a non-emergency setting there were still complexities faced when it came to agreeing how every organization can contribute economic resources from different budgets – such that in the end it was agreed that FAO would fund the whole thing.

The market assessments that did take place were focused on particular commodities of interest. There was a lack of focus on the general retail market chain which would have been most useful for agencies using cash transfers to cover a broad range of needs. This limited the implementation of some of the market coordination actions recommended by CaLP (Box 3.4) such as discussion and coordination of economic programming to support recovery of small enterprises.

4 Limited cross-sector coordination of cash:

What is evident from this review was the limited coordination that went on between clusters during the response and recovery phases. This was a limitation of coordination generally (not specific to cash) that was identified in the operational peer review as being a risk to economic recovery – however it is particularly pertinent to CTP given that CTP cuts across sectors and has implications for supporting economic recovery. The main issue is where cash coordination sits within the current humanitarian coordination system. The ICC meetings and the CWG were identified by respondents as two forums which provided an opportunity for coordinating CTP across clusters during Haiyan, and the Cash Coordinator (as chair of the CWG and member of the ICC meetings) provides a link between these forums.

In Eastern Visayas there were food and cash interventions going on at the same time. If the FSAC had been able to track the cash interventions, through the CWG, and seen the impact on food, my advice would have been to tell food partners to stop immediately”.

47 Interviews with Oxfam, CRS, Save the Children and FAO

48 Interview with IRC

49 IASC (2014): All partners in the HCT self-assessment emphasized the importance of the transition from relief to recovery and highlighted the need to plan recovery on an inter-cluster as well as inter-agency basis. Nevertheless the “how” to do it – both as a system and practically on the ground – has yet to be secured. The team observed that neither the HCT nor the inter-cluster coordination group have developed a cross-sectoral approach to ensuring a smooth transition, and many clusters felt unable to move forward. The inter-cluster coordination group in Manila was viewed as focusing on processes rather than identify and raising cross-cutting issues of strategic importance for HCT guidance and decision-making.”
There was some evidence of inter-cluster coordination on cash issues, in terms of the attendance of the Cash Coordinator at cluster and ICC meetings, discussion of cash in the ICC meetings\(^{50}\) and the setting of standards for CTPs\(^{51}\). In Roxas the joint leadership of the FSAC and ERL cluster and the links that were developed to the CWG are positive examples of the potential for cash coordination across sectors – which succeeded in overcoming the CTP reporting issue between clusters and meant cash issues became more of an agenda item in cluster meetings.

There were also some examples provided where discussions on coordination of CTP for achieving complementary sector objectives did take place\(^{52}\). However, this was considered to be because certain agencies were attending multiple cluster meetings and had prior experiences of working with each other – rather than this being driven through any formal coordination between the clusters. In the clusters where cash was a major response modality there were no joined up approaches across clusters, for example the setting of an agreed MEB for meeting multiple needs or to response analysis. There were a number of reasons given for this:

**Lack of formal engagement of cluster leads with the CWG:** Having the CWG as a technical advisory body outside of the cluster system has advantages, however there needs to be defined links and channels for two way information sharing with the clusters.

It was reported that the engagement of cluster leads with the CWG in the early months varied and not all leads attended the CWG\(^{53}\).

> “The importance of UCT came out during early discussions of the ICC. But, the programmes that followed, whilst some were unconditional, were still generally situated within analysis of a particular sectoral need”.

Cash Coordinator

> “We had separate programmes – some CTP for shelter (Samar) and CTP for nutrition, as well as CTP for Food Security. We had separate assessments for each sector cash project. Linking together assessments and response analysis is the next step”.

ACF

> “Right now we have sectoral analysis and discrete projects; this is partly internally driven and partly donor interest”.

Plan

> “Coordination for multi-purpose cash begins in your own agency. This needs to be integrated geographically, and in terms of modalities, programme plans and response analysis”.

Save the Children

Some of this was considered due to a lack of previous experience and the Cash Coordinator sought to overcome this through actively attending cluster meetings and inviting Cluster leads to co-host strategic CWG meetings. Some respondents saw this as part of a broader issue of the accountability of Cluster leads, who it was reported can be more agency-focused than cluster-minded and focused on mandates, which can limit the linkages between the cluster work and the working groups.

> “Compared to previous emergencies, coordination [on the ground in Tacloban] in this first month was the most difficult I’ve seen, as there were many more partners on the ground. There were over 100 organisations working in Tacloban at that time and only 20% were linking with the clusters”.

Save the Children

**Limitations of the ICC coordination forum during Haiyan:** Whilst CTP was discussed in the ICC meetings there were various factors that limited the value of this forum for cross-cluster coordination of CTP during Haiyan. This is a new role for OCHA and there were no concrete tools available to share in these ICC meetings that coordinators could use to better support coordination of CTP either within or across sectors. It was also

---

\(^{50}\) Confirmed by cluster leads, Cash Coordinator and OCHA Inter Cluster Coordinator

\(^{51}\) ICCOG (2014); NAC (2013)

\(^{52}\) Examples given were the links between livelihood and education sectors through C4W for school rehabilitation, and between livelihoods and shelter, through C4W for shelter objectives.

\(^{53}\) Interviews with CalP, WFP, IRC, Cash Coordinator, ICC, UNICEF
identified that the ICC needed to have more buy in and appreciation for CTP as a strategic issue, to get cash on the agenda at ICC meetings and to consider more practical ways for cluster coordinators to cooperate on cross cutting issues.\(^\text{54}\) There was little interaction with the Humanitarian Coordinator on cash issues, which could in turn have influenced response analysis and planning in the various clusters. Cluster leads considered that these meetings could sometimes feel like one way flow of information, from leads to OCHA rather than a dialogue on strategic issues across clusters\(^\text{55}\) – to which OCHA agreed.

**Internal barriers – systems and mind-sets:** Besides the structural and institutional barriers to cross-sector coordination on cash identified above, another barrier to cross-sector coordination of CTP in Haiyan identified was the mind-set within agencies. Humanitarian programming has been conditioned with a sectoral focus. Interest is growing for more integrated programming focused on holistic outcomes for wellbeing and economic recovery and CTP is driving this interest. Tools and systems to support these new ways of working are still developing and mind-sets are transitioning. Donor reporting systems were also felt to be geared towards designing and reporting on particular sectoral objectives.

5 **Exclusion of non-traditional actors:**

A feature of the Haiyan response as mentioned in Section One was the number of ‘non-traditional’ humanitarian actors engaging in the response, including church groups, CSOs and other non-conventional organisations such as home owner associations and rotary clubs. This was a challenge for the coordination of cash and in kind responses since these organisations were outside of the cluster coordination system, yet were contributing significantly to the relief effort.

This had implications for the effectiveness of CTP coordination. It was a frustration to international agencies who were participating in the cluster system since it limited the value of strategic coordination between agencies on things such as 3W and standard setting. It contributed to overlap and duplication of CTP and inconsistency in wage rates and transfer values between programmes. There were concerns amongst some agencies that these organisations were implementing CTP without due consideration to the risks, such as whether markets could respond\(^\text{56}\).

The experiences during Haiyan engaging ‘non-traditional’ actors and the implications for future coordination of CTP are best illustrated by the case of Tzu Chi, a Buddhist NGO founded in Taiwan and operating in the Philippines for 20 years. In the emergency phase of November 2013 to January 2014, Tzu Chi mobilised and implemented over PhP 1.2 billion (US $27 million) worth of relief including commodity distribution, cash for work, direct cash and costs of mobilising equipment and logistics. This experience is detailed in Box 3.5. Almost every respondent interviewed mentioned Tzu Chi. During the response phase many agencies reportedly felt frustrated by their lack of coordination and adherence to standards, had been sceptical about their plans to deliver cash at scale so early in the response and had had reservations about the potential harm that this could do. However respondents were unanimous that Tzu Chi had achieved what no humanitarian agency had thought was possible in those early months and that the feedback from communities supported by Tzu Chi was overwhelmingly positive. It was noted that markets had indeed generally been able to respond to the demand created by Tzu Chi’s cash injection – indeed, that the Tzu Chi intervention had likely supported economic recovery in the region. Some respondents also considered that the cash amounts provided by Tzu Chi – though larger than those provided by most if not all other agencies – were maybe more in keeping with the level of needs at that time.

---

\(^{54}\) Comparison was made by one respondent to the treatment of gender in ICC discussions, where there was much theoretical discussion of this as a cross-cutting issue, but nothing concrete in terms of convening action through linking the gender focal point to gender expertise and women’s groups in the area.

\(^{55}\) Interviews with UNICEF, ILO, WFP; IASC (2014)

\(^{56}\) ICC, Chamber of Commerce, Save, Oxfam, ACF, ILO
3.4 LESSONS EMERGING FROM CASH COORDINATION DURING HAIYAN

The experiences of cash coordination within the humanitarian coordination system during the Haiyan response and early recovery phase generated a number of lessons which should inform the future planning and implementation of coordination structures and roles in the Philippines and internationally. These findings are in line with the conclusions of the 2015 meeting of the national CWG as well as the UN Typhoon Haiyan Lessons Learned workshop in 2014.

3.4.1 Added value of the Cash Coordinator and Cash Working Group

It was generally agreed that a Cash Coordination position had much potential added value and that the positioning of the role within OCHA and under the ICC was appropriate. People saw the added coordination value OCHA had supporting the coordination of activities across sectors given its impartiality and mandate for coordination, information management and advocacy whilst the ICC provided access to decision makers across the cluster system. It was noted that the Cash Coordinator took on some tasks that in previous emergencies fell to a CWG and that this created better institutionalisation of these activities within the humanitarian coordination system.

Minutes of the CWG meeting Jan 2015; Krishnan et al (2014)
In the aftermath of Haiyan, Tzu Chi launched an international fundraising appeal through the organisation’s network of volunteers and their own TV station. Their priority and starting principle was to help a large number of people quickly and with dignity, whilst preventing risk of further health epidemics.

Tzu Chi engaged with organisations within the Philippines on previous disaster responses including cash for work activities. They had never engaged with the international humanitarian coordination system. Their network shared learning from Tzu Chi’s response to a similar disaster in Taiwan where they supported a rapid cash-based response at scale through cash for work. Tzu Chi had mobilised and paid close to 10,000 people every day, who had in turn volunteered their time to clean up of the community, using their own tools.

Less than two weeks after Haiyan, Tzu Chi saw there was a clear demand amongst the affected population for cash. They followed the same principles in the Philippines and began cash distributions on 20th November 2013 through cash for work. The priority was getting money into people’s hands, the completion of the work was seen as important but secondary to cash assistance. Rather than delay the distribution, their message to communities was to help in any way they could and to bring what tools they had available.

At the time some businesses had pulled out of the affected areas on account of the looting. Through their links to the Chinese business community and Chinese Chamber of Commerce, they raised awareness amongst entrepreneurs of their plans for large scale cash assistance and their need for a supply of goods. Entrepreneurs took action. By the second or third day of the cash distribution, the market was responding to the demand.

Tzu Chi adopted a blanket targeting in the areas where they were working and aimed to support all those who registered for support each day. There was no limit to the number of days allocated to a household or individual. There was huge demand which grew throughout the week, as no other organisation was implementing cash assistance at that time. The first day saw 600 people turn up for work; by the second day there were 2,000 people and by the third day, 6,000 people. Tzu Chi took the following steps to manage this:

- They had no pre-existing payment provider so rather than waste time setting this up, Tzu Chi mobilised their international network of volunteers who brought cash from banks in Manila and Cebu. Payments were made manually through the volunteers at the end of each day.
- Rather than work with small denominations which had limited their speed of implementation in Ketsana, they rounded up the daily wage to PhP 500/day/person. This meant each worker could be paid with a single PhP 500 note and provided a sum that Tzu Chi felt was more in keeping with the needs of those affected, since commodities were more expensive than usual.
- Workers were organised into teams of ten people and payments were made at the end of the day to the team leader, for distribution to the team, relying on peer pressure to ensure payments reached those for whom they were intended. Administration was minimal since targeting was blanket and self-targeted. Simple registration papers were handed out to teams during registration and collected in at the end of the day when payment was made. There was also no ‘monitoring’ of the work completed.

This meant eight volunteers were able to pay approximately 4,000 people within the hour. The response was implemented and wages were paid for 300,000 days of work in just ten days and delivered over PhP 150million into the local economy during the response period.

Tzu Chi began direct cash assistance to vulnerable families in December 2013, in consultation with the LGU. This provided a one-off ‘lump sum’ UCT to meet the recovery needs of affected families. They considered that families would need support mostly for shelter and livelihoods, since the cash for work and food aid of other organisations was likely to be meeting other basic needs. In the interests of time and given the scale of need they decided against defining grant sizes according to the level of damage to assets and instead based it on family size, providing grants of between PhP 8000–15,000. Between December and January the programme covered over 60,000 households in Region VIII and distributed over PhP 750million in direct cash.
Respondents agreed that a CWG is of both strategic and operational value and that addressing both issues should be within such a group’s functions. A CWG can have an important role to play, beyond that of a knowledge sharing and information platform, and beyond discussion of theoretical issues, to actively influence the direction of programming in future responses and more joined up ways of working, particularly assessments and analysis, for efficiency and effectiveness and to support evolution of CTP that cuts across sectors. The communication channels used by the Cash Coordinator (face to face meetings; email updates; and the web platform) were all felt to add value – though keeping communications streamlined and manageable were felt to be important.

The CWG offered an opportunity to develop a guiding framework for all actors engaging in cash based programming as well as programmatic advice in the field. It was felt that in this context, strategic coordination was important at national and sub-national levels whilst operational coordination was a priority within the regions, and that strong coordination links should be fostered between national and regional coordination structures. There was a strong feeling that such a focus on strategic issues for the first time post disaster was perhaps not the best use of Cash Coordinator and CWG resources since these require more time to follow through. This is covered further in 3.5.3.

3.4.2 The need for resources

A clear lesson emerging was the need to properly resource such coordination roles and structures if they are to achieve their full potential. The Cash Coordinator role, at least in the context of Haiyan, was acknowledged to be too broad for one person. There was an identified need to have support to pursue both strategic and operational functions and to have dedicated support for cash coordination at the sub-national level. It was also noted by most respondents that at least in the short to medium term this role required more than coordination skills, it required technical expertise to influence coordinated cash-based response planning across sectors and that OCHA must consider whether these skill sets can be combined in a single position. There should be resources at the sub-national level to account for regional contextual differences.

There was also a need during the Haiyan response for a cash coordination structure with agreed functions, not only at the national level but also close to the response coordination sites, from the beginning of the response phase. Experiences at the sub-national level highlight the importance of leadership – of a clearly identified person or agency with the capacity to fulfil some or all of the group’s coordination functions – and of secretariat support for administration of the group. There was consensus that a dedicated resource, rather than adding coordination responsibilities to an existing full time post, was necessary. Linked to this, another lesson was the importance of having the right people from member agencies consistently, attending meetings if the CWG is to be able to move forward on decision making and actions.

3.4.3 Clarity on roles and responsibilities

In the future it was agreed that it would be important to have more thought and broader understanding across agencies of the role and functions of a Cash Coordinator, and in the event that CaLP or another agency is seconded to provide support, what the division of labour is between the Cash Coordinator and this support.

There is a need to clarify whether a Cash Coordinator should be considered as technical support to inter-cluster coordination, or a strategic coordinator in their own right. The Operational Peer Review recommended the former (from the perspective of all the cross-cutting advisory roles, including cash) but the findings of this research suggest there is a common agreement on the need for a strategic and dedicated function for cash coordination. There was also a need identified for training and sensitisation for ICCs on CTP issues so as to be able to promote the strategic importance of some of the technical advice.

“At the time I thought CaLP was the best for hosting the CWG – but this leads to issues on funding, longevity and mandate. It shouldn’t be CALP leading on the coordination per se but perhaps in a supporting technical role”.

Ex-CaLP Asia Focal Point

IASC (2014)
“We need OCHA to have people deployed who understand strategy and guidelines and also how the implementation works – how to design and deliver.”

WFP

“Anything that is included in emergency response needs to be part of our preparedness planning”.

OCHA

Similarly, it was considered that a CWG requires a clear Terms of Reference, endorsed by the government and HCT, and a clear position within the humanitarian coordination structure so that the added value of the CWG for coordination is well understood by all – since coordination is an investment of people’s time, and needs to serve a clear and valued purpose. It was felt that more delineation of the role of the Cluster, and cluster leads, versus the role of the CWG and Cash Coordinator, and more formalised coordination between these forums (and with the ICC) would be beneficial. Coordination within the clusters is discussed further below.

3.4.4 The importance of preparedness

Several of the challenges identified, which limited the effectiveness of the Cash Coordinator’s role, the full added value of the CWG for strategic and operational coordination and coordination within the clusters, are linked to disaster preparedness. They highlight the value of planning in the time between emergencies. In the immediate aftermath of a rapid onset emergency of this scale there is not time for organisational reflection or to develop new ways of working; whilst information generated from coordination activities needs to be delivered in a timely fashion if it is to influence response analysis and programme design. Certainly this will be essential to support movement towards MPCG, for which the pre-requisites are critical thinking and development of tools and approaches for response analysis and implementation that cut across sectoral boundaries.

The focus needs to be on establishing and maintaining a functional institution that can make inroads into some of the humanitarian cash coordination tasks in a non-emergency setting, whilst ensuring that standards and ways of working developed during the Haiyan response do not have to be reinvented but can be easily and quickly shared. This again aligns with OCHA’s mandate which is to support emergency preparedness in a non-emergency setting. The Philippines CWG had been originally set up prior to Haiyan but the impetus for its existence was always externally driven and interest waned post-emergency. Emerging from the experiences of Haiyan was an interest within a core group of agencies with a long term presence in the country, to see how to make the CWG a functioning and sustainable structure. There is also the added value of OCHA noted here since a core function of the organisation in the Philippines is disaster preparedness.

Similarly greater cross-sector coordination of cash would benefit from the development of concrete tools that the ICC can share with cluster leads and that can be used to inform the Humanitarian Response Plan. These can only be developed in a non-emergency setting. Tool development should take into account potential linkages with social protection schemes – the focus of Section Four.

3.4.5 Linking with actors outside the traditional humanitarian sphere

There was agreement that a CWG or similar coordination structure has a role linking with other actors involved in CTP to coordinate more extensively on targeting and adopting standard ways of working. In the context of the Philippines this includes linking with the government at national and local levels, and raising awareness with non-traditional actors – such as faith based organisations and the private sector. This should be seen as a two way process for learning. It was also considered that such actors may be reluctant to coordinate on standard approaches if there is the risk that doing so impacts negatively on their own ability to respond efficiently and effectively.

3.4.6 The potential of and barriers to MPCG and implications for the cluster system

Agencies that had implemented UCT or undertaken CTP to meet objectives in multiple sectors (whether sector-specific or MPCG) were unanimous as to the benefits of moving towards more integrated and cross-sector ways of programming through CTP, for both the agency and beneficiaries. The experience of Save the Children provides a useful illustration here and is shown in Box 3.6.
CASH COORDINATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

BOX 3.6 SAVE THE CHILDREN’S EXPERIENCE OF MEETING CROSS SECTORAL NEEDS WITH CASH

Shelter, food security and livelihoods are three of the NGO’s core competency areas. In the response phase, Save the Children implemented a variety of humanitarian response programmes which included cash modalities, including programmes with a cash for shelter, cash for food security and cash for livelihood recovery objective. The shelter and FSL programmes were conceived of separately and implemented in different geographical areas, targeting different beneficiaries. Each involved a separate needs assessment and the value of the cash grants were calculated according to the needs relating to that particular sector – rather than the cumulative needs of the household. PDM data from the shelter programme highlighted that much of the grant intended for shelter was being spent to cover household’s food needs.

This led to the development of a more integrated, multi-sectoral package during the recovery phase with the objective of meeting households’ shelter needs whilst making people’s lives generally more secure. This comprised of:

- A single UCT of PhP 5,000, for food and basic needs to be determined by the household.
- A conditional cash grant for shelter, delivered in three tranches, with later tranches provided once progress in the construction of the shelter was confirmed.
- A single livelihoods grant of PhP 6,700, provided after attendance at skills training and development of a business proposal.

PDM found that 96% of families then spent their shelter money on shelter and that the household didn’t have other unmet needs. It meant that people’s real priorities were taken into account.

This integrated approach was also more efficient for Save the Children – by providing shelter support through cash, the programme was able to cover shelter needs of the affected population in four months, and on 30% less budget than they would have achieved by providing this support in kind.

*Source: interview Save the Children*

Respondents considered that the challenges of cash coordination within the cluster system experienced during Haiyan were barriers for integrated programming and for the use of CTP – including MPCG – to meet needs in multiple sectors. These were considered by many respondents to be fundamental to the design of the present sectoral coordination system, and to be constraining efforts to adapt programming to global trends and enable more effective response. Whether solutions can be found within this structure, or whether this may require more radical changes to humanitarian coordination mechanisms was a topic of some debate. This also raised questions for donors and about how emergency funding should be used and reported on.
Key Takeaways of the Review

1. The Cash Coordinator position and Cash Working Group forum both demonstrated added value that contributed to greater streamlining of decision-making and implementation of CTP across agencies. There were several factors during the Haiyan response that limited the full potential of these coordination mechanisms including lack of resources, preparedness, attitudes, exclusion of 'non-traditional actors,' and lack of clarity on the structure and functions of these mechanisms.

2. UCT made up a significant portion of the cash based response to Typhoon Haiyan. In most cases these programmes and the cash values provided were still aiming to achieve sector-specific objectives and not designed to cover all of an affected household’s needs. There remain a number of barriers to overcome for agencies to move towards using more flexible cash grants. Some are internal barriers including structures and mind sets. The sectoral structure and other limitations of the cluster coordination system created barriers to the analysis, design and monitoring of integrated programmes and flexible cash grants. A CWG has the potential to bridge some of these barriers.

3. To better support cash coordination in future humanitarian interventions, especially in a way that allows cash to bridge sector divides, investments are required throughout the disaster management cycle but particularly as part of disaster preparedness, capacity and tool development, consideration of how to coordinate with non-traditional actors and changes of mindsets.

“Do we take baby steps and try to bend the existing system to make it more relevant; or do we need to fundamentally change the existing structures?”

OCHA
4 COORDINATING EMERGENCY RESPONSE WITH THE 4PS PROGRAMME

The increasing frequency and severity of disasters and crises worldwide, the costs of disasters and the knowledge that the poorest and most vulnerable can often be hardest hit, coupled with the increasing investment in development of national safety net programmes or systems in disaster-affected countries has led to growing interest in the potential for national safety net programmes to be used as a mechanism for coordinating more efficient and effective emergency response at times of crisis. Interest has been driven by experiences in contexts of cyclical, slow onset crises, but is potentially applicable to countries affected by recurrent weather-related shocks such as the Philippines. As mentioned in Section One, one of the context specific factors with potential to influence cash coordination during the Haiyan response was the existence of an extensive national social protection programme targeting a large number of households within the disaster-affected area.

BOX 4.1 PHILIPPINES’ 4PS SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMME

In 2007, DSWD launched its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) to reach extremely poor households and improve health, nutrition, and education of children under the age of 14. Beneficiaries receive monthly conditional cash grants of up to 1,400 pesos:

- 500 pesos/month for health or nutrition expenses.
- 300 pesos/month per child for educational expenses (maximum of three children per household).

The programme aims to target some of the poorest and most vulnerable households with children, through a household poverty survey based on proxy means testing which is administered in four year intervals by the LGU. Grants are provided on the condition that targeted children in beneficiary households attend school and receive appropriate healthcare.

Payments are delivered on a bi-monthly basis through an established network of payment providers including remittance companies, the postal service and card based payments, managed by Land Bank.

The programme is implemented in practically all municipalities in 80 of 81 provinces. As of June 2013 the programme had almost four million registered households. 805,672 of these households (20.5% of the caseload) resided in the typhoon-affected Visayas. In Leyte and Eastern Samar, almost half the population qualified for the programme before the typhoon.

Source: interview with DSWD, WFP (2013)

The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) was established in 2007 under the DSWD and has extensive coverage across some of the poorest parts of the country affected by the typhoon. Further detail on the programme is included in Box 4.1. In the aftermath of Haiyan, WFP was keen to design a response strategy that would support the government and use existing delivery platforms where possible. The agency also had an existing partnership with the DSWD to support emergency response through in-kind food distribution.

The primary objective of WFP’s approach during the response phase (December 2013 to February 2014) was to increase the food security of the most vulnerable and where possible stimulate market recovery. It employed a mix of food and cash based initiatives in recognition that not all markets were expected to recover at the same time or at the same rate. Following meetings between the Cash Coordinator, CaLP, DSWD and cluster leads, WFP approached DSWD with the idea of using the existing platform of the 4Ps programme (i.e. the programme’s lists of pre-identified vulnerable households and existing payment delivery system) as an efficient way to reach a large portion of the caseload of disaster affected households, with cash, during the response phase. An MOU was put in place and after conducting assessments of the market functionality and the recovery of the 4Ps financial service provider partner conduits, the programme could begin.

---

59 de La Rosa (2014); ODI (2013); Pelham, Clay, and Braunholz (2011); Practical Action (2011), Ridsdel (2012)
WFP initially targeted 5 of the 171 municipalities affected by Typhoon Haiyan and scaled up to 60, focusing on the hardest hit areas in Eastern Visayas, Region VIII. The intervention reached 527,770 people (105,554 4Ps-registered households) during the response period and provided an unconditional transfer of PhP 1300/month/family for two months. This totalled over PhP 740million (US $16.5m).

Through the same mechanism, UNICEF provided unconditional cash transfers of PhP 4,370/month to 5,801 4Ps-registered households in five disaster-affected municipalities in Eastern Samar. Households received the grant on a monthly basis from July to December 2014 to support household livelihoods recovery and reduce negative coping strategies impacting on children. This totalled almost PhP 175million (US $4million).

Source: Data provided by WFP and DSWD

Based on an assessment of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for food needs, WFP provided an additional unconditional ‘top-up’ cash transfer of $30 per month, plus 50kg of rice, to all 4Ps beneficiaries (over 500,000 people) in the targeted areas for two months. At the same time the usual conditions associated with use of the 4Ps grant (to ensure attendance of children at school and health clinics) were waived by DSWD since these were not appropriate during the emergency. The assistance provided by WFP plus the standard 4Ps transfer allowance provided by DSWD meant that families received assistance covering 100% of the food basket during this period. WFP’s objective was to support vulnerable families to meet their food needs, however the cash was provided unconditionally. By coordinating with other responders WFP hoped to ensure that other basic needs were covered by other actors – thus increasing the likelihood that the cash provided would be spent on food needs.

Based on the experiences of this pilot approach, UNICEF entered into similar discussions with DSWD, with whom they have a pre-existing relationship to support the 4Ps programme, for the rehabilitation phase. This partnership enabled UNICEF to transfer $100 per month to almost 6,000 4Ps beneficiary families in 2014.

WFP, UNICEF, DSWD and one of the 4Ps programme delivery partners, Philpost, all considered that this pilot coordination mechanism had been very successful. There are a number of shared lessons in terms of factors contributing to the success of the approach in allowing the government and agencies to reach large parts of the affected population more quickly than would otherwise have been possible. There were also some challenges or limitations identified. These are presented in Table 4.1.

The existing relationship between DSWD and the UN agencies led to a rapid agreement to the programme on both sides. Within five days an MOU was arranged between WFP and DSWD whereby it was agreed that DSWD would receive WFP funds for transfer to Land Bank and to top up beneficiary accounts from the 4Ps programme. Similarly the use of established operating systems for communicating with beneficiaries and delivering transfers, and familiarity of all concerned (beneficiaries, delivery partners and DSWD) with these, were instrumental to the success of the approach. In fact given the extent of market recovery, DSWD said they would consider giving more cash than food if such an approach was adopted again.
Table 4.1 Experiences of coordinating emergency CTP through the 4Ps programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling factors</th>
<th>Challenges faced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UN agencies had a longstanding relationship with DSWD and previous due diligence to draw upon.</td>
<td>• Challenges of coordination with other actors also delivering cash in the affected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Using the lists of existing beneficiaries meant that a significant portion of disaster-affected households could be identified and verified quickly.</td>
<td>• Some difficulties for the FSPs managing the additional monthly payment (liquidity; branch capacity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Using an existing distribution system that reached rural areas prevented the need to set up a parallel delivery system in the affected areas which would have been time consuming and costly.</td>
<td>• WFP requested hard copy receipts for reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Beneficiaries were familiar with the system and no training was needed.</td>
<td>• The 4Ps programme was not designed to serve both developmental and humanitarian objectives. This meant the approach was limited to support for 4Ps households only, which are not the only chronically vulnerable families and excluded the new ‘transient poor’ created by the disaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 4Ps platform of parent’s associations proved a useful conduit through which to locate and inform beneficiaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with DSWD, WFP, UNICEF

One of the challenges faced related to coordination of the intervention with other actors also undertaking CTP in the affected area. DSWD reflected that many agencies were giving cash in the same areas and whilst the government and UN agencies worked well together bilaterally, further coordination was not achieved. WFP were providing cash top up to the value of the MEB, not taking into account other needs. The ‘topping up’ approach was shared with other cluster leads to see whether there was buy in to use this approach for other needs but nothing came of this.

**REFLECTIONS OF DSWD**

“With a new partner the arrangement would take some time – for example, in 2011 in Typhoon Sendong we received a grant bilaterally from Japan. The paperwork for this took months to approve. It’s unlikely new partners would have such a relationship of trust”.

“It is very difficult in a rapid onset emergency to deliver relief goods. Our staff are also victims and we struggle with a lack of infrastructure. It was more expedient to deliver emergency aid as cash rather than the usual approach of food especially given the challenge of logistics in these early months. There is no way we could have done this amount of in kind relief in the same time”.

“The programme assisted in bringing people back to their place of origin, which is needed for recovery”.

Another limitation acknowledged which is important from a coordination perspective is the fact that the 4Ps programme isn’t designed to address both chronic poverty and humanitarian objectives. It is targeting a very particular group in the population and excludes other chronically poor and vulnerable families including those who will be excluded due to targeting errors as well as the elderly or families with high dependency ratios. It also excludes others in the community who were better off but who have similarly lost assets and who are now unable to meet their basic needs.

**REFLECTIONS OF UNICEF AND WFP**

“The first cash we got out was through our NGO partners. But to reach the scale that we reached with CTP through the 4Ps partnership – there was no other way of doing this rapidly. The targeting, verification, ID, delivery instrument and multi-pathway delivery channels with pre-existing contracts all helped. We reached 500,000 households within 2 months compared to 85,000 through NGOs”.

“It is relatively easy to top up vertically [the existing social protection caseload] but the topping up horizontally [expand programme to cover new beneficiaries] is a challenge”. 
This was also queried by civil society organisations, who noted that other NGOs were also working from the 4Ps beneficiary lists to target their assistance. This was acknowledged by UNICEF and WFP and is why WFP was also working through implementing partner NGOs to reach other Non 4Ps affected households.

Finally there were some difficulties noted on the part of Philpost and also DSWD concerning Land Bank’s capacity to deliver the top up programme. One issue was liquidity to be able to meet the additional funds required, however this was achieved without too much difficulty. Another challenge was that the usual 4Ps payment schedule operates bi-monthly, however WFP requested that cash top ups be delivered on a monthly basis. This was not insurmountable but did create additional work for payment agents – as did WFP’s request for hard copy receipts for proof of delivery of funds.

The partnership has changed the government’s perception of partnerships with humanitarian actors and it is hoped will pave the way for an established coordination mechanism during other emergencies. DSWD has already reached out to WFP to request similar support during the response to Typhoon Ruby, where WFP supported 6,810 households through the same mechanism. WFP and UNICEF are currently considering ways to adapt the social protection programme in order to reach other non-beneficiary households, including research by Bankable Frontiers into other areas where WFP could tap into this opportunity.

Key Takeaways of the Review

1. The delivery of emergency aid (as cash transfers) to disaster affected households who were beneficiaries of the national social protection programme (4Ps), as a cash top up to their usual social protection benefit and delivered through the usual 4Ps payment mechanism, was the first time such an approach has been adopted in a rapid onset emergency. The mechanism was coordinated through UN agencies that had established partnerships with the government, which facilitated decision making. Using the 4Ps programme’s existing targeting system (i.e. existing social protection programme beneficiaries) enabled WFP to identify a large number of disaster-affected households very rapidly. Meeting the needs of those who were 4Ps beneficiaries through this mechanism also supported coordination of WFP’s cash interventions through implementing partners – who focused their response on those households who were affected by the disaster but who were not 4Ps beneficiaries. The relationship between WFP and DSWD was essentially bi-lateral and therefore transfer values were not informed by joint needs analysis across sectors.

2. The 4Ps programme provides cash grants to households (rather than restricted vouchers). The coordination of WFP’s emergency programme team with this programme therefore contributed to the provision of WFP’s food assistance as unconditional cash transfers. The relaxing of the usual 4Ps programme conditions by DSWD also ensured that the funds provided were fully fungible, since beneficiaries were no longer obliged to use funds to meet their child’s health and education expenses. Two factors limiting the use of the mechanism for providing multi-purpose cash grants as part of the response to Typhoon Haiyan were the non-participation of other cluster leads/organisations and WFP’s decision to set the transfer value based on the value of the food basket only. In future, however, this mechanism could accommodate more cross-sectoral approaches.

Whilst it will be important to reflect on the evidence generated through WFP’s independent evaluation, evidence collated from this review suggests that the ‘piggy backing’ of emergency aid onto the national social protection programme has the potential to provide financial assistance to a large cohort of the disaster-affected efficiently and effectively. The expansion of the coordination mechanism to include other actors – whether donors or other cluster leads – should be investigated. Future use of this coordination mechanism should include the establishment of pre-identified trigger mechanisms and linkages to the national disaster early warning systems.

---

60 This is expected to be published in May or June 2015 (WFP pers. Comm.)
5 CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING AND COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR

5.1 PARTNERSHIPS WITH FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

5.1.1 The services for cash transfer available in the Philippines

In earlier experiences of CTP in emergencies in the Philippines, agencies operated through paper vouchers and cash was distributed manually. The Philippines is home to a very sophisticated cash transfer industry and over the years there has been a growing trend for agencies to partner with financial service providers (FSP) to deliver cash to beneficiaries. Three main channels exist:

- Previous scoping studies have shown that over the counter services of remittance firms and the postal service offered many benefits over banks, having greater reach and less stringent ‘know your customer’ requirements. People are also familiar with them, given the extent of remittance services in the country.
- Debit cards continue to dominate electronic money transfer (e-transfer) services in the Philippines and are a viable option for CTP especially in urban contexts, given the extensive network of ATMs and POS device. These had previously been piloted by some NGOs on a small scale during humanitarian response.
- The emergence of mobile money also offers the potential for electronic transfers to deliver aid whilst building financial inclusion, although the infrastructure is still developing. Whilst in other countries (e.g. Kenya’s MPESA) mobile money services include the service option of using mobile money to purchase goods at accredited merchants, at the time of Typhoon Haiyan this part of the business model in the Philippines was not widely developed. Mobile money services were being mainly used for sending remittances and for airtime. For this reason both leading mobile network operators, Smart and Globe, had developed a pre-paid card that interlinks with the mobile money account for store purchases.

5.1.2 Experiences of partnering with financial service providers in the Haiyan response

In the week that Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, ACF had embarked on a study in order to better prepare for a transition to using e-transfers in future emergencies. This was to include a mapping and assessment of e-transfer service providers. Following Haiyan the scope of the mapping exercise was changed to include a rapid assessment of over the counter as well as e-transfer service providers and to collect information on the services provided and the likely feasibility of partnering with these companies for cash delivery in the Haiyan response. This provided a ‘traffic light’ scoring system to indicate companies’ likely viability for the immediate response and early recovery phase. Over-the counter service providers were judged to be the most appropriate for the response phase. This assessment was shared with the Cash Coordinator for dissemination to the CWG.

The ACF report recommended that information requests for service providers be coordinated to prevent duplication of effort and reduce the risk of overwhelming them, and also to give FSPs a true idea of the real scale of services required in a particular location to ensure they have the capacity to deal with the needs. Evidence from other responses also shows the value of working in consortia from a cost-effectiveness perspective – being better positioned to negotiate such arrangements as standardised fees, sometimes lower, and other common standards. A number of FSPs were invited by the Cash Coordinator to attend a CWG meeting in December 2014. Others participated in a later meeting in March 2014. All FSPs included in this review had attended a CWG meeting.

NGOs undertook their own assessments of FSPs, pre-selecting a number of providers for further bilateral discussions and quotations. Approaches to FSPs were made on the basis of prior working relationships, agencies’ own initial assessments of the situation on the ground, and some consideration of lessons learned. A number of response programmes started their disbursements in December 2013 whilst others followed in 2014.
“We had no previous experience. We looked at six different FSPs – Philpost; MLH; Gcash; Cebuana; MLH; Palawan Express and we selected Palawan”.

Plan International

“Red Cross Philippines already had contracts with LBC and GCash Remit, who we approached based on the assessments circulated to the CWG and prior confidence of the team”.

IFRC

We worked with the remittance agencies that we worked with before. We also tried to come up with ways of working with the Landbank and Smart ATM card”.

ACF

“We had a longstanding partnership with BanKO, providing technical assistance to support development of BanKO’s savings led mobile banking product. This relationship was reactivated for an 18 month period to support CTP for recovery”.

Mercy Corps

“Red Cross Philippines and ACF were existing clients. Oxfam and Handicap International came on board for Haiyan”.

LBC

“We were contacted by 7 agencies. Many had heard about our partnership on the national 4Ps programme. We had previously worked with Save the Children and ICRC. The others were new. We had bilateral discussions and provided quotes for all. We ended up partnering with 4 agencies in the response or recovery periods”.

Philpost

“We worked with Oxfam, Help Age, ADRA to deliver cash transfers after Yolanda. All these NGOs were new customers”.

MLHuillier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Financial Service Provider</th>
<th>Pre-existing relationship?</th>
<th>Month started</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Help Age</td>
<td>MLH</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Jan 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>LBC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Palawan express</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Apr 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MLH</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Apr 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Palawan express</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Philpost</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mar 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Red Cross</td>
<td>G Cash Remit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LBC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philpost</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Aug 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save</td>
<td>Philpost</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Jan 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Philpost</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Apr 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MLH</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Jan 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LBC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>ICCCCC (an MFI)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Jan 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>BanKO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BanKO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>May 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Palawan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Jan 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSWD/WFP</td>
<td>LandBank/Smart</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: programme date provided by FSPs and agencies

LBC, MLH, Palawan Express and G Cash remit are remittance agents; Philpost is the national postal service; BanKO is a savings-linked mobile money provider; Smart operates Smart money through mobile money transfer and debit card. ICCC is an MFI.
Agencies and financial service providers included in this study reflected on the coordination of the response between the humanitarian sector and FSPs. A lessons learned workshop on the topic was hosted by Mercy Corps and attended by agencies and FSPs\(^{68}\) and the findings as well as ‘lessons learned’ studies and evaluations\(^{69}\) were taken into account.

Both agencies and FSPs considered there to be value gained from the inclusion of the FSPs in the CWG meetings and overall, experiences from both agencies and FSPs on the partnerships they had entered into were positive. It was felt that projects generally progressed smoothly and enabled the timely, efficient and effective delivery of transfers to affected populations during response and recovery. There were also a number of challenges identified on both sides. These experiences are summarised in Table 5.2 and generate a number of lessons for coordination.

Table 5.2 Experiences of coordination between the humanitarian sector and FSPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What worked well</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation and contracting</strong></td>
<td>• Humanitarian organisations did not completely understand the need or the process for complying with KYC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contracting was relatively smooth, especially for remittance agencies – average of 3 weeks.</td>
<td>• Contracting was stringent for formal banking and for e-transfer partnerships which led to delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pre-existing relationships greatly simplified and quickened the process.</td>
<td>• Each agency approached FSPs separately, for very similar information and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information sharing</strong></td>
<td>• The initial ACF assessment of FSPs was not updated during the response and early recovery stage so information on service recovery was not centrally available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The initial assessment circulated by ACF was appreciated.</td>
<td>• Some FSPs felt that their inclusion in the CWG came too late to influence agencies’ choice of provider for the response phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sharing of agencies’ experiences with service providers influenced decisions of other agencies later in the recovery phase.</td>
<td>• The interim Cash Coordinator had requested FSPs to submit proposals to her and the CWG. FSPs reported that they then received no further feedback on these.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Having FSPs attend the CWG was useful to give agencies an overview of the options available and it provided FSPs with information on the scale of the need and requirements of agencies.</td>
<td>• The lessons learned sessions with FSPs were also appreciated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The lessons learned sessions with FSPs were also appreciated.</td>
<td>• Registration and delivery went relatively smooth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Registration and delivery went relatively smooth.</td>
<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• KYC challenges overcome for over the counter services.</td>
<td>• FSPs experienced some difficulties in ensuring liquidity in the earliest weeks, and some FSPs had difficulty with electricity supply. Some affected areas were a long distance from cash out points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Central Bank relaxed KYC requirements for Typhoon affected households, enabling the use of alternate IDs such as Barangay certificates and NGO provided IDs.</td>
<td>• There was no standard way of working across agencies (eg – different requirements for beneficiary identification).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of e-transfers (mobile money) during the recovery phase allowed for flexibility setting the transfer value, provided automatic reconciliation and offered potential added value in terms of financial inclusion and resilience building.</td>
<td>• No harmonisation of delivery plans between agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continued barriers to establishment of CTP using e-transfers despite the high development of this sector (contractual delays; KYC barriers; lack of prior experience of agencies and beneficiaries; concerns about infrastructure recovery; service coverage in rural locations).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with Philpost, LBC, MLHuillier, BanKO, USAID-SIMM, Mercy Corps, Philippines Red Cross, IFRC, ACF, Plan, Save the Children, Oxfam.

\(^{68}\) Krishnan et al (2014)\(^{69}\) IFRC (2014), LBC (2014)
5.1.3 Lessons learned for coordination in future emergencies

Interviews and the Mercy Corps Lessons Learned workshop generated a number of important lessons to inform future coordination of the humanitarian sector and FSPs during emergency response.

1 Importance of preparedness:

A clear lesson from both agency and FSP perspectives was the importance of prior knowledge and working relationships in order to leverage full value from these partnerships for rapid response. At the time that Haiyan struck there was a lack of agency awareness on the delivery options available and the functionality and coverage of the various services. Those agencies that had had prior exposure to CTP in emergencies in the Philippines already had some knowledge of the FSP landscape and several had pre-existing agreements with service providers that could be reactivated within a day or so. In the case of the Red Cross, IFRC’s have an on-going project to build disaster preparedness capacity of the Philippines Red Cross and as part of this had established service level agreements with service providers.

“The pre-existing agreements simplified things and we were able to disburse faster. It meant we could focus all our time on targeting and then immediately distribute in December 2013”. ACF

“Our preparedness planning and pre-agreements with service providers meant we covered the needs of 60,000 families in 3 months without big problems”. FRC

“We should pre-position with FSPs in the same way as we pre-position for commodity distribution”. Plan International

Agencies with agreements in place considered that this was a key element of their ability to respond as quickly as they did. Remittance firms reported that certain agencies have since contacted them to discuss the establishment of pre-agreements.

Noting the challenges faced in ensuring liquidity in the affected areas and the interference of relief operations with their day to day business, FSPs felt that earlier warning of the likely aid requirements of humanitarian agencies in terms of location and anticipated volumes could have made operations easier. There is evidence that with appropriate planning, transfers at scale were indeed possible. The BSP aimed to support recovery of services by ensuring liquidity was re-established in affected areas within 10 days – 14 days. There was not however an established central coordination process between the private sector and DSWD.

“Partners rated FSP’s cash liquidity as the most critical to reducing operational downtime; For example: with adequate planning one rural bank G-Cash merchant was able to disburse to up to 3,300 beneficiaries per day in one location” Mercy Corps (2015)

2 Improving harmonisation between agencies:

There was a consensus from those interviewed on the potential added value of greater harmonisation of approaches to FSPs between agencies.

The efforts of the Cash Coordinator to bring FSPs and aid agencies together through CWG meetings were appreciated on both sides – though in future it was agreed such meetings should happen earlier if they are to influence programme design during the response phase. Service providers would also have appreciated more communication with the CWG coordinator, which decreased after proposals were sent through (due to the turnover in the Cash Coordinator role).

ACF’s mapping of service providers highlighted an important gap in agency knowledge and the added value of developing such shared resources which can be centrally stored and disseminated. This mapping only took place because ACF happened to have a resource dedicated to this activity at the onset and once circulated it was not updated further. To be of most value it was agreed such a resource should be developed ahead of an emergency and then be updated to reflect the reality on the ground – again highlighting the importance of
preparedness. The USAID-SIMM project team did update some of this information when chairing the CWG. During the rehabilitation phase (late 2014) there have been steps taken to address this by the Cash Coordinator, Mercy Corps and CWG (see Section Six).

Taking the role and value of the CWG still further, study participants and those in the lessons learned workshop agreed that there could be value in more strategic approaches to service providers, as a sector with aggregate needs, rather than engaging in several parallel and identical bilateral discussions, something that was not capitalised on during Typhoon Haiyan. This is relevant in the Philippines because the topographical context means there is no single service provider with coverage in all areas, whilst the humanitarian response was also organised as regional hubs. It can help service providers understand aggregate demand and make appropriate adjustments. There was seen to be added value in a CWG taking on this initial role. When USAID-SIMM agreed to chair the CWG, their aim was to facilitate a multi-lateral communication between FSPs and agencies to harmonise approaches. However, they met with some opposition from members who had their own contract requirements and who by this point had often moved ahead unilaterally.

“We learned which agencies were going to work where and what the priorities were which is of strategic value for us”.

“MLH

“The CWG agenda was very packed and speakers only have a few minutes. We didn’t really get past the www. We did not really discuss streamlining operations to avoid redundancy of efforts”.

BangKO

“At the CWG meeting we learned for the first time that you could use the Philpost service to deliver cash to far flung areas. Philpost was active in attending the meeting and provided information on branches etc. The CWG coordinator also suggested names to reach out to in the various companies”.

ADRA

“At some point still need to have your own contract. But the negotiations could be done collectively”.

ICRC

Linked to this was the suggestion of standardising approaches to the FSPs through the development of pro forma ‘minimum’ contract templates that could be adapted to suit the requirements of agencies. This was discussed in an early meeting and Mercy Corps shared their standard contract template with the interim cash coordinator in January but it appears this document was not circulated further.

More joined up coordination around operational issues, at least at a regional level, was felt to be useful. Agencies and FSPs mentioned some challenges for FSPs in ensuring branch capacity given the numbers of clients they were expected to serve, and there were at least two examples of agencies working in the same operational area arranging cash payouts for the same day. FSPs felt that better information was needed on the number and value of planned cash disbursements per location/per day to help resources and cash flow planning.

3 Overcoming constraints to the use of e-transfers:
Following Haiyan there was definite interest and much discussion amongst agencies on the potential of e-transfer technology to deliver cash transfers, on the basis of a number of potential benefits of e-transfers including the security and accountability of funds, reduced need for liquidity and distribution of physical cash, the potential for efficiency gains over time and for longer lasting benefits for beneficiaries.

However, only a limited number of agencies adopted such mechanisms in their programmes and this was well into the recovery/rehabilitation phase rather than during the response. Interviews and the Lessons Learned workshop yielded consensus on the reasons for this:

1. Most agencies did not have prior experience of using these mechanisms and most e-transfer FSPs had limited experience of delivering aid programmes. Agencies were reluctant to design, train and pilot new ways of working where speed was of the essence.

2. The KYC requirements for account opening were generally considered to be more onerous and time consuming than for the over the counter services. For example, Mercy Corps took four months to register their 25,000 recovery programme beneficiaries in a rolling registration period.
3. The reach and user familiarity of over the counter services in the more rural areas was greater than with mobile money agents. For example there are Philpost branches in almost every municipality and if not they have the capacity to arrange delivery to the LGU or the Barangay, whilst the vast majority of Filipinos routinely receive remittances from family working abroad.

4. There were concerns about the infrastructure; that the mechanism relied on (ATMs, POS and network connectivity) would not be available (although from discussions with Visa and private sector actors it seems that in fact they recovered fairly rapidly).

These, again, are lessons for preparedness. The CWG was considered to have had an added value in raising awareness and interest about the e-payment options available whilst the experience sharing of members such as Mercy Corps influenced other members to approach and eventually to use e-transfers during their own recovery programmes.

It’s possible that e-transfers could have more of a role in future emergency response if some of this activity is coordinated earlier as part of preparedness.

“After we attended the CWG and explained our concept with Mercy Corps, at least 9 agencies from the CWG, they all contacted us. We gave proposals. From May 2014 onwards we have partnered with four agencies in the rehabilitation phase”.

BangKO

“We offered our pre-paid card system, no NGO wanted to use it. There was worry about the control of cash, training and whether people will share their PIN”.

LBC

“USAID’s chairmanship of the CWG was a value added. They developed the agenda around issues of relevance to the members and were able to share their previous project and technical experience on e-transfer mechanisms”.

ACF

“I shared the information from the CWG [on e-transfers] with our operations team. This made them consider the idea of using e-payments for the first time. In terms of change it didn’t happen as post-Haiyan was not the right time to try something new with the DOLE [their government partner responsible for making payments on ILO emergency employment programmes]. But it was valuable, it was an attempt to raise the bar on programme quality”.

ILO

5.2 THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S ROLE IN RESPONSE AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

As noted in Section One, there is a global trend of non-traditional actors’ direct involvement in humanitarian response and CTP, including the private sector, and this was seen in the response to Haiyan. The US Chamber of Commerce’s ‘Corporate Aid Tracker’ indicates that the private sector has contributed US $58.9 million towards the Typhoon response. However, this reflects primarily western based companies and does not include Filipino companies which also made significant contributions. Some of the private sector support builds on the Filipino tradition of bayanihan. Individuals and private organisations are also recorded as the largest donor to the inter-agency Strategic Response Plan (24.4%)70.

In the MIC context of the Philippines where a vibrant private sector exists that is well versed in disaster response and business continuity, there are further questions on the potential benefit of coordination with the private sector for humanitarian response and CTP, in the area of supply chain recovery and market assessments.

OCHA recently set up a global private sector section, looking at how to improve coordination between the humanitarian system and business to enhance humanitarian effectiveness. The unit identified the huge potential for private sector coordination in the Haiyan response and on 23rd November 2013 OCHA deployed a private sector adviser to Manila until 31st January 2014. The terms of reference included: to reach out to private sector networks seeking information and opportunities to connect international response efforts to private sector offers; act as a focal point for private sector queries and offers of support; liaise with cluster leads to identify needs in the Response Plan and bring them to the attention of the local and international

70 OCHA (2014b)
private sector; and liaise with local business networks to see how the humanitarian community can work more effectively with the business community in this emergency and in the future\(^\text{71}\).

### 5.2.1 Private sector experiences with humanitarian coordination after Haiyan

In the Philippines there are a number of private sector umbrella bodies. Besides being well positioned to leverage funds for disaster response and recovery programmes – and in some cases implementing these directly – these networks also include organisations for which distribution and supply chain analysis and recovery are core parts of the business strategy\(^\text{72}\):

- The Philippines Disaster Response Foundation (PDRF) is a public private partnership that began in 2009 and brings together the government and corporations in a variety of sectors including telecoms, retail, real estate, mining, banking and microfinance to coordinate, aggregate resources and leverage complementary expertise to support disaster recovery.

- The Philippine Chamber of Commerce (CoC) is a private organisation of small to medium enterprises, ranging from five to several thousand employees. Chambers are organised regionally, with regional governance. In the Visayas there are seven active Chambers organised by province.

- Founded in 1970, the Philippines Businesses for Social Progress (PBSP) is a non-profit organization that brings together some 250 member companies (multi-national and national) to jointly invest in poverty reduction initiatives. They are the largest corporate foundation in the Philippines, with links to private networks including Chambers of commerce and the Mayor’s club.

This section illustrates the experiences of these private sector actors in the coordination of the Haiyan disaster response.

1. **Coordination with the government:**

   Informants reported that one of the weakest parts of disaster response and recovery in previous emergencies in the Philippines has been the lack of official communication and coordination between the government and private sector. In the aftermath of Haiyan this was thrown into sharp relief when private sector actors in Tacloban reported that despite the massive focus on efforts to procure and import relief goods, businesses had actually had enough food and bottled water supply on the ground to cover needs for at least two weeks. The problem was not one of supply, but of information and coordination. The private sector was not consulted in the pre-emergency phase and it was therefore not clear where supplies were; whilst distributors lacked the requisite security and transport from the government to recover logistical operations\(^\text{73}\).

2. **Coordination with international agencies:**

   Respondents\(^\text{74}\) reported that the initial engagement of OCHA with the business community, through the umbrella bodies mentioned above, was a positive experience and developed mutual learning which will be valuable for informing future response efforts. For the first time IASC cluster coordinators were connected to networks such as PDRF. Meanwhile the private sector was encouraged to understand humanitarian standards and appreciated the SitReps. One outcome was that the PDRF adopted the cluster system as a means of organising their members to coordinate response initiatives, whilst OCHA has since taken lessons learned from the private sector networks in the Philippines to support coordination of private sector networks with the humanitarian system in the Ebola response.

---

\(^{71}\) OCHA (2014b)

\(^{72}\) For example, PDRF membership includes Proctor and Gamble, Smart, Globe, Coca Cola, Nestle whilst the Philippine Chamber of Commerce includes coca cola and River Valley.

\(^{73}\) Interview with Chamber of Commerce.

\(^{74}\) Interviews with OCHA private sector coordinator, PBSP, PDRF, Chamber of Commerce, ILO.
However, a number of barriers were identified which limited the private sector’s potential to contribute to the response and recovery efforts of the humanitarian community during Haiyan:

• This was the first opportunity for private sector networks to interact with the cluster system. Although the interim and full time Cash Coordinators did have bilateral discussions with private sector network coordinators about the ways in which economic recovery strategies could be aligned with humanitarian CTP response planning, the response period was already underway and there was no time to further think through or establish these linkages.

• There remains an inherent lack of trust and general reticence on the part of humanitarian agencies to engage with private sector actors, which are still not seen as partners in humanitarian response. An example shared of this was in early meetings of agencies coordinating the shelter response and the PBSP. The shelter response during Haiyan was beset by difficulties accessing supplies of corrugated iron (CGI) sheeting since local supplies did not meet SPHERE quality standards. No approaches had been made to the business community to find a solution to this challenge. The President of the PBSP who headed up the business cluster covering shelter was connected with the humanitarian shelter cluster and extended an offer to support international procurement through the business network – requesting an understanding of the material standard requirements; the dollar value demand; agency procurement rules (whether direct supply or through local markets). For various reasons it seems this offer of procurement support through the private sector was still not well considered by those leading on shelter.

• OCHA’s private sector adviser had no local counterpart and so had to spend time building knowledge of and making contacts with private sector networks during the response period.

• PDRF and their members reportedly found interacting with the UN system confusing – with multiple UN divisions to involve in discussions, and multiple approaches to them from different divisions, all requesting similar information. This is something echoed in interviews with UN agencies.

5.2.2 Potential added value of coordinating humanitarian and private sector responses

This section highlights the activities of some private sector actors during the Haiyan response and early recovery.

PDRF and the Chamber of Commerce – experience of supporting market recovery

The PDRF’s support to response and recovery efforts post-Haiyan are highlighted in Box 5.1. The network is able to leverage funding rapidly from their members, the diaspora and oversees societies such as the US Philippines Society. Besides directly funding relief and recovery efforts the core competencies of their shared membership during Haiyan proved to be effective at assisting economic recovery, particularly of the retail sector.

Meanwhile the Philippine Chamber of Commerce – Eastern Visayas explained that as a result of lessons from the Haiyan response, the government entered into discussions with the Chamber of Commerce and their retail members in preparation for Typhoon Ruby and other recent typhoons. Supermarkets committed to pre-positioning of goods in affected areas and were open for business again within 24 hours.
## Box 5.1 PDRF-Supported Initiatives in the Haiyan Response and Early Recovery Phases

### Supporting Relief (Cash and in Kind)
- Funded emergency food for 27,000 children in Leyte in 2013 (for the Ministry of Education).
- Funded cash for debris clearance in the side streets for 1,500 beneficiaries in two Barangays, in December 2013 and January 2014 (for UNDP).
- Funded cash for work for mangrove rehabilitation involving 1,000 women in August 2014 (for DSWD).
- Brought together two of their members, the mobile network operator Smart and Landbank, in a strategic partnership to support the movement of cash to communities early in the disaster response. Smart provided emergency recovery of the telecoms infrastructure to Landbank's ATMs. This won an award from the GSM Association (GSMA) in 2014.
- Smart developed and implemented a funding strategy based on text donations and crowd funding to fund PDRF’s recovery activities.

### Support for Economic Recovery
- The Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) faced delays in accessing the congressional funding required to underwrite rehabilitation loans to local businesses and approached PDRF to fund a pilot. The project rehabilitated 500 businesses, providing capital items alongside training.
- PDRF developed a pilot strategy for a Chinese-Filipino food wholesaler, Suy Sing, to support economic recovery of microenterprises in Tacloban. Through their members, PDRF had the knowledge of the location and recovery status of sari sari stores. Using their distribution network, Suy Sing provided dry goods that were in demand locally to sari sari stores on credit, with delayed payment terms, in order to restart businesses. This began in Tacloban with 20 stores and then expanded to 70 by early 2014.
- In 2013, PDRF and PBSP funded an organisation called Hapinoy to undertake an assessment of the sari sari store retail value chain in the Visayas. Hapinoy used this as a baseline to see how the operations of sari sari stores and wholesaler distributors were affected and assess market recovery. The findings were used by PDRF members to manage supply chain recovery. PDRF funded Hapinoy to implement a recovery plan to repair and restock over 300 stores to assist market recovery.

Source: interview PDRF, PDRF (2015), Hapinoy (2013)

### Added Value of Coordination on Markets
These examples illustrate real potential for more coordinated ways of working between humanitarian actors and the private sector around market analysis and response strategy to leverage mutually beneficial relations through cash based responses that meet people's basic needs whilst also supporting economic recovery. The members of both PDRF and the Chamber of Commerce have a stake in getting the retail supply chain up and running as quickly as possible – a precursor for cash transfers for response at scale. Meanwhile the demand created through the cash injection to communities, if communicated to businesses, can further drive market recovery, as was illustrated with the experiences of Tzu Chi in Section Three.

### Risks from Lack of Coordination with the Private Sector
Private sector representatives and those in the UN commented on the real risks to economic recovery from a lack of coordination with the humanitarian system on both the agency and the government side.

The impact of aid projects (cash for work) still focusing on emergency needs from Typhoon Haiyan when the economy had already transitioned to the recovery phase was noted as creating challenges for businesses to rehire local labour. This was in part because some agencies were paying more than the minimum wage for cash for work activities. However, even in cases where wage standards were followed, the Chamber of Commerce reported that generally the work completed was less than a full day’s work, meaning agency projects were still more attractive than local employment. They considered that such projects have an important role in response and early recovery but should have transitioned sooner to fit into the recovery phase. This was echoed by several other respondents.75

---

75 OCHA Region VIII Head of Sub-office; OCHA private sector adviser
There was similar evidence emerging from a Save the Children study evaluating the impact of agency response and recovery programmes on economic recovery post-Haiyan in two livelihood zones. This found that programmes providing grants for livelihood recovery hadn’t always taken into account the businesses that existed prior to the emergency and the implications of new businesses to competition and profitability. For example there were reports from the LGU of Estancia, Iloilo Province that this has led to far more sari sari stores now operating than prior to the emergency – to the extent that the government has had to impose restrictions on licensing for further businesses76.

Another was the risk to economic recovery from a lack of coordination and preparedness planning on the part of the private sector and government actors. One of the challenges the business community experienced in the recovery phase was the lack of capital to be able to restock supplies. The Chamber of Commerce approached the government with a request for a soft loan facility and eventually the DTI was able to launch a PhP 2 million Credit Support Fund under their Small Business Corporation, which functioned to underwrite risk for financial institutions. This didn’t launch until May 2014.

BOX 5.2 PBSP’S CTP IN HAIYAN RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

During their organisation’s response to Typhoon Haiyan, PBSP raised over US $5m in response funds towards cash and in-kind interventions. They directly implemented a range of CTP:

- Cash grants for food.
- Cash or vouchers for shelter repair.
- Cash for work – temporary employment creation linked to repair of essential infrastructure, debris clearance and mangrove reforestation.
- Some cash for livelihoods recovery.

PBSP was not aware of the cash working group and was not participating in the humanitarian coordination system. Consequently response analysis and design of their cash programmes wasn’t influenced by ‘humanitarian best practice’ or by standards shared through the CWG. Programming however has followed logical principles which align with best practices promoted by lead humanitarian agencies:

- They partnered with FSPs to deliver the cash and have agreements in place with the major money transfer companies.
- The decision to deliver cash is based on an understanding that markets must first be functioning. Before Haiyan they took steps to build expertise in standards for market assessment in partnership with IRC and received tools and training on EMMA.
- The shelter transfer value was based on the equivalent cost of the IOM shelter kit. The food transfer value was based on the cost of a weekly food pack for a family.
- Cash for work activities were designed to support the recovery of the fishing industry through rehabilitation of key blockages in the value chain. They considered the government minimum wage rate and added 10%. The duration of the work per beneficiary is task based.
- They selected areas and recipients in collaboration with the LGU and blanket targeted everyone on the Barangay lists.

Source: interview with PBSP

Private Sector and Engagement in CTP – the case of PBSP

As the largest corporate foundation in the Philippines, operating collectively the members of PBSP are able to mobilise considerable restricted and unrestricted support for initiatives in the fields of health, education, environment and livelihoods and to provide support during disasters. Support from members is received both as cash and in kind donations – including commodities and services and expertise which particular members have an added value in. The foundation is also able to crowd fund money from the public and to mobilise

76 Interview Save the Children; Pelly et al (2015)
money internationally since they host the Philippines chapter of United Way Worldwide. In partnership with
development partners they can also leverage corporate funding to co-fund oversee development assistance
projects. They undertake analysis of the needs and gaps in services in disaster affected areas and then develop
packages of assistance in accordance with the areas of interest above. One of their major project areas during
the Haiyan response was cash transfers to individuals. Box 5.2 illustrates their experience with CTP during the
Haiyan response. As with the Tzu Chi case study in Section Three this is illustrative of the growing significance
of non-traditional actors in CTP.

“We are not reporting through the humanitarian system as we
have no mandate to do so, no one is asking for this from us. We
report to our donors. We would be happy to follow cross-agency
standards if we had known about them, but we didn’t”.

PBSP

**Experiences in coordination:** PBSP understood the value of coordination with the humanitarian sector and
attended some meetings of the Livelihoods and Early Recovery Cluster in Cebu. However, as with Tzu Chi they
were essentially operating outside of the humanitarian system and thus their programming is not captured
in cluster mapping or reports of who is doing what where, or designed in accordance with agreed standards.
They did report to the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) created after
Haiyan to oversee the relief operations of the government.

The key benefit PBSP received from participating in the cluster system was information on who is doing what
where. However, in their opinion further strategic coordination between operational agencies was limited on
account of:

- the exclusion of responding actors from coordination structures,
- the proliferation of assessments by different agencies without a common metric,
- the reluctance of agencies to move to other locations when gaps were identified.

Drawing on their own targeting experiences, PBSP also questioned whether the government’s poverty
mapping, promoted as a coordination tool, was relevant for targeting in this context. For example, PBSP worked
in the municipality of Isabel, in Leyte which was a ‘first class’ municipality and was not part of the government
mapping, but the area was devastated and shelter and livelihoods were affected.

**Lessons for Future Coordination:** The PBSP were not aware of the CWG but would have been happy to get
involved in any forum which allowed access to models and best practices and which brought added value
to the efficiency and effectiveness of cash based responses. As with PDRF, they would also be in a position
to contribute strategically to cash based response analysis and planning across agencies by leveraging the
knowledge and services of their members which could be applied to support the retail pre-positioning and
recovery required for CTP.
A role for MFIs in supporting rapid response through CTP – the case of Card Bank

Card Bank is a rural micro finance institution (MFI) operating across the Philippines. In the Typhoon Haiyan-affected provinces of Samar and Leyte the MFI has over 290,000 clients. Card Bank’s response to the disaster for affected members is highlighted in Box 5.3. Similar responses by MFIs have been noted in previous emergencies such as in Haiti in 201077.

Such networks were not tapped into by the humanitarian community during the Haiyan response. This illustrates the potential added value of such institutions, with both extensive service and client reach in remote rural areas, to facilitate rapid humanitarian response. There is the potential that existing MFI client lists and networks could be used to better coordinate cash based responses. Similarly BanKO explained that the pilot with Mercy Corps showed that existing customers can be helped quickly and this could be useful for future targeting of aid78.

BOX 5.3: CARD BANK’S DISASTER RESPONSE TO SUPPORT ITS MEMBERS IN THE TYPHOON-AFFECTED AREAS

Card Bank deployed a Disaster Response Team to make contact with staff members and their families and reactivate branches as soon as possible. By mid-December they knew that over 170,000 of their members had been affected by the disaster.

Relief packs were distributed to the affected families totalling US $1.7 million.

To support members to rebuild their businesses and livelihoods they activated an emergency financial assistance facility for livelihood and housing calamity. This provided interest free loans with favourable repayment terms to members. Around 60% of their members who were affected by the disaster made use of the product. Distributions started in January 2014 and continued to around June 2014.

They set up a partnership to support sari sari stores to recover through provision of dry goods to them at wholesale price.

Source: interview with Card Bank, CARD MRI (2014)

5.2.3 Implications

The experiences of private sector engagement in the response and recovery efforts post-Haiyan, essentially independently of the formal humanitarian system, have implications for future humanitarian response in the Philippines as well as globally.

Added value of partnership: The case studies above illustrate the potential for private sector partnerships to support effective coordination of humanitarian response, and particularly CTP, in a number of important ways – including market assessment and recovery, cash supply chain management, rapid targeting of aid, and leveraging funding and expertise for CTP. The existence of umbrella bodies described here are an entry point for efficient coordination. This is an opportunity to leverage the strategic value of both sectors; the networks, expertise and business processes of the private sector combined with the skills in situation analysis and programming standards of the humanitarian community. Furthermore, private sector networks are interested to learn more about these standards and for guidance from the humanitarian community.

The risk of non-partnership: Experiences in the Philippines and more recently in the Ebola response are part of a growing trend of engaging with the private sector – financial services, telecoms, distribution, fast-moving consumer goods and analytical industries – in humanitarian response. The evidence suggests that such engagement will only increase. If ways to coordinate the actions of the humanitarian system with those of the private sector are not developed, the opportunity to set common standards and leverage efficiencies will be lost. If the private sector’s growing influence in this sphere in terms of funds, processes and expertise, and with a long term presence in country, continues independently from the humanitarian sector, this will also have implications for the future role and influence of the traditional humanitarian system.

77 WFP pers. communication
78 BanKO interview
“What we [the ‘traditional’ humanitarian community] consider as the humanitarian sector is actually about 10% of the whole sector. Where has the 10% ever led the 90%? We cannot ignore this”.

Interview respondent

Key Takeaways of this Review

1. The Cash Coordination role, and the CWG, forged links between implementing agencies and private sector actors – namely the financial service providers – within the response period and this contributed to improved coordination of cash delivery through awareness raising about available services and the humanitarian communities’ requirements. More active coordination earlier, ideally as part of preparedness, was needed to improve use of CTP in rapid response and certainly for more widespread adoption of e-transfers.

2. Communication between OCHA’s private sector adviser, Cash Coordinator and business networks identified the extent of engagement of the private sector in emergency response and recovery. Improving coordination with the private sector in areas such as market assessment and recovery could be of great added value to aid agencies’ decision-making on CTP, in terms of whether the market can respond to demand and certainly for any move towards more flexible use of cash grants, but this was not taken advantage of during Haiyan.

3. Partnerships with the private sector for aid coordination are emerging – in the Philippines and globally. There are no ‘optimal’ coordination models – however lessons from this review identified a number of areas for future coordination that could support CTP. This includes building formal linkages between the government and the private sector for coordination of humanitarian interventions, and coordination between OCHA or the CWG and business membership bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce, to inform response analysis.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD WITH CASH COORDINATION

This review has demonstrated the added value, or potential added value, of a number of cash coordination mechanisms during the response to Typhoon Haiyan, along with the enabling and limiting factors of each. Taking into account these factors and the lessons learned, this section provides a number of recommendations to improve cash coordination and move towards the use of flexible cash grants during future disasters, in the context of the Philippines and also globally. Where possible these have taken into account recent relevant actions of those with a stake in cash coordination in the Philippines and globally.

6.1 IMPROVING CASH COORDINATION IN THE PHILIPPINES DISASTER RESPONSE

6.1.1 Emergency Preparedness

1 Institutionalising an active CWG in a non-emergency setting

The CWG has the potential to be very valuable to cash coordination during disaster responses in the Philippines, but to leverage this requires that such a group is mobilised at the beginning of a crisis and has clear leadership, functions and processes. There are also a number of areas of CTP which would benefit from greater coordination but that require discussion, planning, agreement and action in the space between disasters.

Given the above and the cyclical nature of disasters in the country, a Philippines Cash Working Group should be set up and institutionalised as a permanent coordination structure with a clear and agreed terms of reference, secretariat, leadership and membership. This should be endorsed by the national government and/or include government in the membership through the representation of DSWD. The latter option may be less bureaucratic and likely to encounter delays. This would facilitate coordinated planning and action from early in an emergency, since it would enable the activation of a clear coordination structure with defined ways of working from the outset (as per the cluster approach) whilst the group could lead on the development of joint tools, processes, standards and partnerships in a non-emergency setting.

The outgoing OCHA Cash Coordinator has recommended that this be achieved by setting up a ‘Steering Committee’ of members, made up of those organisations with a long term presence in the country, that each assign a dedicated staff member (ideally Filipino nationals) to be a CWG focal point as part of their job description. The aim is that this Steering Committee focuses in between crisis events on disaster preparedness of cash coordination such as defining coordination structures, roles and resources at the sub-national level for activation during emergencies; discussion and agreement on standards for CTP with the government; developing joint assessment tools; and actions to help members move forward with private sector partnerships.

There is traction for this recommendation and the approach seems logical in the circumstances. The group will need a predictable leadership as well as a secretariat, an action plan to prioritise and move forward with key preparedness activities, and will need to be linked with the humanitarian coordination system. OCHA is committed to providing secretariat support and there are plans for member agencies to assume a rotating chairmanship in a non-emergency setting. In the event of a L2 or L3 emergency, leadership would devolve to OCHA. OCHA, through a new Cash Officer position within the Disaster Response Unit, is a member of the Steering Committee and so this will ensure a smooth transition. It will also ensure that the activities of the CWG during preparedness and emergency response are linked to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group since this is chaired by OCHA, which could then ensure that key aspects of CTP as advocated for by the CWG core group are fed into relevant clusters, into response analysis and planning and throughout the humanitarian programme cycle.

79 A TOR for the core group, known as the Steering Committee, has been drafted which outlines objectives and functions of the group in a non-emergency setting and in emergencies along with group membership and leadership. This highlights that in any emergency, OCHA shall become the de facto chair of the CWG. Core group organisations are identifying agency focal points and the group has met twice to date (January and March 2015).

80 Level 1 Response: Emergency response operations are within the response capabilities of the UN country offices with routine support from regional offices. Level 2 Response: operations requiring regional augmentation of country level response capability. Level 3 Response: operations requiring mobilisation of global response capabilities i.e. a Corporate Response.
The Steering Committee membership is presently INGOs and UN agencies. It is recommended that consideration is also given to inclusion in the Steering Committee of government representatives (through the DSWD) and potentially the private sector or at the very least that the CWG is endorsed by the government. Continued support from the OCHA head of office is likely to be important in the short to medium term to assist the development of this national level structure.

2 OCHA’s role in supporting cash preparedness

This study confirmed the added value of OCHA in supporting cash coordination through a dedicated Cash Coordinator. During Haiyan, this position was an external, time bound deployment. Given the regular nature of emergencies and the need to make progress on a number of elements of cash coordination in the downtime between emergencies, plus the permanent presence of OCHA in country and its mandate to support preparedness, there is value to be had in institutionalising a cash coordination role within OCHA Philippines. This idea has met with traction within OCHA Philippines. A new Cash Focal Point position has been designated within the Preparedness and Disaster Response Unit, which has cash coordination as a core element of the job description, including being OCHA’s focal point for the CWG Steering Committee. In the event of a large scale emergency, there is likely to still be a need to deploy a dedicated Cash Coordinator – but in future any deployed staff could be supported and guided by the Cash Officer and would be working with established procedures.

As part of preparedness activities, thought needs to be given to how OCHA can support cash coordination within the response hubs. The challenge with OCHA deploying sub-national coordinators during the Haiyan response was the time it would have taken to train these people. It would be worthwhile having this as an agenda item for the core CWG in an effort to seek commitment from members, perhaps on a region by region basis, on who can commit to providing a resource for more localised cash coordination during emergencies. This is mentioned in the CWG TOR81. In the event that a Cash Coordinator is deployed by OCHA to Philippines, this could also free up the OCHA Cash Officer to take up a coordination role in a response hub.

It is planned that in the future the ICC will be activated by OCHA as part of an emergency preparedness plan. If so there may be some value in OCHA developing a national HCT strategic preparedness plan for the Philippines. Some OCHA sub-national offices have been working on similar plans at a regional level. This would require collaboration with other agencies with a stake in preparedness, including UNDP and the private sector, and would need to define both long term and short term activities.

There should also be thought given to how CaLP in the Philippines, through the capacity building officer position, can support OCHA and other actors such as the government to build their internal preparedness on cash – for example through training. CaLP recently developed a draft capacity assessment tool which could be a starting point to identify areas in need of support and development of a training plan82.

3 Improve preparedness planning between aid agencies and FSPs

At this stage in the Philippines, bilateral arrangements between aid agencies and FSPs are probably still inevitable. However, this review identified a desire on both sides to improve coordination of preparedness activities. The following actions are recommended to improve preparedness, reduce the burden of labour and duplication in an emergency and speed up response.

- **Establish pre-agreements with FSPs:** This is a recommendation coming from the FSPs, and prior relationships with FSPs were shown to be beneficial for agencies that responded in Haiyan. A number of NGOs are currently discussing this with service providers. This would mean that contractual negotiation and compliance issues were dealt with ahead of time and arrangements could simply be re-activated.

- **Minimum standards for contracting:** A recommendation emerging from the Mercy Corps Lessons Learned workshop is discussion on and drafting of a document summarising the minimum contracting terms for service providers, and minimum requirements for CWG members. This could then guide future contractual negotiations.

---

81 The TOR states that the CWG or Steering Committee may nominate/volunteer/vote for Emergency Chairpersons who will serve as the automatic Chairs of cash working groups at the field level in the event of an emergency.

82 CaLP (2014a)
• **Regular mapping of FSPs services and coverage:** Providing agencies with timely access to up to date information on what services exist (profile; services; rates; capacity) and their coverage would be useful for agencies in preparedness planning and response analysis, and needs to be undertaken in a non-emergency setting. In 2014 USAID-SIMM worked with various FSPs to collate some of this information, which was then mapped by OCHA to show the distribution of outlets for payment. Now that this is partially created it will not take too much time to finalise and then update periodically and there is presently buy in from a number of the FSPs. Going forward, this needs to have clear leadership and a timeframe to ensure it is kept up to date. OCHA has made a general commitment to continue these updates. OCHA should identify a point person for coordinating this on a quarterly basis as well as someone within the Information Management (IM) unit to update the maps and post on the OCHA website.

• **Defining KYC regulations during emergencies with BSP:** Knowing ahead of time which regulations BSP will relax during an emergency and for how long would be useful for both FSPs and agencies. The ad hoc amendments created by the BSP in the aftermath of Haiyan are a starting point for discussion of a more strategic approach to response planning and agreement of standards.

The core group of the CWG would be well positioned to take on these tasks. For this reason it could be useful for the FSPs to be represented on the Steering Committee at some stage – although this may be more conducive in a few months once the group has established ways of working as a community.

At present there is no single FSP with coverage or capacity to commit to development of a national, consolidated payment platform for use in emergencies, as is being discussed in Lebanon and also at a global level by some donors and UN agencies. However, in the future it may still be possible to streamline payment arrangements of aid agencies by exploring ways of inter-collaboration between FSPs – particularly since FSPs are beginning to actively coordinate amongst themselves to develop inter-operable systems for money transfer, such as shared agent networks. For example it may be that a particular FSP, or FSPs, are considered the most strategic to lead cash transfer delivery in particular provinces; or that a distribution system similar to that of the 4Ps programme could be set up, where aid agencies have a contract with a single provider who then subcontract the most relevant service providers sub-nationally.

4 **Set up mechanisms for coordination with the private sector during emergencies**

The lessons from the Philippines during the Typhoon Haiyan response are illustrative of the growing significance globally of businesses in disaster response and recovery, and of the need to develop mechanisms to better coordinate the inputs of the private sector with those of the humanitarian community. OCHA Philippines has recognised this and a staff member – the Public Information and Private Partnerships National officer – is tasked with leading discussions of private sector engagement in emergencies. The following are recommended actions for OCHA and others to focus on as part of preparedness in order to set the foundations for moving forward with better coordination in emergencies.

• **Formal inclusion of the business sector in the humanitarian coordination structure:** As mentioned in Section Five, until now there has been no formal engagement between government/UN and the private sector on disaster coordination. A starting point will be to formalise such arrangements with an MOU for cooperation, to maximise the value of the NDRRMC and to bring the private sector further into the coordination structures at country level. Representation would need to be carefully considered and an organisation (or organisations) selected, taking into account such things as leadership, prior expertise, capacity, and links to others in the business community. There are a number of umbrella bodies representing corporations and the business community which could have strategic relevance here. At the time of writing the NDRRMC is about to discuss a draft protocol / standards for public-private cooperation in disaster response and rehabilitation. Meanwhile during its meeting on January 8, 2015 the HCT approved including an observer from the private sector to the HCT. PDRF was identified as the suitable representative.

---

83 As of March 2015 it is understood that a member of staff within the IM unit has been assigned to provide support to the Cash Thematic Area which will include the FSP mapping and updating of knowledge sharing platform to be hosted by OCHA.  
84 A concept being developed by the USAID-SIMM project and partners.  
85 Although the private sector is part of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC).  
86 Including PBSP, PDRF, Chamber of Commerce and the Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR). The latter is a membership body with a seat on the NDRRMC.
• **Developing a strategy for coordination of economic recovery and CTP:** There is a clear need for a better engagement strategy between private sector actors supporting the supply chain, business recovery post-disaster and agencies coordinating CTP. This is in order to reduce duplication of effort, inform CTP response analysis and the ways in which CTP can support economic recovery, as well as when response should transition into early recovery. For example, as part of new approaches to disaster preparedness the PDRF and PBSP are establishing crisis operations centres, and the Chamber of Commerce is developing a business recovery centre. It is hoped these will improve the coordination and timely communication of information on market intelligence and commodity movements, supply chain and business recovery. Discussions with these organisations should be held on the timeframe for these approaches, ways in which information could be made available to the humanitarian community and ways of working together from the forecast stage onwards. This should be led by the OCHA Head of Office and Public Information and Private Partnerships National officer and could be a priority activity of the core CWG.

5  Develop mechanisms to ensure further coordination between the social protection system and humanitarian aid during emergencies

The experiences of WFP and UNICEF coordinating their response and recovery programming with the DSWD to enable vertical expansion of the 4Ps programme to meet some of the broader needs of disaster-affected beneficiaries has been positive. This enabled them to rapidly reach a large number of affected households. WFP and UNICEF are undertaking assessments of this strategy to see if it's best placed to respond at scale to a disaster. Reports are forthcoming and it will be important to take into account the lessons highlighted for the development of future coordination mechanisms based on the 4Ps. That said, the following actions are recommended for DSWD, UN cluster leads and humanitarian donors:

**Build capacity for vertical expansion of the 4Ps programme in emergencies:** Learning from the pilot in the Philippines should be discussed collectively between the cluster leads, DSWD and humanitarian donors and a decision made about whether or not it is something to be explored more fully in emergencies. Assuming it is, these actors should collectively define the actions needed to put in place the necessary systems and capacities to activate and use this mechanism in future emergencies, and meeting broader needs aside from food security. This should include discussion on:

• **Implications for 4Ps programme design and staff capacity:** Including identifying what actions are needed as part of preparedness to transform or adjust a developmental programme to better accommodate humanitarian needs in a disaster. This may include a revision of the 4Ps strategy and objectives; identification of and response to training needs of administrators of the 4Ps programme at national and local government level; and development of humanitarian operating procedures in discussion with LGU and payment partners (e.g. removal of conditions). UNICEF and CaLP have already begun to identify and act on the capacity building needs of DSWD through a CaLP Level One training adapted to the needs of the government.

• **Use of this mechanism to meet multi-sectoral needs:** Including defining the terms of engagement of other cluster leads, defining a MEB that goes beyond food needs, and discussing the implications for funding flows. For example, would each UN agency provide a defined cash top-up to DSWD? Would one UN agency take the lead on behalf of all clusters? Or would humanitarian donors develop a direct relationship with DSWD through some pre-agreed rapid respond fund?

• **Trigger indicators:** Going forward it would be useful to identify adequate trigger indicators and thresholds to activate mobilisation of and actual implementation of emergency responses through the 4Ps programme, as well as for exit/scale down.

**Discuss the feasibility of horizontal expansion of the 4Ps programme in emergencies:** This was not attempted during the Haiyan response but is something that is being developed and tested by governments and donors in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya87). The premise is that a social protection programme could operate a surge capacity or ‘crisis modifier’ function, which uses the social protection programme operating systems (verification, payment and monitoring) to temporarily and rapidly reach additional, non-beneficiary households with cash assistance. This is something that could have potential in the Philippines but will require a good deal of thought and planning.

87 On the Productive Safety Nets Programme and Hunger Safety Nets Programme phase II respectively.
One way could be to build on the National Household Targeting System for poverty reduction which provides a national database of poor and chronically poor households. The LGUs operate a community based monitoring system – part of the national poverty reduction strategy for planning and development – which should (on paper at least) vet every household according to certain indicators on a five-year basis and which could be updated more regularly in disaster prone provinces. This would require detailed discussions in a non-emergency setting and inputs from a variety of stakeholders. The implications – both positive and negative – would need to be discussed including the capacity of the DSWD and LGUs to update and verify lists regularly, the accuracy of these surveys to identify the vulnerable, and the capacity of the operating system to be able to verify and provide payments to a temporary caseload.

**Better define coordination of interventions targeting non-4Ps beneficiaries:** The 4Ps programme reaches a particular cohort of the population. In the future, assuming a mechanism for rapid and multi-sectoral disaster response through the existing 4Ps programme is further developed, there is the opportunity to better coordinate the actions of other actors to reach those who are not enrolled in the programme. For example, discussion between humanitarian donors, the core CWG, DSWD and the UN could lead to the development of a MOU that 4Ps households will be supported in disasters through the 4Ps top-up approach and other implementing partners should focus their efforts on filling the gaps. This also has implications for the coordination of DSWD’s own parallel emergency assistance programmes (cash for work and emergency cash for shelter assistance) which could be coordinated to support the non-4Ps caseload.

6 Define how to operationalise standards for cash for work activities during emergencies

The lesson from Haiyan is that, whilst minimum standards aimed at reducing risks on emergency employment as well as developmental programmes are commendable, activities need to go beyond the definition of standards to develop systems and processes to operationalise these. Without the means to apply these standards quickly and effectively humanitarian programming will be delayed and can have the opposite effect. The cluster leads supporting cash for work should collaborate with government counterparts in the DSWD and DOLE and the CWG core group to define mechanisms to coordinate the effective application of these standards in a disaster. This should include discussion around nuances and how to relax the application of standards if this is appropriate for assisting response in a large scale emergency, just as the BSP relaxes certain financial regulations during disasters.

6.1.2 Response and Early Recovery Phase

7 OCHA and the CWG ensure both operational and strategic coordination of CTP

Following an emergency the core CWG should continue to meet as a national platform in Manila but should immediately activate plans (developed in a non-emergency setting) to establish a CWG, or groups, within the affected regions. Similarly, OCHA should mobilise to ensure that the role and functions of a Cash Coordinator are adequately covered at the national and sub-national levels. The national level will require more strategic engagement whilst the sub-national level will require support to strategic and operational coordination of CTP. Sub-national groups will need to have clear arrangements for chairmanship – whether provided through OCHA or through a core group member – and secretarial support will be required at both levels.

In the short term, OCHA may not be best placed to support some of the more technical elements of cash coordination (see section 6.2) and so pre-arranged support on operational coordination from a technical partner would be useful. In the context of the Philippines this could include CaLP given its long term presence in country and the Asia region. An alternative would be to arrange for this support to be provided by a core CWG member or members. The core CWG includes four of the five agencies who are on the CaLP Steering Committee and who are mandated to respond to emergencies in the country. The leadership needs to be clear to all from the beginning and committed to by the agencies taking these roles.

It will be important to have clear lines of communication and alignment of activities between the Cash Coordinator and the CWG at the national level, and complementary roles and structures at the sub-national level. New organisations that join the core CWG should be encouraged to assign a dedicated focal point to attend the meetings.
8 Developing and disseminating tools for harmonising approaches on CTP

A lesson emerging from this review was the desire of all agencies for greater harmonisation of approaches on CTP, including through the sharing and use of joint tools. The development of such tools should be an activity of the CWG Steering Committee, should prioritise the dissemination of these tools, adapted where needed, and get agreement from all members on their use. It will be important to raise awareness also of emerging tools to support multi-sectoral assessments and analysis.

Areas where harmonised approaches can be promoted include:

- Needs assessment and response analysis: Tools are being developed globally by several core CWG members to support more holistic programme development. The CWG should be a contributor into the 72 hour questionnaire that informs response decisions.
- Common templates for post distribution monitoring.
- A more standard approach on market assessments: This could be by, for example, developing common indicators through 4 or 5 standard questions that are essential to collect for OCHA/government cash coordination and that can be added to an agency’s own markets assessment. To support movement towards cash as a response modality across sectoral areas it is likely that two approaches to market analysis will be useful: i) of the retail sector’s ability to recover from the disaster and ensure a steady supply of a variety of day to day goods in demand; and ii) analysis of the chains and blockages for critical commodities where the emergency is likely to create huge new demand (for example – shelter materials). For the former it is recommended that linkages are developed with the private sector to provide this information. For the latter, developing coordination of joint assessments at the national and regional level would be appropriate.
- A web-based approach to coordination of 3W information on CTP. The technology and support capacity exist in the Philippines and crowd sourcing was used in the response to Typhoon Ruby in December 2014 for people to report damage to households, property and missing people. This could be a more efficient way of collating this information and would provide immediate outputs.

9 Improve information sharing with the private sector

Through OCHA, the OCHA Cash Coordinator and the CWG, more formal and consistent ways of sharing information between the humanitarian sector and the private sector (planned for in a non-emergency setting) should be put into practice from early in the response phase.

Strategic coordination:

- **Sharing the 3W for CTP with the FSPs:** Knowing which agencies are going to be involved and where, and the likely aggregate volume of cash to be required would be useful for FSPs in planning their support for emergency CTP. This could begin as early as the disaster forecast stage through meetings convened between the FSPs and core CWG members, to support pre-positioning, and could continue in the early meetings of the CWG. This should include the BSP, Land Bank and other actors responsible for supporting the pre-positioning of cash.
- **Information sharing for market recovery:** One task of the OCHA cash coordinator (in partnership with an OCHA private sector officer should this position be filled) should be to identify the information on supply chains and market recovery that can be made available through the various private sector umbrella bodies and their recovery centres, and to raise awareness of this with the CWG members to inform response analysis. These private sector actors would similarly benefit from an understanding of the location and scale of cash injections planned in the response and the commodities that will be in demand. The regular engagement of the Cash Coordinator and ICC with private sector representatives, such as the Chamber of Commerce, to understand stages of economic recovery will improve the transition of humanitarian programming to better support early recovery.

---

88 Including Save the Children’s Hazards, Vulnerabilities and Capacities Assessment tool and ICRC’s VAM.
• **Sharing of standards**: For those private sector organisations who are undertaking their own disbursements of cash to disaster-affected households, mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure CTP standards are also reaching them – and ideally influencing their programming. The most effective way could be through the umbrella bodies that exist. These groups could be invited to participate in the CWG in a non-emergency setting, or the Cash Coordinator could circulate information bilaterally to these leads. The Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) could be a useful network to engage with here. They have regular meetings to harmonise policy and practice on CSR and they circulate standards to inform their member’s in-kind CSR efforts. It should be straightforward to provide them with a briefing on similar standards for cash-based support. For the best effect these should be supported by the national government.

**Operational coordination:**

• **Coordination on disbursement plans for FSPs**: At the sub-national level, coordination of operational plans between agencies through the CWG should be done to identify any overlapping plans to work with particular service providers in particular areas and to harmonise these plans.

10 **Building links to other non-traditional humanitarian actors working on CTP**

The Typhoon Haiyan response saw the engagement of a large number of faith based organisations in humanitarian response. This is a global trend and should be anticipated to continue in the Philippines. To ensure that minimum standards are more consistently adopted and ways of working are harmonised, organisations need to be linked with the humanitarian coordination systems of the international community. As with the private sector, one means of reaching these NGOs and CBOs could be through the engagement of OCHA and the CWG with the registered umbrella bodies and networks that represent faith based organisations, such as the ACT Alliance. These bodies may also have resources and a mandate for capacity building of local partners. Besides seeking more direct engagement, OCHA should address this with the government as this is an area more appropriate for them to take responsibility and leadership for. One example could be to create a code of conduct defining ways of working between international organisations and others during disasters. These links could be explored in a non-emergency setting. During the response phase a cash information kit could then be readily provided to all new players during the emergency and these organisations could be invited to join the CWG.

11 **Developing clear coordination between the CWG and other coordination structures**

The lessons from this review and the perspectives of most respondents indicate that there is a benefit, in the Philippines context, for having the CWG independent of but linked to the UN system. It was considered that this is more likely to ensure engagement in a non-emergency setting since the cluster system is not active all through the year, and to maintain the independence and collective influence of the (non-UN) members. That said, there is a need for greater clarity on i) how the CWG links to the UN system, for greater legitimacy, and ii) the functions of a CWG compared to the clusters, to reduce overlap or duplication.

The structure proposed by the outgoing Cash Coordinator, (6.1.1 above) whereby the CWG core membership includes OCHA and is led by OCHA during emergencies, provides a direct link to the ICC. Going forward, it will be important to ensure that this translates into a clear link to the decision makers at the HCT level to ensure that cash is included appropriately in the SRP. One way of doing this is to gain endorsement from the HCT on the importance of the CWG (and other working groups) on strategic response planning. It is understood that this will be being considered during forthcoming HCT meetings.

Whilst a core focus of the CWG activity will be on technical issues, it was generally agreed that in the future it will need to function more like a cluster in and of itself. That is to say it will take, analyse and use information to make decisions and give advice on CTP design across sectors. If this is the case there is the need for the core CWG to define, with cluster leads, which activities relating to CTP coordination will be the remit of the CWG in emergencies and which will be the remit of the clusters, along with a means of sharing information between these forums. For clusters where significant engagement of members on CTP is likely it is recommended that all

---

89 For example, not using plastic packaging; which brands or quality of dried food goods to use.
90 Since a main difference between the working groups and the clusters is that the working groups are not institutionalised by the HCT or with a government lead.
91 The ERPWG and the ICCWG are now endorsed by the HCT (OCHA pers. Comm).
cluster leads should be members of the CWG, or that within each cluster a core CWG member is defined as the ‘cash champion’ for the cluster and feeds back this information.

There was a consensus that well flagged and targeted email communications, and shorter updates, are more helpful with more chance of getting read.

6.2 IMPROVING CASH COORDINATION GLOBALLY

Experiences in the Philippines demonstrate the continued evolution of CTP which is becoming mainstreamed as a response modality in multiple sectors. Whereas in previous L3 emergencies the focus of coordination was on creating the buy in for cash, in the Haiyan response cash was considered from day one, by the government, UN, agencies and donors. Based on lessons from the Haiyan response, this section sets out recommendations for the UN and donors for improving cash coordination globally, to ensure CTP can be implemented quickly and at scale as part of rapid response and in a way that best meets the needs of those affected by disasters.

6.2.1 Building OCHA’s cash coordination role in contexts where OCHA leads coordination

This review demonstrated the clear value of OCHA taking a lead in cash coordination in disasters and of the benefits of the role of the Cash Coordinator. Globally, there is discussion ongoing within OCHA and between OCHA and strategic partners (DFID, CaLP) which will further define OCHA’s future role in supporting cash coordination. Based on experiences in the Haiyan response the following recommendations are made in order to develop OCHA’s global capacity to support cash coordination in emergencies.

12 Develop internal understanding of CTP within OCHA

Compared to other UN agencies, OCHA are still relatively new to CTP. OCHA’s role in coordination of in-kind aid during emergencies doesn’t require detailed technical knowledge of the sectoral programme areas. However, what is evident from Haiyan is that some level of understanding of CTP within OCHA, including appreciation of the benefits over in kind aid, buy in to the use of CTP across sectors, and understanding of the implications for coordination, is necessary if OCHA are to fulfil the potential of this role. This understanding is necessary if OCHA ICC is to make cluster leads more accountable and ensure cash is considered strategically in the HCT and with governments as part of response analysis, recovery and rehabilitation, as well as to build the confidence of agencies around OCHA’s added value.

It is recommended that OCHA develop an organisational policy and guidelines on CTP, and invest in training for ICCs, Heads of Office, resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators and other strategic positions within OCHA to inform their engagement in cash coordination. These could be developed internally or adapted from CaLP’s training resources. It should be possible for humanitarian donors to fund these activities – for example through the ECHO ERC fund.

13 Build OCHA’s internal capacity for supporting inter-cluster coordination of CTP

In the Philippines the first deployment of a Cash Coordinator hosted by OCHA had to be sourced externally, as there was no such capacity in OCHA and the role was deployed without pre-existing systems and processes to support these functions. Going forward, OCHA must build internal capacity to support inter-cluster coordination of CTP, including:

- **Defining and disseminating procedures to guide OCHA in coordination of CTP:** This should define OCHA’s engagement on cash coordination in L2 and L3 emergencies, including hosting and secretariat functions as well as clear definition on when full time deployment of a dedicated ‘Cash Coordinator’ position (or positions) would take place and the terms of reference for such a position. For the short to medium term at least, this TOR may be best focused on the strategic coordination elements of the role with the expectation that additional (non-OCHA) support is provided for operational coordination (see 3 below).

- **Developing key competencies in CTP for deployment on cash coordination:** If a Cash Coordination function is to become a standard deployment for OCHA it will be important to build OCHA’s internal capacity to support this role. This could be through building an internal roster of Humanitarian Affairs Officers (HAO) with specific training for cash that can be deployed in the first wave of the response. It could also be supported
through the development and hosting of a broader Cash CAP facility, similar to the GenCAP and ProCAP. One host option could be the global food security cluster (gFSC) which has begun to look at the development of this, with support from the Norwegian Refugee Council. Whilst this roster is linked to a particular sectoral coordination body, it would be worth at least exploring whether this initiative could be expanded to meet broader, more cross-sectoral requirements so as to build on what exists rather than start something new in parallel. OCHA could coordinate with the gFSC to discuss the feasibility of getting the necessary skills, including cross-sector expertise. Similarly there are other rosters that could be activated and strengthened and this option could be explored before creating a new mechanism.

- **Developing a cash coordination toolkit**: development of internal guidelines and tools which a Cash Coordinator can use to support the HC and others in the strategic coordination of CTP would be very beneficial.

14 **OCHA to develop technical partnerships to support operational coordination**

The lesson from Haiyan was that agencies expected more support on coordination of operational issues, and that this required technical experience of CTP design and implementation to be well delivered. It was also evident that the Cash Coordinator role in the Philippines, with a focus on strategic and operational coordination, was too broad for one person to fulfil. Given this and the fact that OCHA is not an operational agency and is still building internal capacity for cash coordination, a solution would be to invest time in developing partnerships with organisations with expertise in technical assistance, to support OCHA.

A co-lead on cash coordination, with OCHA focusing more on strategic elements and the technical partner on operational coordination between agencies, could be valuable. This co-lead however would need to be a dedicated role – not a second position alongside a person’s regular job. CaLP would have a mandate for this, as would various INGOs. There is evidence from experiences of several clusters that such an NGO co-lead can work. CaLP’s presence in country during the initial months of the Haiyan response could have supported this role, however the relationship between OCHA and CaLP was ad hoc and the outcomes were less – or at least less visible – than they could have been. This should be more formally developed so as to be a predictable arrangement activated when a disaster hits. If such a system was piloted it would be important to measure the effect of such a partnership.

6.2.2 **Develop mechanisms for inclusion of the private sector in cash coordination**

The clear lessons emerging from the experiences of the private sector in disaster response in the Philippines is that in contexts where it is feasible and appropriate to do so the humanitarian community need to work with the private sector to improve aid effectiveness. CTP provides clear rationale to do this, both for efficient and effective delivery of cash and for better understanding of markets and coordination of economic recovery. Partnerships will not be appropriate in all contexts and of course there should be alignment with humanitarian principles, however, the potential added value of this broad group of actors to humanitarian response is huge.

OCHA has invested in a global private sector unit in order to further coordination between the humanitarian community and the business community, and CaLP, NGOs and donors are engaged on various initiatives with the private sector on CTP delivery. The following actions are recommended to improve coordination of the private sector to support CTP:

15 **Identify clear asks for how the private sector could support CTP response analysis and implementation**

These can be identified by OCHA with CaLP, cluster leads and others in advance of a disaster and then shared with the private sector in an effort to mobilize support. One such ask could be to develop ways to share market assessments and support coordination of market recovery in disaster prone countries, to define leadership between the humanitarian community and the private sector.

---

92 For example, in Philippines CARE does this within the shelter cluster, in WaSH coordination it is Oxfam, and Save the Children for protection.
16 Develop SOPs for OCHA to coordinate private sector response in disaster-prone countries
This could include preparedness planning between the HCT and business community, the deployment of a private-sector focal point and updating and communicating with relevant business platforms. Such a deployment and activities would complement those of a Cash Coordination function.

17 Research and analysis of ways to harmonise cash delivery with FSPs
The experiences in Haiyan showed the potential for greater coordination and preparedness planning between the FSPs and aid agencies including the potential of and barriers to moving towards a common payment platform. More investment and coordination, between all sectors (private sector, UN, donors and implementing partners) on initiatives to overcome these barriers and to understand the implications for disaster preparedness, effective response and humanitarian funding flows, would be very useful.

One such initiative is DfID's "Expert Cash Panel" to be managed by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) from 2015. This aims to identify options for harmonised delivery mechanisms on CTP and the implications that multi-purpose cash delivery is expected to have on the current humanitarian architecture. This work will include a range of actors, including the private sector and humanitarian agencies. There is also work underway between humanitarian and private sector actors looking at a common electronic payment solution in preparation for the World Economic Forum, and OCHA is a part of this.

6.2.3 Actions to move towards greater use of Multi Purpose Cash Grants
The lessons from this review have led to recommendations of ways to coordinate between agencies in order to support greater use of Multi-Purpose Cash Grants (MPCG).

18 Inclusion of disaster affected communities in response planning
Ensuring greater community participation to identify needs was highlighted in the Operational Peer Review93. This is important to ensure accountability to affected populations and for determining appropriate responses through unconditional or multi-purpose cash grants. OCHA has a role here in advocating for such consultations with cluster leads and at the global cluster level. Cluster leads could take steps to pilot collective community consultation, to inform joint response analysis.

19 Financial and technical support for joint assessments
Moving forward with MPCG to meet needs across sectors requires a change in how agencies programme. A starting point is considering ways to undertake joint analysis. Firstly, this requires tools – more detailed than the Multi Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) – that can be used to define needs across sectors. These are being developed by a number of agencies, some through donor support with the intention of building capacity of the sector as a whole94. Secondly, this requires coordinated implementation of needs and market assessments. One way of supporting this could be through the cluster system, with OCHA engaging cluster leads, another could be through a CWG or information management working group. Donors could support this through provision of funding for coordinating assessments – they could also promote confidence within implementing agencies to share agency-specific assessments.

One good practice highlighted by many of the clusters in the Philippines was the analysis by ACAPS using pre- and post-disaster secondary data, with the aim of informing decision-making and recovery planning in the Philippines. This could be seen as best practice for future responses and deserves consideration by UN Agencies and donors at a global level as to the best ways of ensuring that this kind of analysis can be done on a regular basis. Such a process would need to begin earlier and be a lighter review than in the Haiyan response, to avoid lessons being learned mid-way through the response.

An implication of this is that donors must be willing to fund broader economic programming and be willing to fund the real gap in the minimum expenditure basket of families affected by disaster.

93 IASC (2014)
94 Such as Save the Children's response analysis tool which was developed as part of an inter-agency ERC-funded project.
20 Changing sector-focused reporting templates

A solution is required to the challenge, seen in the Haiyan response, on how agencies should report targets and outcomes on unconditional cash transfers or MPCGs. The consensus in the Philippines was that reporting should focus instead on contributions to household basic needs and overall changes to wellbeing. These changes should be discussed by global cluster leads and OCHA to develop reporting templates and financial tracking systems that reflect these. This could build on any progress of the core CWG in the Philippines or the cash consortium in Lebanon on this area.

21 Critical assessment of the appropriateness of the cluster coordination system

The above recommendations are an attempt to improve coordination of CTP within the structure of the existing humanitarian coordination system. Some of the challenges identified in this review are however symptomatic of problems inherent in the present cluster coordination structure. These limit the ability of the humanitarian system to meet the coordination needs emerging from the trends seen in humanitarian response.

There were some in this review who considered that more fundamental change is required and that the cluster system is no longer fit for purpose. This is an issue with far reaching consequences that goes beyond the scope of this review. This review echoes the recommendations of others that the current structure of the humanitarian coordination system needs to be critically assessed in light of these global trends and if it is found unfit for purpose then alternative structures, which facilitate coordination across sectors and between a wider variety of stakeholders, must be proposed. This should be a core agenda of the Humanitarian Summit. From the perspective of CTP coordination and moving towards MPCG, one alternative for consideration could be if aid were coordinated by process rather than by sector (eg assessment and analysis ‘cluster’, a delivery ‘cluster’; a monitoring ‘cluster’; etc).

22 Donor’s role in supporting coordination across sectors

During the Haiyan response, and in other recent Level Three emergencies there have been roles emerging for donors to support cash coordination and particularly coordination across sectoral divides. This can include the following:

- Financial support to OCHA to fund coordination positions and to develop organisational capacity to coordinate CTP.

- Advocacy towards UN agencies leading the clusters to take more of a lead on cross-sector coordination of CTP, to move towards a common agenda for CTP in Strategic Response Plans and to be more accountable in the promotion of CTP as an efficient and effective multi-purpose tool.

- More active involvement in strategic coordination in countries where they are funding responses, including coordination with other donors, the government and the ICC in order to support a transition from an individual project level approach to a more programme level approach, including defining targeting approaches, harmonisation of transfer values to meet a variety of basic needs, as well as exploring harmonised operational systems for cash delivery, such as through national social protection systems and through common platforms for implementing partners. As much of the above needs to be undertaken as part of emergency preparedness, especially for rapid onset emergency contexts, funding the design and implementation of cash preparedness strategies that are part of overarching systematic preparedness should be prioritised.

---

95 In Philippines, the OCHA reporting template as well as the minimum information required are currently with the OCHA IM team who are working to improve the capturing of CTP reporting into the current 3Ws (OCHA pers. Comm).
96 Interviews with DFID and ECHO. Both donors have been involved in supporting cash coordination during the response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon.
97 ECHO’s Emergency Response Capacity fund is one such mechanism that could be utilised.
98 DFID’s recent Value for Money Study (DFID 2015) on transfer modalities in emergencies concludes that “the potential for Value for Money gains of cash are particularly evident when cash is considered as a multi-sector tool with a wide range of benefits. The goods and services that households access as a result of cash transfers vary between households and span different aid sectors. The flexibility of cash to provide access to a range of goods and services means that it is uniquely placed to enable VfM gains in the humanitarian system.”
ANNEXES

ANNEX A: REFERENCES

5. CALP (2014b), ‘Philippines Cash Coordination Lessons Learned’, CaLP internal report.
18. IFRC (2014), ‘Case study: Unconditional Cash Transfers Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)’, IFRC.
24. NAC (2013), ‘Special Meeting of the National Advisory Committee re Humanitarian Agencies’.
26. OCHA (2013b), ‘Snapshot of Cash Transfer Programmes Planned, by Sector (1st Dec 2013)’, update of the OCHA Cash Coordinator to the HCT.


30. OCHA (2015a), ‘OCHA Philippines Cash Transfer Programming Infographic’.


## ANNEX B: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agencies (international)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Julien Jacob</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihoods Adviser</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sarah Murray</td>
<td>Cash Adviser</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Isabelle Pelly</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihoods Adviser</td>
<td>SCUK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rosie Jackson</td>
<td>Senior FSL Adviser</td>
<td>SCUK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Claire Holman</td>
<td>Cash in Emergencies Officer</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Greg Matthews</td>
<td>Senior Adviser for Emergency Preparedness and Response</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agencies (in country)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jerome Lanit</td>
<td>Area Coordinator</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Demos Militante</td>
<td>FSL Adviser</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aaron Anderson</td>
<td>Shelter Manager</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gustavo Cavero</td>
<td>FSL Programme Manager</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ana Ferreira</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services (CRS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Michael Belaro</td>
<td>Cash Focal Point</td>
<td>Philippines Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Gabriel Sembrano</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Emilo Paz</td>
<td>Livelihoods Programme Manager and Focal Point for Cash Programming</td>
<td>Plan International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Erynn Carter</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Vaidehi Krishna</td>
<td>Cash Transfer Programme Manager</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Arnel Limpiada</td>
<td>CTP Coordinator</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Jermaine Bayas</td>
<td>EFSL Coordinator</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CaLP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lili Mohiddin</td>
<td>ex-CaLP Technical Coordinator</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Carla Lacerda</td>
<td>Ex-CaLP Asia focal point</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Edwina Thompson</td>
<td>Ex-OCHA interim Cash Coordinator</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sarah Bailey</td>
<td>Lead on DFID VfM study of CTP during the Haiyan response</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary Gulliman</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary for Operations</td>
<td>Department for Social Welfare &amp; Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Organisation</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN (International)</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Juliet Lang</td>
<td>OCHA Global Cash Focal Point</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sandra Hart</td>
<td>Food Security Cluster Coordinator</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Karen Smith</td>
<td>Private Sector Adviser</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Nicola Peach</td>
<td>Regional Cash and Vouchers Adviser</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mamta Khanal Basnet</td>
<td>CBI specialist</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN (in country)</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Betty Kweyu</td>
<td>Cash transfer programme specialist, social policy section</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>David Carden</td>
<td>Head of office</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kasper Engborg</td>
<td>Inter Cluster Coordinator (Head of Regional sub-office Tacloban)</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Geovani Lapina</td>
<td>Programme Assistant</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Eileen Tufay</td>
<td>Cash and Voucher Focal Point</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Ruth Georget</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Coordination and Resource Mobilization Officer</td>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ivan Ledesma</td>
<td>Livelihoods cluster coordinator and ex-Save the Children programme manager</td>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Mayen Olmedo</td>
<td>Cash Focal Point</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Agnes Palacio</td>
<td>National Disaster Response Adviser</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Fe Kagastian</td>
<td>Cash Coordinator</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor (international)</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Heidi Gilert</td>
<td>Humanitarian Adviser</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Fergus McBean</td>
<td>Resilience Adviser</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kate Hart</td>
<td>Middle East, Humanitarian and Conflict Humanitarian Adviser</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Roman Majcher</td>
<td>Regional Technical Adviser</td>
<td>ECHO Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Devrig Velly</td>
<td>Regional Food Security Coordinator</td>
<td>ECHO Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor (in country)</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Arlynn Aquino</td>
<td>ECHO Programme Officer</td>
<td>ECHO Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Mamerto Tangonan</td>
<td>SIMM Programme Manager</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Organisation</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Judith Dumapay</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Aileen S. Lamasuta</td>
<td>Vice President, Debit &amp; Prepaid Cards Division</td>
<td>BPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Cecille Lumpas</td>
<td>Division Manager</td>
<td>ML Huiller Remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Marc Jeric Santos</td>
<td>Corporate Account Executive</td>
<td>LBC Remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mark Louie Garawan</td>
<td>Corporate Account Executive</td>
<td>LBC Remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Luzviminda Valdez</td>
<td>4Ps Project Management Office Head</td>
<td>Philpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Cleofe Figuracion</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Corporate Communications</td>
<td>Card Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Roberto Nazal</td>
<td>Head of Development Group</td>
<td>BanKo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Rafael Lopa</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Eric Camacho</td>
<td>Director, Health, Environment and DRRM</td>
<td>Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Oliver Cam</td>
<td>Head of Regional Office Tacloban</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Rene &quot;Butch&quot; Meily</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith Based Organisation</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Michael Siao</td>
<td>Foundation Volunteer heading CTP</td>
<td>Tzu Chi Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C: MAP OF CTP AND MARKET ASSESSMENTS

An OCHA cash coordination resource99 circulated to the CWG mailing list and uploaded to the OCHA response website

ANNEX D: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CASH COORDINATOR

Main tasks and duties to be executed:

1. Facilitate and as necessary set-up appropriate structures (most likely including an Inter-Sectoral Cash Working Group) that ensures both technical and strategic coordination of CTP. Ensure that the coordination structure incorporates current coordination efforts by INGOs, IFRC and other key actors. To liaise with the Government of the Philippines over the feasibility, acceptance and use of cash transfers to administer emergency assistance and recovery activities, in coordination with UN agencies. This includes understanding government approaches to CTP, ensuring that all policy, SOPs, technical solutions meet government approval, seeking senior OCHA and HCT where appropriate (and understanding when to)

2. Facilitate/develop inter-agency/cluster CTP strategy exploring all options cash, voucher and cross-cluster collaboration – working in a collaborative manner on all levels.

3. To ensure assessment information is collated and represented (i.e. rapid market assessments and cash feasibility studies) and represented within cluster (and sub-cluster) level coordination mechanisms.

4. Support the adjustment or revision of any large-scale coordination tools (IM, Flash Appeal etc.) to ensure they are able to support the use of CTP

5. Support assessment processes including market analysis; participate in assessments as necessary; ensure cash is an integral part of all sectoral assessments as appropriate

6. Make contact with any existing working groups on cash coordination and ensure there is coordination between them

7. Travel to the different hubs to work with clusters and operational partners to assess CTP potential in a multi-sectoral response

   Participation in HCT and preparation of key messages/policy for HC/HCT meetings to advocate for CTP

8. Develop/deliver training/tools/cash assistance guidelines and SOPs as needed

9. Monitor implementation of cash modalities ensuring lesson learning and dissemination of findings

10. Helping partners and determine the appropriate timeframe in which to transition between emergencies activities and the role of cash within this.

11. Ensure to the extent possible, that CTP follows best practice in accountability to affected people as well as donors

12. Promote the evaluation of CTP; develop ToRs for future evaluation (as part of handover or final report as needed

13. Final reports with key lessons learned and phased recommendations for future CTP

Source: DFID Terms of Reference (2013)
## ANNEX E: GUIDANCE ON CASH FOR WORK STANDARDS INTER-CLUSTER COORDINATION OPERATIONAL GROUP ON CASH

Guidance on ‘Cash-for-Work’ in Typhoon Haiyan-affected areas (Update: 7 January 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Wage rate</th>
<th>Work activity</th>
<th>Mandatory requirements</th>
<th>Optional considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE AREAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Cash-for-Asset Recovery               | 5 days minimum    | 100% of minimum wage¹ | Light debris clearance and reconstruction of personal property that helps to recover individual or small-scale community assets | Workers are 18 years old and above²  
  - Provision of appropriate protective gear  
  - Coordination with LGU to ensure geographic spread / dumpsites / access to barangay health workers  
  - Safety instructions on the use of hazardous tools and equipment (e.g. chain saws)  
  - Payment on a weekly basis to ensure that workers are able to cover the household’s immediate basic needs  
  - Robust beneficiary communication and accountability mechanism  
  - Regular monitoring of work conditions to ensure workers are safe from exploitation, sexual abuse and harassment  
  - Regular update on 4W³ | Provision of accident insurance⁶  
  - Tetanus vaccination where necessary⁵  
  - Protective gear shared with other agencies operating in the same area  
  - Master list of workers shared with LGU and/or SSS for coordination purposes  
  - Coordination on Financial Service Providers  
  - Communication with the nearest health clinic when the work activity is planned so that there is reach-back to further medical support if needed  
  - If large-scale, communication with local market actors about cash injection so they can plan |
| **PUBLIC AREAS**                      |                   |                 |                                                                               |                                                                                                             |                                                                                          |
| Emergency Employment through Cash-for-Work | 15 days minimum | 100% of minimum wage¹ | Light and heavy work that recovers public infrastructure and spaces, and creates immediate income and social protection for working men and women | All mandatory requirements above apply to this type of work.  
  Additional requirements:  
  - Tetanus vaccination⁵  
  - Master list of workers shared with LGU  
  - Registration of workers with SSS if engaging for 6 months or over  
  - Provision of accident insurance⁶  
  - Provision of a health worker on site  
  - Coordination with: Protection Cluster on child friendly space; Health Cluster on ensuring no conflict with vaccination schedules | Provision of 1 health worker per 150 workers  
  - Coordination on Financial Service Providers  
  - Communication with the nearest health clinic when the work activity is planned so that there is reach-back to further medical support if needed  
  - If large-scale, communication with local market actors about cash injection so they can plan  
  - Provision of PhilHealth coverage⁷ |

Source: Inter Cluster Communication (2013)

¹ A uniform wage rate must be adopted throughout the region, and calculated at 100 per cent of the regional minimum wage, following the Government’s guidance (refer attached).
² It is recognised that some people under 18 years of age are now heading households; please consider an unconditional cash transfer or cash voucher programme for these individuals.
³ The community should be made fully aware that the activity is intended for a limited timeframe and a specific purpose. There should be no expectations that the programme will run indefinitely. Care should be taken to avoid undermining the volunteerism of those who are already clearing the debris without a cash incentive; if there are signs that the community is waiting for payment for such work, or there is tension introduced because of the Cash-for-Work programme, this should be raised within the relevant cluster.
⁴ Coordinate with the relevant cluster on reporting format, and list relevant type of work under Activity. Standard indicators will be provided by 23 December 2013.
⁵ Refer to note from WHO about registering with Rural Health Units.
⁶ If your implementing partner is a Government agency, use GSIS (refer to ILO for guidance). If you are not working through a Government agency, please use the Philippine Red Cross (refer attached).
⁷ As per PhilHealth Circular 0034-2013, PhilHealth coverage is automatically provided to communities who are affected by a calamity with no capacity to pay the premium contribution (refer attached).
MEMO ON TETANUS VACCINATION

From: <bluemeli@wpro.who.int>
Date: Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 9:15 PM
Subject: Tetanus Vaccination for debris removal workers
To: undac.guiuan@gmail.com
Cc: jean_marie1123@yahoo.com, sky_5302001@yahoo.com

To all partners who are engaged in debris removal activities

DOH and WHO are concerned about the health of your debris removal workers as their activities expose them to high risk for tetanus infection through injuries. We would therefore like to encourage the vaccination of all your staff against tetanus. In order to provide sufficient stocks of vaccines to the respective Rural Health Units in which your staff/volunteers can receive the vaccination we would need to know the following:

- number of staff/volunteers in your programme(s)
- municipalities in which your teams are working/residing so that we can equip the respective RHUs with sufficient stocks.

Please note that we would recommend a first vaccination followed by a second one after 4 weeks to ensure full protection against tetanus infection. We would like the RHU's to run line lists to have an overview of how many debris removal workers have benefited from the support and hope this is acceptable for you. We will be in touch again soon with details on how your workers can receive the vaccines (many already attending the RHU's for it and it remains as simple as that … plus the line list).

Please share your information with me by email (bluemeli@wpro.who.int) or face to face before Saturday the 21st.

Warmest regards,

Ina Bluemel

WHO Philippines - HCC Eastern Samar Province
GLOBE: 09154665396 Thuraya: +8821651137962
SMART: 09202470430 PLEASE NOTE: SMART IS NOW WORKING IN GUIUAN
bluemeli@wpro.who.int
skype: ina.bluemel
PHILIPPINE RED CROSS ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Register workers at any Red Cross Chapter nationwide and contribute an annual membership fee of PHP120 for annual coverage. www.redcross.org.ph/membership. During emergencies, PRC members will have the access to safe blood, safety and other lifesaving services of the PRC. Other services require fees to augment direct operational costs.

CAPIZ
Macopa Street, Brgy. Tiza, Roxas City, Capiz
Tel: (036) 621-1125 Mobile: 0917-627-0610
E-mail: capiz@redcross.org.ph
Administrator: Nelia Borda-Cartujano

CEBU
Osmeña Blvd., Cebu City
Tel (032) 412-4140
Telefax: (032) 253-9797 Mobile: 0920-929-4645
E-mail: cebu@redcross.org.ph
Administrator: Norma C. Tancinco

ILOILO
Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City (beside Ramon Q. Avancena Hall of Justice)
Telefax: (033) 337-5950 E-mail: iloilo@redcross.org.ph
Administrator: Gilbert Paul L. Valderrama

LEYTE
Cor. Magsaysay Blvd. & Del Pilar Sts., Tacloban City
Telefax: (053) 321-3330
Mobile: 0919-683-0801, 0922-890-4045
E-mail: leyte@redcross.org.ph
Administrator: Marcela G. Pagasartonga

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
10th Street lacson Capitol Subdivision, Capitol Shopping Center, Bacolod City
Fax: (034) 434-9286
E-mail: negros.occidental@redcross.org.ph
Administrator: Raul Garganera

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) CONTACTS
Regional contacts can process SSS registration forms (SS Form RS1) for self-employed persons, and/or simply verify whether workers are already registered and entitled to members assistance.

CAPIZ
Mr Esteban L. Panes
Tel (036) 621-4256 * 522-3839 Fax No. (036) 621-0611
Email: roxas@sss.gov.ph
JGM Bldg., Burgos St., Roxas City, Capiz

NORTHERN CEBU
Mr Joaquin B. Descartin
Tel (032) 251-2432
Email: bogo@sss.gov.ph
Tan Bldg., San Vicente St., Bogo, Cebu

CEBU
Mr Mario V. Corro
Tel (032) 505-9301 * 505-9310
Fax Nos. (032) 254-4182 * 254-759
Email: cebu@sss.gov.ph
SSS Bldg., Brgy., Kalubihan, Osmena Blvd., Cebu City

ILOILO
Ms Eva J. Cura
Tel. Nos. (033) 509-9826 * 338-1307 * 509-9828 * 337-553 Fax No. (033) 509-7850 * 336-7814
Email: iloilo@sss.gov.ph
TTW Bldg., corner J.M. Basa and Mapa St., Iloilo City, Iloilo

LEYTE
Ms Lilibeth A. Cajucom
Tel. Nos. (053) 321-2278
Fax No. (053) 321-4310
Email: tacloban@sss.gov.ph Robert Yu Bldg., National Highway, Brgy. Fatima, Marasbaras, Tacloban City, Leyte

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
Mr Isaac P. Ciocon, Jr.
Tel. Nos. (034) 488-0112 * 488-0270
Email: sagay@sss.gov.ph
JGM Bldg., National Highway cor. Roxas Ave, Sagay City, Negros Occidental

Mr Raul A. Casiano
Tel. Nos. (034) 435-2796 to 97 * 434-4749 * 434-8991 Fax No. (034) 434-3483 * 433-5988
Email: bacolod@sss.gov.ph
SSS Bldg., Lacson St, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental

PALAWAN
Santisima Rosario C. Baac
Tel (048) 433-7147 to 48 * 433-1671
Fax No. (048) 433-2726
Email: palawan@sss.gov.ph
Go Siong Kuan Bldg., Lacao St., Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
In the last five years there has been a growing trend towards the use of cash transfer programming (CTP) as a response modality in emergencies across the humanitarian sector. The fungibility of cash, when provided without restrictions, offers increased choice for affected populations to meet cross-sectoral needs according to their priorities. There is consequently a growing interest in the mainstreaming of cash transfers in response, recovery and rehabilitation and in the potential of so called multi-purpose cash grants within some international non-governmental organisations and donors. The effective and appropriate use of CTP requires strong intra and inter-agency coordination and communication between various actors across sectoral divisions, which poses particular challenges as well as opportunities for aid coordination efforts.

The Cash learning Partnership and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees commissioned this review in order to document lessons learnt on the effectiveness of cash coordination during the initial three to four months of the response to Typhoon Haiyan, and to provide recommendations on inter-agency and cross-sectoral coordination. The objectives of this study are to:

1. Identify cash coordination mechanisms and tools in the Typhoon Haiyan response that effectively facilitated and streamlined decision-making and implementation across agencies.

2. Define what coordination elements contributed to or didn’t contribute to the use of flexible cash grants.

3. Build evidence on optimal coordination models that can create an enabling environment for cash transfers – and especially multi-purpose cash grants – where appropriate in future humanitarian interventions.

This research was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the generous support of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA).