EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPACITY (ERC) CONSORTIUM – ETHIOPIA

Building an evidence base on operational models for the delivery of CTP

CaLP Case Study
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPACITY (ERC) CONSORTIUM – ETHIOPIA

CASE STUDY

Building an evidence base on operational models for the delivery of CTP

Authors: Helene Juillard and Chloé Maillard (Key Aid consulting)

Date: April 2018

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>Basic Needs Assessment or Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CaLP</td>
<td>Cash Learning Partnership</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Cash Transfer Programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Response Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFSVL</td>
<td>Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP</td>
<td>Financial Service Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCG</td>
<td>Inter-Cluster Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Minimum Expenditure Basket</td>
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<td>MPG</td>
<td>Multipurpose Cash Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSMA</td>
<td>Multi-Sectoral Market Assessment</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OM</td>
<td>Operational Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROAP</td>
<td>Response Options Analysis and Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operational Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRH</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Emergency Response Capacity (ERC) Consortium for the Uptake of Multipurpose Cash Grants (MPGs) is comprised of five humanitarian response agencies: Save the Children, the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), Danish Refugee Council, Mercy Corps and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) financing. The consortium’s primary aim is to improve capacity, coordination and evidence for MPGs through the design of collaborative tools and mechanisms to enhance agencies’ capacity to set up and implement MPGs in emergency contexts.

The consortium also intends to operationalize the MPG toolkit by developing a set of training modules as well as new tools and approaches to be used at situation analysis stage, and to test those in two pilot countries: Nigeria and Ethiopia. This toolset is composed of a Basic Needs Assessment (BNA) Guidance and Toolbox, and a Facilitator’s Guide to Response Options Analysis and Planning (ROAP) led by Save the Children; a Financial Service Provider (FSP) assessment tool (also known as the Delivery Guide) led by Mercy Corps; and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) tools developed by Danish Refugee Council.

In addition to these consortium-developed guidance and tools, the consortium deployed two tools developed by other agencies but relevant to this project: the Multi-sector Market Assessment: Companion Guide and Toolkit developed by UNHCR, and the feasibility-assessment tools developed by the DFID-funded Cash Feasibility Consortium (i.e. a partner’s capacity assessment and review of acceptance, safety and security aspects), which were rolled out by OCHA.

The Ethiopia pilot examined by this review is the second ERC Consortium pilot, and was implemented from mid-October 2017 to mid-April 2018.

Objectives and METHODOLOGY

The review of the pilot followed a similar approach to that of the ERC consortium Nigeria case study, to facilitate comparison. CaLP’s CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework provided a basis for assessing the work of the ERC Consortium in Nigeria, and was thus also used to support this review. It relied on a qualitative approach including a literature review, an online survey and a field mission to Ethiopia to conduct key informant interviews with relevant stakeholders. In total, 28 individuals were consulted.

Barriers to the uptake of MPGs

One of the main objectives of the ERC Consortium is to design processes and tools to enhance inter-agency capacity to design emergency responses that take MPG programming to scale. This directly matches the main identified barrier to MPG uptake in Ethiopia, which is the lack of capacity of the humanitarian stakeholders. The ERC approach applied to Ethiopia has therefore proven relevant to partially address the main barriers to MPG uptake.

However, the nature of the consortium activities – which were defined at global level – could not be changed on a country-by-country basis to address some of the context-specific barriers to MPG uptake. For example, there is limited coverage of FSPs in Ethiopia, and about 60% of the projects using cash transfer programming (CTP) in Ethiopia rely on direct cash distribution. The FSP assessment produced by Mercy Corps provides a comprehensive picture of the country-level regulatory environment, and is a light touch assessment of the capacity of the different existing service providers in the Somali region. As a stocktaking exercise, it is a good first step, but it does not necessarily provide a suggested way forward to overcome this barrier.

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1 The ECHO-funded Operational Guidance and Toolkit for Multipurpose Cash Grants was created in 2015 by a consortium led by UNHCR to meet the need for operational and comprehensive guidance for humanitarian actors to assess the feasibility and design of MPGs and to implement MPGs.
Project cycle and quality in the ERC Consortium

The pilot did play a contributing role in encouraging the uptake of MPGs in Ethiopia, mostly from a technical angle, i.e. by developing and piloting situation and response analysis tools and approaches. It has definitely contributed to pushing the MPG agenda forward. The pilot also benefited from the global and national trend towards increased use of MPGs. In addition, the selection of Ethiopia as a pilot country relied on the fact that the ERC approach would add value to the CTP landscape.

Similarly to the Nigeria review, the pilot has had the most influence on the steps directly related to its core activity, i.e. situation analysis. As the pilot engaged with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) as a whole, these effects will not be limited to consortium members, though they will only be proportional to the commitment and involvement that each organization demonstrated throughout the process.

Structure of the ERC Consortium

At global level, the consortium structure did not change – it remained the ‘light’ and fairly informal structure described in the Nigeria review. This structure proved to be efficient and non-bureaucratic. The consortium management structure was primarily composed of technical team members. Questions have been raised about whether engaging senior managers on a deeper level could have increased uptake of MPGs (and not only of the tools) and in-country buy-in.

The consortium’s light and informal structure, however, is not easily replicable, including at country level during the pilot. Progress has been made based on the experience of the Nigeria pilot to create a greater sense of ownership in country; however, there has been limited collaboration and horizontal learning between consortium agencies at country level, which limited the effectiveness of the pilot. Cross-fertilization has also been limited, as each consortium agency led its own assessment without the participation of other consortium agency team members during the data collection or analysis phases. The fact that the majority of those assessments were sub-contracted reinforced the disconnect.

The decision to implement a pilot at country level without dedicated in-country resources, especially when the pilot is expected to have an effect on coordination, can be questioned. The Consortium Coordinator was not physically present on a full-time basis in country. Despite her best efforts to visit very regularly, building on the lessons learned from Nigeria pilot, in-country key informants felt that the absence of a full-time coordinator hampered informal communication and advocacy efforts.

Efficiency and effectiveness of the Ethiopia pilot

At global level, the consortium management structure allowed cost-saving and resources-sharing mechanisms through the exploitation of good pre-existing working relationships between the technical focal points. The main area of cost-saving and resources-sharing resulted from the consortium management structure.

Building on learning from the Nigeria review, the pilot successfully engaged with humanitarian stakeholders in Ethiopia, using the ICCG as an entry point. Having a single Consortium Coordinator supported the fact that communication with the ICCG has been centralized and consistent, which helped with clarity on the pilot’s objectives and ultimately, its effectiveness. The diversity of actors attending the final ROAP workshop is an encouraging sign, as is the fact that organizations participating in this workshop agreed to design a joint integrated pilot to deliver MPGs.

Overall, the tools have been described as technically sound and robust, but also intimidating and lengthy. The fact that organizations were not sufficiently trained on using them did little to demystify the ERC approach. With the ERC project coming to an end, and no plan for dedicated resources on the tools’ future roll-out, the risk of the tools not being used is perceived to be as high as 80%. The learning event organized at the end of April 2018 in Addis Ababa will be pivotal in paving the way for future uptake and buy-in.
Conclusion and recommendations

At global level, delivering the ERC project as a consortium has had indisputable added value. It increased the quality of the final outputs by ensuring cross-organizational inputs, and it increased the uptake of the final toolset. Buy-in has been enhanced both from consortium agencies who have been directly involved in developing the tools, and from non-consortium organizations who tend to see those tools as being agency-neutral and hence more easily adaptable to their own context.

At country level, delivering the pilot in a consortium also resulted in added value through increased buy-in from organizations both within and outside the consortium. However, having a global consortium delivering a country-based pilot without in-country resources was a missed opportunity for increased effectiveness. Future operational models should consider the following elements:

- **Appoint an in-country pilot manager**, who could either be hosted by the consortium lead or within one of the consortium agencies. If multiple pilots are being delivered by the same consortium, having a different organization hosting the pilot manager in each of the pilot locations on a rotating basis could create an enhanced sense of ownership.

- **Horizontal learning** needs to be favoured as much as possible. It seems a missed opportunity to have trained daily workers on how to use the consortium tools instead of involving staff from other consortium member organizations or even beyond.

The decision for this pilot to engage with humanitarian stakeholders in Ethiopia **using the ICCG as an entry point was particularly successful**, and should be replicated. The entry point for increased uptake of MPGs cannot be limited to the Cash Working Group (CWG), as this would limit the inputs of sectoral experts.

By design, the project did not deliver MPGs, which hampered the extent to which humanitarian stakeholders could ‘learn by doing.’ To facilitate the uptake of MPGs, **future operational models should consider the whole project cycle: there should be efforts to enhance situation and response analysis (as per the ERC activities in Ethiopia), but also direct involvement in response design and implementation.** The preliminary discussions about running a pilot MPG project in Ethiopia following on from the ROAP workshop could be a first step in this direction.

The future global uptake of MPGs does not lie solely in the hands of consortium organizations. However, the future of the developed toolset mostly does. There is no common view across consortium members as to where the toolset could sit or who owns it. It goes beyond the scope of this review to comment on what is the most appropriate way to roll out the tools, but the diversity of potential channels for uptake brought up by consortium representatives should be seen as an opportunity. The Common Cash Delivery platform, of which the NGOs in the ERC consortium are a part, now has a ready-to-use set of tools, even if they require a degree of contextualization. Organizations that specialize in assessment, such as REACH, have demonstrated interest in the BNA. The toolkit should also be integrated into the next iteration of the CaLP Programme Quality Toolbox.

Finally, CTP operational models can only flexible and adapted to context in a structured and predictable manner if the elements that define an operational model (e.g. governance bodies, decision-making processes, time commitment) are formalized. If this happens, the delineation between outcomes-related and process-related elements will be much clearer when it comes to the review of any operational model. Such a formalization process can be iterative, but should also rely on existing, non-CTP related evaluation methodologies of operational models.
I INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings from a review of the operational model used to deliver the project entitled ‘Emergency Response Capacity (ERC) Consortium for the uptake of MPG – Ethiopia pilot’. The project was implemented by a consortium led by Save the Children with the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), the Danish Refugee Council, Mercy Corps and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It received funding from the ERC budget line of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and was implemented from October 2017 to April 2018 in Fafan Zone in the Somali Region of Eastern Ethiopia. It followed the implementation of a first pilot in Nigeria from April to September 2017.

1.1 CALP-LED LEARNING AGENDA ON OPERATIONAL MODELS FOR CTP

As humanitarian needs outpace available funding, the humanitarian sector has to consider how to make its responses more efficient. Cash transfer programming (CTP) is one potential solution. Given the growing body of evidence on CTP and recommendations elaborated during the World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain, the policy momentum for using cash as a primary option for responding to humanitarian needs is high. Humanitarian actors have also made significant progress in the use of multipurpose cash grants (MPGs) as a transformative tool to address the needs of crisis-affected populations.

However, coordination of CTP in general – and MPGs in particular – remains challenging, as cash responses cut across sectors and groups, and can be used for multiple objectives. Moreover, there are still no inter-agency/universal models or standards for collaboration on large-scale cash responses. As a result, the coordination and design of operational models have so far been ad hoc, and the multitude of assessment efforts and CTP designs have led to inefficiencies that limit both the scale and quality of the responses.

In this context, CaLP has developed a learning agenda to generate stronger evidence on existing CTP operational models, based on a common analytical framework. CaLP’s intent is to consolidate this evidence and adapt the framework into practical guidance to enable donors and operational agencies to assess the appropriateness of operational models for a given context. This CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework has provided the basis for assessing the work of the ERC Consortium in Ethiopia, so the learning can feed into the broader evidence base on operational models.

1.2 CONTEXT OF CTP IN ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa; it is also one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of $590. Despite rapid economic growth over the past decade, about 10 million people are still considered to be food insecure. The population is highly susceptible to humanitarian crises, including droughts, floods, epidemics and conflict. Ethiopia has a history of devastating droughts, with the most recent in 2015–2016 being the worst in 30 years. The number of Ethiopians in need of assistance fluctuates between 2–13 million annually. The country also has one of the largest refugee populations in the region, which was estimated to be over 780,000 in January 2017.

Both the government and the international humanitarian community have mobilized to address the population's crisis-related needs. Programming in Ethiopia utilizes both in-kind and cash transfer interventions, either during/after emergencies and through a social protection scheme. The government established the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 2005, which provides social transfers to millions of at-risk citizens.

While CTP has been used for crisis response, so far this has been on a limited scale, especially considering the global and regional trends of increased CTP uptake. The majority of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia is still delivered through in-kind assistance, and when CTP is used, direct cash distribution is the most common delivery mechanism. 

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9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

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2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

This study reviewed the operational model that the ERC Consortium applied in Ethiopia, in order to contribute to the body of evidence on how operational models affect the design and delivery of CTP. It therefore focused on the process and not on the outcomes of such interventions. In addition, as the ERC Consortium did not implement a MPG programme, the review mostly focused on the adequacy of the operational model to influence the quality of CTP in preparedness, situation analysis and response analysis stages in Ethiopia.

CaLP commissioned this review to fulfil two primary objectives:

- To examine the extent to which the ERC Consortium created an enabling environment for the uptake of MPG programming in the target area.
- To evaluate the influence of the ERC Consortium's approach and tools on the quality of MPG programming in Fafan Zone in Ethiopia.

More specifically, this review should enable all relevant stakeholders to:

- Identify the extent to which the ERC Consortium is responding to the needs of humanitarian organizations in Ethiopia for quality CTP by promoting inter-agency collaboration and uptake of MPGs.
- Identify the extent to which the ERC Consortium has identified and tackled in-country obstacles to inter-agency collaboration and uptake of MPGs.
- Highlight the technical and strategic assistance the ERC Consortium provided at the level of (a) consortium members' Ethiopia country offices; (b) the broader humanitarian community in country; and (c) in-country cash coordination systems.
- Map the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the consortium model for the Ethiopia pilot implementation, and the extent to which it has built on learning from the Nigeria pilot (see paragraph below).
- Issue recommendations on how the CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework can be enhanced, based on the consortium's experience in Ethiopia.

Within the overall ERC project, in December 2017 the ERC Consortium's first pilot in Nigeria was reviewed. This initial operational model review looked at the consortium's ways of working at both the global and country levels, specifically during the pilot's roll-out in Nigeria. The present review does not intend to repeat what has already been documented, but rather to identify the extent to which the consortium operational model at the global level was agile enough to embrace the recommendations from the first review. This second review has used the same analytical framework, and this report follows (to the extent possible) a similar structure to facilitate comparison.

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2.2 STUDY METHODOLOGY

The methodology followed a theory-based approach using a case study design and relying on an adaptation of CaLP’s CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework.10 A study matrix can be found in Annex 1.3.

The review was led by Helene Juillard with the support of Chloé Maillard, both from Key Aid consulting, between February and mid-April 2018, for a total of 25 days. Primary data was collected between 12-30 March and included a visit to Addis Ababa from 19–23 March 2018.

Primary data collection included semi-structured interviews with informants across NGOs, UN agencies and government agencies, as well as a rapid online survey. In total, 23 key informants were interviewed; the full list of key informants is available in Annex 1.2. Out of the 15 participants at the response analysis training, five responded to the rapid online survey that assessed the extent to which perceptions of MPG changed as a result of the training. Primary data collection was supplemented by a desk review of secondary data. The full list of documents reviewed is available in Annex 1.1. The inception report and this report were reviewed by the ERC Consortium focal points.

2.3 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

Similarly to the Nigeria review, the Ethiopia pilot review faced limitations due to the non-operational nature of the ERC Consortium and the limited representation of informants involved in the primary data collection.

During the phase reviewed, the ERC Consortium did not deliver MPG programming. The consortium’s main purpose was to encourage the uptake of MPGs; by design, it did not deliver MPGs and instead focused on providing technical and strategic support to create a conducive environment for their uptake. On the other hand, CaLP’s analytical framework, has been developed to assess how ‘aspects of operational models (OM) influence quality in CTP’, by providing a list of pre-set indicators to measure.11 These indicators have been developed with an operational structure in mind, and many of them were not applicable to the ERC Consortium (e.g. cost savings as result of the use of a single or common financial service provider, transfer values). The study matrix for this review (Annex 1.3) was therefore adjusted to reflect the nature of the ERC Consortium.

Lack of diversity of the country respondents. Both the ERC Consortium and (most of) the Ethiopia pilot were run at the global level. Priority for interviews was therefore given to ERC Consortium members at the global level and to people located in the capital when in country. As a result, this review has not captured the perspectives of ERC Consortium members at sub-national level, i.e. in Fafan Zone, nor those of beneficiaries or service providers. The consultants tried repeatedly to include the perspective of government representatives, but this proved to be infeasible during the timeframe of the review.

In addition, and in contrast to what happened during the Nigeria pilot review, the bulk of data collection occurred before the end of the pilot roll-out. Data was collected in country before the inter-sectoral Response Options Analysis and Planning (ROAP) workshop. The review therefore occurred before all of the pilot’s effects had time to materialize. As a result, this review focuses on both the palpable effects of the ERC Consortium and on potential effects that may occur after the review.

11 Ibid.
3 ENHANCED RESPONSE CAPACITY (ERC) CONSORTIUM

3.1 ERC CONSORTIUM FORMATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING

In 2015, a different ERC Consortium, led by UNHCR, developed the ECHO-funded Operational Guidance and Toolkit for Multipurpose Cash Grants. It aimed to meet humanitarian actors’ needs for operational and comprehensive guidance to assess the feasibility, design and implementation of MPGs.

In May 2016, building on the existing work on MPGs, the current ERC Consortium was created. It includes Save the Children (SC), CaLP, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Mercy Corps and OCHA, with ECHO financing. As described in the Nigeria review, SC, as the consortium lead, signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with each consortium member to formalize each organization’s responsibilities as well as the partnership’s terms and conditions. Over the duration of the project, the governance structure at the global level has been informal, relying on the pre-existing good working relations between the consortium organizations’ technical leads. As stated in the Nigeria review, ‘The global technical leads of the ERC reported that collaboration and decision making worked well over the course of the project, due in part to the small number of agencies in the group and the clear segregation of technical functions.’

The consortium’s primary aim was to improve the capacity, coordination and evidence base for MPGs through the design of collaborative tools and mechanisms. These efforts strove to enhance the capacity of agencies to set up and implement MPGs in emergency contexts. The consortium invited cash actors from across the humanitarian spectrum to actively contribute to the development of the resources and to test the methods, in order to maximize the usefulness and relevance of the developed tools.

The objectives of the consortium and distribution of responsibilities among the members are shown in Figure 1 below.

![Figure 1: ERC Consortium objectives](image)

Create an enabling environment

Provide strategic leadership at the country level to facilitate MPG feasibility and appropriateness assessments, the integration of MPG programming into the humanitarian programme cycle and coordination platforms, and its consideration in strategic preparedness and response discussions.

**Responsibility of OCHA and CaLP**

Provide timely technical support to facilitate harmonised design of MPGs

Deploy technical response teams to support programming in two selected responses; develop and adapt tools to benefit global development of MPG programmes.

**Responsibility of DRC, Mercy Corps and SC**

Evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of MPGs to meet humanitarian needs

Develop an overarching framework for Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL); examine the catalysts and barriers to increasing the efficient and effective use of MPGs at scale.

**Responsibility of CaLP and DRC**


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The consortium intended to operationalize the MPG toolkit by developing a set of tools and approaches to be used at situation analysis stage, and testing them in two pilot countries: Nigeria and Ethiopia. The project did not implement MPG programmes in the pilot countries, but rather supported MPG design.

The tools developed aimed to address some of the challenges humanitarian actors face in relation to response analysis, by: 1) providing a methodology for them to conduct inter-agency, inter-sector and multipurpose assessments; 2) comparing and analysing delivery modality options; and 3) selecting the best combination of those options based on the needs of the affected communities, including a mixed-modality emergency response when appropriate.

3.2 ERC CONSORTIUM AND THE ETHIOPIA PILOT

Ethiopia was selected as the second pilot country on the basis that each consortium member was already active there, Save the Children’s country office had demonstrated a specific interest in the pilot, the area of implementation was accessible, and stakeholders had clearly shown their openness to investigating the potential advantages of MPGs and the potential for scale-up in the future. The project took place in Fafan Zone in the Somali Region of Eastern Ethiopia. The region was selected primarily due to the operational presence of ERC Consortium partners, but also because of the presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by drought or conflict, its accessibility and enduring stability, its geographical proximity and its representation of a range of livelihood zones.

As in Nigeria, the pilot encompassed a large technical component through the implementation of: 1) a Basic Needs Assessment (BNA) and a Multi-Sectoral Market Analysis (MSMA) led by SC; 2) a Financial Service Provider (FSP) assessment led by Mercy Corps; 3) a partner capacity assessment and review of acceptance, safety and security aspects led by OCHA; and 4) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) tools development led by DRC. These outputs fed into a sectoral and inter-sectoral Response Options Analysis and Planning (ROAP) process led by SC. OCHA facilitated linkages with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG), and CaLP led the capacity-building aspects of the project.

Building on learning from the Nigeria review, the pilot engaged with humanitarian stakeholders in Ethiopia using the ICCG as an entry point. The Ethiopia Cash Working Group (ECWG) also helped share and disseminate information. During the inception stage in late October 2017, a Task Team for Response Analysis was established, although it did not become active until mid-December. The Task Team is a sub-group of the ICCG, and is composed of sector representatives as well as cash and protection experts. It is organized into four sub-sectoral groups: WASH, Health, Shelter and Food Security. The main objective of the Task Team is to ensure the consistency and uptake of the different assessment results to improve multi-sectoral response analysis.

13 Terms of Reference for response analysis task team.
The humanitarian coordination structure in Ethiopia is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

**Figure 2: Humanitarian coordination structure in Ethiopia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (NDPPC)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: DPM&lt;br&gt;Members: NDPPC&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Weekly</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Multi-Agency Coordination (S-MAC)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: Commissioner&lt;br&gt;Co-chair: HC&lt;br&gt;Members: Heads of Cooperation, UN &amp; NGOs &amp; Line Ministries&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Monthly</td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian County Team (HCT)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: HCRC&lt;br&gt;Members: UN Cluster Coordinators, Agency Reps., NGO reps., Donor Reps and Red Cross Movement&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Fortnightly</td>
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<td><strong>National Technical Committee</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: NDRMC&lt;br&gt;Members: Line Ministries (Technical Level)&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Triweekly</td>
<td><strong>Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group (DRMTWG)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: NDRMC&lt;br&gt;Co-chair: OCHA&lt;br&gt;Members: Sector Task Force Chairs, Cluster Coordinators, UN, NGO &amp; donors at the technical level&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Monthly</td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Resilience Donor Group (HRDG)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: Donors&lt;br&gt;Members: Donors &amp; Key Humanitarian Partners&lt;br&gt;Frequency: Monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sectors Task Forces and Cluster Coordinators | | |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| **Agriculture & Livestock**<br>Chair: NDRMC<br>Co-chair: FAO<br>Frequency: Weekly | **Sectors Task Forces and Cluster Coordinators** | **WASH**<br>Chair: MoWIE<br>Co-chair: UNICEF<br>Frequency: Monthly |
| **Shelter & Non-Food**<br>Chair: NDRMC/FAO<br>Frequency: Fortnightly | **Health & Nutrition**<br>Chair: MoH<br>Co-chair: WHO<br>Frequency: Fortnightly | **Child Protection**<br>Chair: MoWCA<br>Co-chair: UNICEF<br>Frequency: Monthly |
| **Education**<br>Chair: MoE<br>Co-chair: UNICEF/Save the Children<br>Frequency: Weekly | **Nutrition**<br>Chair: NDRMC/ENCU<br>Co-chair: UNICEF<br>Frequency: Fortnightly | **Prioritization Committee (Food)**<br>Chair: NDRMC<br>Co-chair: WFP<br>Frequency: Fortnightly |
| **Steering Committee**<br>Chair: Regional President<br>Members: Line Bureau Heads (Strategy Level)<br>Frequency: Weekly | **Regional Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group (RDRMTWG) / Incident Command Post (ICP)**<br>Chair: DPPC Heads<br>Members: Sector Bureaus, Humanitarian Partners<br>Secretariat: OCHA<br>Frequency: Either Fortnightly or monthly | **Emergency Communication Group (ECG)**<br>Chair: OCHA<br>Members: Communication Officers<br>Frequency: Fortnightly |
| **Regional Technical Committee**<br>Chair: Deputy Regional President<br>Members: Line Bureaus (Technical Level)<br>Frequency: Weekly | **Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG)**<br>Chair: OCHA<br>Members: Cluster Coordinators<br>Frequency: Fortnightly | **Inter-Cluster Information Management Working Group (ICIMWG)**<br>Chair: OCHA<br>Members: IM Focal Persons<br>Frequency: Fortnightly |
| **Regional Technical Committee**<br>Chair: Deputy Regional President<br>Members: Line Bureaus (Technical Level)<br>Frequency: Weekly | **Humanitarian County Team (HCT)**<br>Chair: HCRC<br>Members: UN Cluster Coordinators, Agency Reps., NGO reps., Donor Reps and Red Cross Movement<br>Frequency: Fortnightly | **Regional Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group (RDRMTWG) / Incident Command Post (ICP)**<br>Chair: DPPC Heads<br>Members: Sector Bureaus, Humanitarian Partners<br>Secretariat: OCHA<br>Frequency: Either Fortnightly or monthly |

Source: Ethiopia Humanitarian Requirements Document, 2017

The pilot lasted for six months and began in mid-October 2017, as shown in the timeline below. It was supported by a dedicated ERC Consortium Coordinator, who sat within SC at the global level and was tasked with coordinating with partners and sharing information at all levels.
Figure 3: ERC Consortium timeline, including Ethiopia pilot timeline

**ERC Consortium Timeline**

- **Dec 2015**: Creation of the ERC Consortium
- **May 2016**: UNCHR-led release of Operational Guidance & Toolkit for MPGs
- **Aug–Dec 2016**: ERC Consortium Phase I: Review & consultation
  - Ensure the inclusion of MPG in strategic-level guidance for humanitarian response planning
  - Broad review of consortium models
  - Initial consultations with contributors
  - Tool development across the work streams
- **Dec 2016–Feb 2017**: ERC Consortium Phase II: Refining modelling ERC concepts & tools
  - Consolidation of contributor consultations; learning and information-sharing via existing cash platforms
  - Tool consolidation across the work streams
  - Selection of pilot countries and pilot design
- **Apr–Sept 2017**: ERC Consortium Phase III – pilot 1: Nigeria
  - Enabling environment support
  - Feasibility and appropriateness assessment tools
  - Core training modules
  - M&E and learning
  - ROAP workshop
- **Nov 2017–Mar 2018**: ERC Consortium Phase III – pilot II: Ethiopia
- **26–27 Apr 2018**: ERC Consortium final learning event
- **Apr 2018**: End of the Consortium

**Ethiopia Pilot Timeline**

- **October 2017**: Activities presentation
- **November 2017**: Task Team introduction
- **December 2017**: Basic Needs Assessment (BNA)
- **January 2018**: FSP assessment
- **February 2018**: Core training modules
- **March 2018**: Multi-Sector Market Analysis (MSMA)
- **OCHA Partner Capacity Assessment**
- **M&E tools**: Lead by: CaLP
- **IOM**: DRC
- **Oxfam**: Mercy Corps
- **Final tools**: OCHA

Lead by:
- CaLP
- DRC
- Mercy Corps
- OCHA
- Save the Children
Table 1 below captures the pilot activities as set out in the implementation plan.

### Table 1: Implemented pilot activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Status as of 30 March 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 1.4:</strong> Delivery of tailored training to MPG implementing agencies.</td>
<td>CaLP delivered a 3-day response analysis training from 27 February – 1 March 2018 in Addis Ababa. It included 14 participants from 11 agencies. A 5-day core programme course was delivered from 16-21 March to 27 participants from 14 agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 1.6:</strong> Support to joint multisector/multipurpose feasibility assessment at strategic level.</td>
<td>OCHA implemented a Partner Capacity Assessment with 24 organizations that are members of the ECWG. The report has been finalized. A review of the acceptance, safety and security aspects of CTP was also completed, based on secondary data. The report has been shared with the ECWG and was being finalized at the time of data collection for this review. An assessment of government capacity to implement CTP was not feasible due to challenges with collecting relevant information; however, a review of government use and acceptance of CTP was included within the acceptance, safety and security overview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 2.1:</strong> Operationalize the MPG toolkit with additional tools as required for MPGs; test and adapt tools as required.</td>
<td>SC led the ROAP process. The first part of the process started during the response analysis training and was followed by the validation and revision of BNA and MSMA reports. Sectoral response analysis took place from 19-27 March and the inter-sector ROAP workshop was held on 28-29 March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 2.2:</strong> Develop assessment tools to guide FSP selection and inform contracting of private sector partners for payment.</td>
<td>Mercy Corps led a FSP assessment in December 2017. The draft was shared in February 2018 with the global consortium team, but not with the in-country Task Team. The report was completed the same month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 2.3:</strong> Conduct multi-sector and basic needs market assessments on behalf of the humanitarian community. Strengthen or establish market monitoring and basic needs assessments if required.</td>
<td>SC led the BNA in Fafan Zone in December 2017. A draft was shared with the ERC Consortium and with the Task Team for their inputs at the end of February 2018. SC led the MSMA in Fafan Zone in mid-February 2018. A draft was then shared with the Task Team, which was able to provide input by 22 March. The report is currently being finalized. There is currently no mention of market monitoring in the MSMA report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 2.4:</strong> Prepare and disseminate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for MPGs to meet basic needs, adapted for the selected responses.</td>
<td>No information available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 3.2:</strong> Throughout the selected responses, collect and present data on the degree to which basic needs are met through the MPG distribution (post-distribution monitoring).</td>
<td>DRC contextualized the tools used in Nigeria and utilized them to monitor a one-off cash transfer implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and then regular food grants implemented by Oxfam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity 3.3:</strong> Action research review of effectiveness of MPG programming in focus responses.</td>
<td>CaLP commissioned this present review. However, the scope is different from the initial plan, as the present review focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of the operational model as opposed to the effectiveness of MPG programming in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3.3 BARRIERS TO THE UPTAKE OF MPGS IN ETHIOPIA

As previously mentioned, Ethiopia was in part chosen as a pilot country given the recent push – from both the government and humanitarian actors – to use cash as a delivery modality. However, even if the use of CTP is slowly spreading across the country, programmes are struggling to scale up, and the use of MPGs remains marginal. Key informants and secondary literature revealed a number of challenges to the uptake of MPGs. While these relate to the overall uptake of CTP rather than being specific to MPGs, it is likely that the multi-sectoral nature of MPGs further reinforces those barriers.

The most consistently highlighted challenge is the capacity of the humanitarian stakeholders. Not all sectoral practitioners in Ethiopia are necessarily familiar with MPG programming, and 50% of all CTP in the country is meant to cover livelihood and food security needs. Not all sectors are in the same place in terms of acceptance and ownership of cash, and responses are traditionally carried out at sectoral level. There is therefore limited experience of using CTP to cover other sectoral needs or multi-sectoral needs. There is also little experience of using CTP at scale, including during the last El Niño drought response. In the Partner Capacity Assessment implemented by OCHA in March 2018, nine of the 24 responding organizations scored lower than 50% on the capacity test. Considering that the assessment was only of ECWG members (i.e. organizations with an interest in the matter) and focused on CTP as a whole and not on MPGs specifically, it is likely that the overall capacity of humanitarian stakeholders to implement MPGs would score even lower. Furthermore, this assessment highlighted that the lowest-scoring capacities related to financial management and programme management.

Beyond humanitarian organizations, a recent CaLP report highlights capacity issues across multiple actors in Ethiopia, including service providers, vendors and government structures. It also appears that donors funding projects in Ethiopia are not fervent advocates of MPGs.

Looking at service providers’ capacity and coverage, there is limited coverage of FSPs in Ethiopia, and about 60% of the projects using CTP in Ethiopia rely on direct cash distribution. Ethiopia has a very loose FSP network, as only 22% of adults have access to a financial account and 80% of Ethiopians live at least 10km from the closest bank branch or ATM. In 2012, there were only three commercial bank branches available per 100,000 adults, and a third of them were located in Addis Ababa. This is in part due to the constrained legislative environment; private operators have only been able to operate bank accounts and financial products in Ethiopia since 1994. The 2012 National Bank of Ethiopia Directive (NBE Directives No. FIS/o1/2012) further tightened the legal framework, as it restricted investments in banking and micro-finance institutions (MFIs) to Ethiopian nationals.

The country’s regulatory framework also prohibits mobile network operators from conducting money transfers. Mobile money in Ethiopia is therefore operated through a partnership between banks and MFIs on one side, and technology providers (e.g. M-Birr, HelloCash and Kifya) on the other. Finally, the use of mobile money requires a telecommunications provider, and the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) has a monopoly. As the single operator in country, it has limited coverage, at only 43%. These factors have been major impediments to the uptake of mobile money in Ethiopia, and in 2014 less than 1% of the adult population had used mobile money. As a result of low phone penetration and ownership, and minimal usage of financial services, beneficiaries’ acceptance of cash transfers has regularly been flagged as a barrier to the use of CTP. This does not necessarily rule out the use of CTP in general, or of MPGs in particular, but it should be considered at response analysis stage.

Beyond the financial regulations and overall regulatory environment that may not be particularly conducive to using MPGs, political acceptance has been highlighted as one of the most significant barriers to MPG uptake in Ethiopia. CTP has been implemented in Ethiopia as part of the Productive Social Safety Net Programme

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20 In sub-Saharan Africa, the average is 34%. World Bank (2017) Data.
22 Ibid.
(PSNP) for more than a decade, and since 2005 the PSNP has followed a ‘cash first’ principle. However, all the cash assistance provided is conditional,24 and the level of acceptance of unconditional unrestricted cash (i.e. the essence of MPGs) is low.

Another potential barrier to the uptake of MPGs in Ethiopia is **market functionality**. Traders face constraints such as limited access to working capital, restrictions on storage and quotas on imports.25 Low access to capital, for instance, reduces traders’ capacity to respond to higher demand following a cash injection,26 as traders participating in a CTP or MPG programme may need to receive working capital loans in order to cope with the higher demand. Markets also tend to accommodate large seasonal swings through significant price changes. Those substantial seasonal changes in local food prices, added to exchange rate variations and volatile international market conditions, have a strong impact on the cost-efficiency of cash or voucher transfers compared to in-kind assistance. These variations also require promoters of cash programmes to consider market-support interventions in order to boost trader capacity, support the delivery of cash assistance and avoid short-term price increases.27

As mentioned, the ERC Consortium’s primary objective is to encourage the uptake of MPGs. It has mainly done so from a technical angle, i.e. by developing and piloting situation and response analysis tools and approaches. The overall ERC Consortium design did not originate from a formal identification of the global barriers to MPGs;28 rather, the identification of the barriers to the uptake of MPGs in Ethiopia happened in an iterative manner while the pilot activities were being rolled out.

While at the project design stage the consortium did not know where the pilots would be implemented, the selection of Ethiopia as a pilot country relied on the fact that the ERC approach would add value to the CTP landscape. As a result, it is no surprise that during data collection for this review all the informants stressed the relevance of the consortium activities in the Ethiopia context. However, they also flagged areas where the approach had limitations.

Table 2 below matches the main barriers to MPG uptake with the ERC Consortium’s approach, illustrating where the latter helped overcome these barriers and where gaps still persist.

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24 Beyond a small portion of transfers that are unconditional, for households that are not able to work.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
Table 2: MPG barriers and ERC activities to address them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to the uptake of MPHs in Ethiopia</th>
<th>ERC activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of the humanitarian stakeholders</td>
<td>Along with the harmonization of MPG programming, the main purpose of the ERC Consortium is to design processes and tools which in turn should help organizations design emergency responses that take MPG programming to scale. This relates directly to the main identified barrier to MPG uptake (capacity). The entire ERC process, which consisted of embarking sectors on a more thorough situation and response analysis, proved to be relevant, as did the response analysis training that was open not only to consortium agencies but also to all operating organizations in the country. However, only the people implementing each assessment during the pilot were trained on how to use the respective tools (e.g. only Mercy Corps team members were trained on using the FSP assessment). This has limited the extent to which different humanitarian stakeholders have improved their capacity to conduct a situation analysis for MPG uptake. Training on M&amp;E tools has now been developed and is being rolled out in Nigeria, but it will not be rolled out in Ethiopia before the end of the pilot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Service Providers’ capacity and coverage, and regulatory environment’</td>
<td>The FSP assessment produced by Mercy Corps provides a comprehensive picture of the country-level regulatory environment, and is a light touch assessment of the capacity of the various existing service providers in the Somali region. As a stocktaking exercise, it is a good first step towards addressing this barrier. However, it does not necessarily provide a suggested way forward on how to support service providers’ capacity and coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries’ acceptance of cash transfers</td>
<td>Several of the assessments produced, such as the BNA and the FSP, provide some insight into beneficiaries’ acceptance (or otherwise) of cash transfers. However, the direct beneficiaries of the ERC activities were the humanitarian actors in country. As such, it has not been possible within this review to assess the extent to which the ERC pilot is relevant to address this barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political acceptance of unconditional unrestricted cash grants</td>
<td>The ERC approach includes an element of enhancing political acceptance, which also proved to be relevant. However, the pilot’s constrained duration, the thin link with the PSNP and the vacancy of the CaLP Policy Coordinator position all limited the effectiveness of this element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market functionality</td>
<td>The MSMA provides a detailed picture of market functionality in Fafan Zone. It suggests that market disruptions are common but temporary, as markets adjust quickly. Their functionality varies depending on location and the availability of alternative routes and sources of goods. However, at the time of the review, the MSMA did not provide recommendations on how market functionality could be enhanced, which limited the relevance of the ERC approach to address this barrier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ERC Consortium approach applied in Ethiopia has proven relevant to partially address the main barriers to MPG uptake. However, the nature of the consortium activities, which were defined in the project documents and related budget at the global level, could not be changed to address the context-specific barriers to MPG uptake in Ethiopia. This is further described in the Findings section below.

4 FINDINGS: THE ERC CONSORTIUM MODEL’S INFLUENCE ON THE UPTAKE OF MPGs IN ETHIOPIA

This section analyses how aspects of the ERC Consortium have influenced the quality of CTP. It focuses on how the model affected the uptake of MPGs, while highlighting the role of contextual factors.

4.1 INFLUENCE OF THE ERC CONSORTIUM ON THE PROJECT CYCLE AND QUALITY

Table 3 below highlights how the ERC Consortium influenced each step of the project cycle. Unsurprisingly, and as found by the Nigeria review, the pilot has had the most influence on the steps directly related to its core activity, i.e. situation analysis. As the pilot engaged with the ICCG, these effects will not be limited to consortium members. However, they will only be proportional to the commitment and involvement each organization demonstrated throughout the pilot process. As only informants based in the capital (when in country) were involved in the data collection for this review, it is not possible to assess whether these effects are more or less important in Fafan Zone than at the Federal level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTP project cycle – key activities</th>
<th>Level of influence</th>
<th>Nature of influence</th>
<th>Detailed explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preparedness</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Preparedness is not a main focus of the ERC Consortium’s work. In theory, preparedness was supported by the technical assessments implemented in Fafan Zone. However, at the time of this review, informants were primarily interested in knowing how they could use the ERC outputs to inform immediate response design as opposed to future responses. When asked about the potential use of the ERC outputs, no informant mentioned updating contingency plans or implementing pre-crisis responses to strengthen markets, FSPs or community resilience so that these entities could better withstand shocks. This may be due to the fact that the FSP assessment and the MSMA provide a good overview of the current situation, but lack a section on how to strengthen markets or FSP service delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Situation analysis</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>The Ethiopia pilot unpacked a comprehensive range of multi-sector assessments that address the main elements of CTP appropriateness. As in Nigeria, the ERC Consortium’s main influence in Ethiopia lay with ‘the multi-sectoral approach to assessments and analysis’. Interviewed in-country consortium members and assessment leads perceived the tools to be useful. As in Nigeria, of the pilot’s different tools the BNA was reported to be a ‘game changer’. Non-members could not extensively comment on the relevance and effects of the different tools, as they had not necessarily seen them at the time of this review (NB: Task Team members had seen the findings of the BNA and the MSMA, but not necessarily the tools per se). The enumerators involved in the data collection did not have the opportunity to comment, as it was not possible to interview them and no data was collected in Fafan Zone for this review. Of the tools used, only one was not developed specifically by the consortium but rather built on previous work: the MSMA that UNHCR developed. UNHCR also developed a Cash Delivery Mechanism Assessment Tool, but Mercy Corps decided not to use it and instead developed a new FSP assessment. The contextualization of the tools has been the responsibility of global technical staff. The BNA was contextualized based on the feedback of locally recruited assessment team leaders and enumerators in Fafan Zone ahead of its roll-out, the FSP assessment by a California-based consultancy group, the MSMA by the UK-based consultant leading the exercise, and the M&amp;E tool by the Tufts University students that led the exercise. While it goes beyond the scope of this review to assess the relevance of the tools’ contents, the process would have been strengthened if contextualization had been coupled with localization, i.e. if there had been greater involvement of enumerators in the adjustment of the tools, or of national consultants in leading the assessments. From an operational model perspective, since the work was implemented by a consortium, each member was given an opportunity to provide input at different stages of the tool development process. Building on learning from Nigeria, all informants were aware of the different assessments being implemented as part of the pilot and did not feel that they were ‘disjointed situation analysis tools’. Cross-fertilization has, however, been limited, as each consortium agency led its own assessment without the participation of other consortium agency team members during the data collection or analysis phases. The disconnect was reinforced by the fact that the majority of those assessments were sub-contracted. The Task Team was responsible for ensuring consistency across the situation analysis ‘puzzle’. The estimated time commitment for each Task Team member was 12–15 days during the pilot’s duration, but this is likely to have been an underestimate considering their range of responsibilities. Furthermore, participation in the Task Team was voluntary and in addition to members’ pre-existing responsibilities, as noted in the interviews. As such, allocating even 12–15 days to the pilot was reported to be difficult. It was relevant to task the ICCG with ensuring consistency across the situation analysis, and having a single point of contact (i.e. the Consortium Coordinator) facilitated this. This task, however, should be part of the ICCG Terms of Reference so that sufficient resources are allocated to it. Considering the pilot timing, it was not realistic to expect such change in resource allocation, and therefore the responsibility of ensuring full cross-fertilization at the situation analysis stage should have rested with the consortium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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20 On a scale ranging from none to limited, medium, strong and very strong.
32 Ibid.
33 (n.d.). Terms of Reference for Response Analysis Task Team.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTP project cycle – key activities</th>
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<th>Nature of influence</th>
<th>Detailed explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Response analysis</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Response analysis is a significant aspect of the ERC Consortium work, and this was strongly acknowledged during the Nigeria pilot review. In Ethiopia, because the data was collected before the inter-sectoral ROAP workshop, it was too early to determine with certainty the pilot’s effect on the response analysis or response design. The Humanitarian Requirement Document (HRD) had already been finalized by the time the pilot’s assessments were carried out; there was therefore less opportunity than in Nigeria for the ROAP workshop recommendations to be reflected in the HRD. Looking at the potential effects of the pilot on response analysis, most of the interviewed ECWG members expressed a willingness to adopt the recommendations of the ROAP workshop. From an operational model perspective, using a consortium to implement the pilot has seemingly had little effect on the response analysis step. Self-reported willingness to endorse the ROAP workshop recommendations was as high amongst non-members as amongst consortium members. This reflects the design of the consortium, which intended to influence the clusters and the CWG. However, there were missed opportunities for collaborative work between consortium members. For example, it was the sole responsibility of the consortium lead at the global level to organize and facilitate the ROAP workshop, and no other global consortium technical focal point planned to attend the workshop to support the participants. Whereas the original pillars of the consortium’s work specifically mentioned deploying a team of technical experts to support programming in the two pilots, in reality each partner individually deployed technical experts. For the ROAP process in particular, it would have been interesting to have had a team of experts supporting the work that could equally draw on all the consortium’s assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programme design</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>As previously mentioned, it is too early to draw conclusions about the pilot’s effects on programme design in country at the organizational level. Looking at the individual level, all consulted ROAP training participants (n=7) reported that their perception of MPGs changed as a result of the training. However, participants’ level of confidence to design and deliver MPGs was not tracked, hence it is not possible to draw a conclusion. Looking at the transfer value, several ECWG members that are part of the minimum expenditure basket (MEB) Task Force mentioned that the pilot was timely to support the ongoing work around the definition of the MEB in Ethiopia. Defining a MEB is not within the scope of the pilot, and the ECWG initiated this work before the pilot began. In contrast to what happened in Nigeria, there was no attempt to use the information from the MSMA on market prices, nor from the BNA on household expenditure, to inform the MEB, as it was already being developed. MEB Task Force members highlighted that the pilot, by initiating discussions on MPGs, will likely support the government’s endorsement of a multi-sectoral MEB. Once the MEB has been signed off, it will be easier to agree upon a transfer value for emergency cash transfers that is different from the PSNP transfer value. From an operational model perspective, being in a consortium has so far had a limited effect on the programme design step. Some of the operational agencies in Ethiopia have individually started to consider how they could use the pilot’s results to design new projects or to adjust the design of existing ones. One of the action points agreed upon by the Task Team members on the last day of the inter-cluster planning workshop was to design a joint, integrated pilot MPG project using the information the consortium generated throughout the ROAP process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP project cycle – key activities</td>
<td>Level of influence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>As in Nigeria, the M&amp;E tools have not been piloted within a consortium member’s project. In Ethiopia, they were applied to a one-off cash distribution by IOM for non-food items (NFI) in December 2017, and then to Oxfam’s monthly food cash distributions. As in Nigeria, there were no ongoing MPG programmes – let alone one being implemented by a consortium member – to use for the Ethiopia pilot. As the M&amp;E tools have not yet been made externally available, their effects have been quite limited. It has not been possible to interview IOM staff within the frame of this review, but considering that its cash distribution was a one-off, it is unlikely that IOM will be able to use the findings from the M&amp;E report to make operational decisions. Oxfam has been more engaged in the process, through reviewing the questionnaire and participating in the data collection. It has also expressed an interest in the report findings. When it comes to the continued use of the tools, Oxfam does not currently utilize MPGs and felt that its current M&amp;E system was appropriate for the type of cash assistance it has been distributing. However, Oxfam noted that it would consider these tools if it starts to use MPGs in future. From an operational model perspective, working as a consortium has had moderate positive effects on the quality of the M&amp;E tools. There has been a genuine effort to learn from the pilot in Nigeria; of the four Tufts University students who led the M&amp;E tool development and piloting, two had been involved in the Nigeria pilot (though remotely). In developing the tool, the Tufts team relied heavily on other Consortium members’ resources, notably the CaLP guide on monitoring for CTP. Finally, by the end of the pilot, the Tufts team approached SC to align the M&amp;E questions with the BNA ones (i.e. to use the BNA as a baseline). The pilot sequence was unfortunately not ideal, as the M&amp;E and the BNA were implemented in parallel, as opposed to the M&amp;E being implemented after the BNA. The alignment of the BNA and the M&amp;E tools will undoubtedly be reflected in the final version of the latter that will be produced by the end of the ERC project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Coordination</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>In Ethiopia, as at the global level, there is growing interest in CTP, and the environment in the country is becoming increasingly conducive to CTP uptake. It is therefore difficult to determine to what extent progress is specifically due to the pilot rather than the overall changing environment. Ethiopia benefits from an active and lively CWG. As a consortium, and through the global Consortium Coordinator, the ERC engaged heavily with the ECWG, and interviews with ECWG members demonstrated that they were quite knowledgeable about the ERC Consortium activities. The ECWG was approached more as a partner for the roll-out than as a potential beneficiary of the pilot. As the pilot did not attempt to alter the structure of cash coordination in Ethiopia, ECWG members did not attribute any gains in cash coordination effectiveness to the ERC Consortium. As with the global focal points, the pilot’s heavy engagement with the ICCG fostered closer bonds between the ECWG and ICCG. All consortium members are also active ECWG members, hence they regularly engage with one another within this coordination platform. However, as noted in the interviews, it seems that being part of a consortium did not foster closer coordination among these organizations at the country level. All interviewees highlighted the Consortium Coordinator’s communication efforts, even though some informants would have preferred a more structured communication model (e.g. they felt there were too many emails exchanged, or that Samepage was not user-friendly). Other technologies, especially communication and remote project management platforms such as Trello or Slack, could potentially have made the process smoother. From an operational model perspective, almost all in-country informants questioned the decision to implement a pilot at the country level without dedicated in-country resources, especially since the pilot was expected to affect coordination. The fact that the Consortium Coordinator was not physically present on a full-time basis hampered informal communication and advocacy efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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35 For example, during the pilot, the ECWG was moved inside the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group.
Compared with Nigeria, the Ethiopia pilot has demonstrated a more limited effect across the project cycle. This is due to the timing of the review. In Nigeria, the pilot review took place in December 2017, two months after the end of the pilot. In Ethiopia, due to the upcoming end of the ERC project, the review took place while the pilot’s activities were still underway; hence it was too early in the process for the full effects to have materialized.

Learning from the pilot in Nigeria, several changes were made to the operational model to enhance effectiveness across the project cycle. These are detailed in Table 4 below.

**Table 4: Changes made to the operational model for the Ethiopia pilot**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations from Nigeria</th>
<th>Changes made in Ethiopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure an analysis of contextual feasibility informs the design of the consortium package and engagement strategy.</td>
<td>More time was dedicated to selecting the country for the second pilot and ensuring the adequacy of the consortium activities and the country’s CTP landscape. However, the ERC activities were decided at the global level and there was only a certain degree of flexibility in the range of activities the consortium could implement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build ownership at the country level, both for the members of the consortium and across the broader spectrum of humanitarian actors.</td>
<td>This is a major success of the pilot: building on the Nigeria experience, there has been a strong push to engage with the different clusters and encourage inter-cluster collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider formalizing decision-making structures at the country level.</td>
<td>Within specific consortium agencies, the degree of formalization between the global and country levels increased. SC, for example, developed formalized ways of working. However, in-country collaboration between consortium members was not more formalized than in Nigeria, which hampered horizontal learning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2 INFLUENCE OF THE ERC CONSORTIUM ON DRIVERS OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mirroring the structure of the Nigeria pilot review, this section examines six aspects of the pilot operational model that have had the most influence on efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the ERC Ethiopia pilot, i.e. the ‘drivers of quality.’ Table 5 below provides a summary of this analysis, and the findings are explained in greater detail in the sub-sections that follow.
Table 5: Drivers of quality within the ERC Consortium operational model, Ethiopia pilot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers of quality studied</th>
<th>Nature of influence on quality</th>
<th>Key findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the consortium at global level</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the consortium at country level</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium ways of working: Communication</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium ways of working: Sub-contracting</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource allocation</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared costs and resources</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-agency ownership</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{37}\) E.g. market training in Nairobi.
4.2.1 Structure of the ERC Consortium at global level

At the global level, the consortium structure did not change for the Ethiopia pilot; it remained the ‘light’ and fairly informal structure described in the Nigeria review. Global-level interviewees from the consortium agencies all described a well-functioning structure with good relationships between members and smooth decision making. However, this structure, despite being as efficient and non-bureaucratic as possible, cannot be easily replicated as it is in large part personality-driven.

The consortium’s management was primarily composed of technical team members. As such, there appears to be an opportunity to increase the potential positive effects by getting senior managers more involved; this could help increase the uptake of MPG in terms of in-country buy-in as well as use of the tools.

4.2.2 Structure of the ERC Consortium at country level

At the country level, the structure of the consortium remained informal, as was the case for the Nigeria pilot. There were constant efforts by the Consortium Coordinator to engage with the representatives of consortium members at the country level to create a sense of belonging. In-country consortium member interviewees were all aware of the ERC activities and of the fact that they were part of a consortium. They were also reasonably well aware of who was doing what, where and for which reasons. The pilot activities were, however, on top of their other responsibilities. Unless there are dedicated resources in country, consortium members’ commitment will always be limited and the structure cannot be more formalized. It is not feasible to have a perfect piloting environment in the humanitarian sector, and the barriers to an effective structure identified in the Nigeria review – such as the stretched response capacity or the volatile security situation – are fairly common across crisis responses. It is therefore important to consider them when designing a structure, as one cannot expect a formal consortium structure to run without resources.

As previously mentioned, almost all in-country informants questioned the decision to implement a pilot at the country level without dedicated in-country resources. This was also the case during the Nigeria review. Building on said review, the Consortium Coordinator spent significantly more time in Ethiopia than in Nigeria. However, the fact that no resources had been budgeted for a country-level coordinator to be physically present on a full-time basis in Ethiopia hampered the informal communication and advocacy efforts. This also increased the burden on the Consortium Coordinator and SC technical lead, as they spent about half of their working time in country during the last three months of the pilot.

In rolling out the pilot, the light touch and informal consortium structure hampered horizontal learning across consortium members and, to a certain extent, consistency across the different assessments.

4.2.3 Consortium ways of working (communication and sub-contracting)

From the beginning of the pilot, the ways of working were adjusted to build on learning from Nigeria. For instance, the selection of Ethiopia as the second pilot country was the result of a more structured process. The consortium produced a longlist of countries and collected information on each of them based on pre-established criteria, before filtering the options and creating a shortlist. For each shortlisted country, the offices of the respective consortium agencies were consulted to assess their appetite to host the pilot. SC even asked interested country offices to fill out an Expression of Interest. The objective was to ensure senior management’s awareness of the implications of hosting a pilot. Once selected, the SC Ethiopia country office received a formalized ways of working document, detailing roles and responsibilities. This created the necessary clarity to ensure sufficient country office involvement, lack of which had been a major deterrent to such involvement during the Nigeria pilot.

All interviewed parties, whether internal or external to the consortium, had a good understanding of the pilot’s overall objectives. The priority, resources-wise, has been to rally ICCG and Task Team members as opposed to consortium members. Considering that the objective of the pilot was to encourage the uptake of MPG not only by the consortium members but by the overall in-country operating environment, this seems to have been an effective choice of ways of working.

As mentioned in Table 3, all interviewees highlighted the Consortium Coordinator’s communication efforts, even though some informants would have liked to have had a more structured communication model.
Most of the roll-outs of the pilot’s assessments were sub-contracted. According to interviewees, this led to efficiency gains, notably in terms of time saving. However, as each consultant was managed by the responsible agency at global level and in Ethiopia at different times, they had limited contact with each other. This decreased the effectiveness of the entire process.

### 4.2.4 Resource allocation

As the outcomes of the consortium work are still to be determined, it is too early to reflect on the extent to which the overall ERC budget, of a little more than €1m, spent over a 24-month period, was used in the most effective and efficient way. It was not possible to access disaggregated data for the Ethiopia pilot specifically so this section analyses overall budget data, and reflects on implications for the Ethiopia pilot budget.
The vast majority of the budget was dedicated to human resources. This appears to be normal, as the consortium was not operational.

Consortium management costs represented about 12% of the total budget and consisted of the salaries of the Consortium Coordinator, part of the SC technical lead's time in the capacity of project manager and Consortium Coordinator's supervisor, and of a part-time finance and award officer. Based on the review team's experience, this ratio is fairly standard. At the global level, as noted by the interviewees, delivering the project through a consortium did lead to some increased effectiveness and efficiency gains. This would therefore justify these consortium management costs and the decision to implement such a project as a consortium.

Notably, the consortium management costs represented 40% of Save the Children's total grant, despite the other responsibilities SC assumed during the project’s implementation (e.g. developing the BNA and the ROAP tools, and implementing two BNA, two MSMA and two ROAP exercises).

Resource allocation for some of the tool development was drastically underestimated. For example, to support the BNA development, the narrative budget planned for a total of 30 days' work, which is already limited considering the breadth of the tool. However, the actual budget only provided for 10 days of work, hence a total of €5,000 to develop the BNA. The time spent to adjust the BNA to the needs of humanitarian stakeholders (e.g. to look not only at CTP but also at in-kind assistance, so that the BNA was seen as ‘modality neutral’), or to engage with OCHA at the global level to inform inter-agency processes, were not budgeted for.

At the same time, some positions funded under the project were vacant for most of the pilot’s duration, which led other consortium members to underspend their budgets; however, there were no changes in budget allocation to reflect these constraints. The agile consortium structure did not translate into integrated budget management. This is most likely a result of the respective organizations' financial rules, but it limited the added value of working through a consortium.

Some extra activities were implemented outside of the pilot countries (as approved by the donor), which may also have limited the positive effects of the combined consortium approach. It is therefore the review team's opinion that resource allocation has proven to be neither efficient nor effective.

Beyond the Consortium Coordinator, who was working full-time on the ERC project, other global technical focal points estimated having spent 4–20 days per month supporting the Ethiopia pilot. In total, more than 200 days were spent on the Ethiopia pilot. The overall number of days spent per organization is shown in Figure 7 below.

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38 This figure reflects the budget figure and does not encompass the time spent on management by the SC technical lead, who managed the Consortium Coordinator.

39 Some budget reallocation occurred after the data collection phase for this review, towards the end of the ERC project.
4.2.5 Shared costs and resources among the ERC Consortium partners in Ethiopia

The main areas of cost-saving and resource-sharing resulted from the consortium management structure. Having a single Consortium Coordinator helped centralize and ensure the consistency of communication with the ICCG. Non-members interviewed at the country level clearly identified the Consortium Coordinator as being the main point of contact for all pilot-related questions, which helped clarify the pilot’s objectives.

Another, almost unintended, shared resource was the work the SC technical lead did on the ROAP. The ROAP was meant to be SC’s responsibility. However, as the ROAP provided the opportunity for all the assessment results to be jointly analysed to inform response design, other consortium members at the country or global levels could have been involved in supporting its facilitation. This did not happen, and instead the process required the SC technical lead’s unbudgeted, full-time engagement in the project in February and March. Although it is not yet possible to draw a conclusion, since the ROAP will produce its results in the coming weeks and months, it appears that the other consortium members’ limited involvement could potentially result in some loss of effectiveness of the ROAP process and lower uptake of its recommendations in Ethiopia.

Beyond the examples cited above, during the review of the Ethiopia pilot very few examples emerged of consortium partners having saved costs in country thanks to working in a consortium.

4.2.6 Inter-agency ownership of ERC Consortium-developed tools and processes

Building on learning from the Nigeria review, the pilot successfully engaged with humanitarian stakeholders in Ethiopia using the ICCG as an entry point, as opposed to using the CWG as in the Nigeria pilot. As previously noted, having a single Consortium Coordinator allowed communication with that group to be centralized and consistent, which helped clarify the pilot’s objectives and ultimately improved its effectiveness.

In Ethiopia, the Task Team was formed at the start of the pilot in mid-October, whereas in Nigeria the Cash Task Team was formed after the different assessments took place, in August 2017. As the Task Team was a sub-group of the ICCG, this was a good way to create both an inter-agency and inter-cluster sense of ownership of the ERC Consortium’s developed tools and processes. The constant communication efforts of the Consortium Coordinator also contributed to creating awareness across agencies and sectors. At the time of this review, ownership of the pilot outcomes was yet to be determined. The diversity of actors that attended the final ROAP workshop is an encouraging sign, as is the fact that organizations participating in this workshop agreed to design an integrated pilot to deliver an MPG project.
According to the in-country interviews, inter-agency ownership at the country level has been less influenced by the chosen operational model than by the ways of working (e.g. early Task Team creation, the focus on inter-agency communication). By contrast, global-level interviewees tended to note that working as a consortium created a natural sense of ownership across member organizations.

The capacity of in-country humanitarian organizations to use the ERC tools and keep the assessments up to date is yet to be determined. During interviews, a few examples were shared as to how the tools have been/will be replicated in other countries. However, no examples were shared about this being done in Ethiopia. As less than a year passed between the start of the first pilot and this review, it is too early to determine whether the use of the ERC tools will be sustained and replicated; determining this is also outside the scope of this review. However, several in-country interviewees expressed concerns about the capacity of organizations in Ethiopia to use the ERC tools, especially as they have not been trained on how to do so.

With the ERC project coming to an end in April 2018, and no future plan for dedicated resources for the tools’ roll-out, many interviewees perceive the risk of the tools not being used to be as high as 80%. The learning event organized at the end of April in Addis Ababa will be pivotal in paving the way for future uptake and buy-in.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The ERC approach and activities have without doubt been relevant to the Ethiopian context. While the pilot has not addressed all the barriers to MPG uptake, it has benefited from the global and national trends towards increased use of MPGs and contributed to pushing the agenda forward. It is also likely that the recommendations from the ROAP process will be used across sectors and organizations.

At the global level, delivering the ERC project as a consortium has had indisputable added value. It increased the quality of the final outputs by ensuring cross-organizational inputs, and it increased the uptake of the final set of tools. It also helped to enhance buy-in among both consortium agencies that have been directly involved in developing the tools, and among non-consortium organizations as they tend to view these tools as agency-neutral and hence more easily adaptable.

At the country level, delivering the pilot through a consortium also resulted in added value, as it increased the buy-in of organizations both within and outside of the consortium. However, delivering a country-based pilot through a global consortium without in-country resources was a missed opportunity for increased effectiveness.

Future operational models should consider the following elements:

- **Appoint an in-country pilot manager**, who could either be hosted by the consortium lead or within one of the consortium agencies. If multiple pilots are being delivered by the same consortium, having different organizations host the pilot manager in each pilot location on a rotating basis could create a stronger sense of ownership.

- **Horizontal learning** needs to be prioritized to the greatest possible extent. Training member agencies’ own employees on how to use the consortium tools, instead of involving the staff from other consortium member organizations or from other organizations working in the pilot area, was a missed opportunity in the case of the Ethiopia pilot.

The decision for this pilot to engage with humanitarian stakeholders in Ethiopia using the ICCG as an entry point was particularly successful, and should be replicated. The entry point for the increased uptake of MPG cannot be limited to the CWG, as this would limit the inputs of the sectoral experts.

The fact that the project was not designed to be operational hampered the extent to which humanitarian stakeholders could benefit from ‘learning by doing’. To facilitate the uptake of MPGs, future operational models should consider the whole project cycle, including efforts to enhance situation and response analysis (as per the ERC activities in Ethiopia) but also direct involvement in response design and implementation. Preliminary discussions about running a pilot MPG project in Ethiopia following on from the ROAP workshop could be a first step in this direction.
While consortium members cannot dictate the future global uptake of MPGs, they do have significant influence over the future of the developed set of tools. There is no common view across consortium members as to where the toolset could sit or who owns it. It goes beyond the scope of this review to comment on what is the most appropriate way to roll out the tools, but the diversity of potential channels for uptake brought up by consortium representatives should be seen as an opportunity. The Common Cash Delivery platform, of which the ERC Consortium NGOs are members, now has a set of tools that are ready for use, even if they require a degree of contextualization. Organizations that specialize in assessment, such as REACH, have demonstrated interest in the BNA. The toolkit should also be integrated into the next iteration of the CaLP Programme Quality Toolbox.

Finally, CTP operational models can only be flexible and adapted to context in a structured and predictable manner if the elements that define an operational model – such as governance bodies, decision-making processes, time commitment, etc. – are formalized. If this happens, the delineation between outcomes-related and process-related elements (i.e. the operational model) will be clarified. Such a process can be iterative and should also rely on existing, non-CTP related evaluation methodologies of operational models.
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1.1 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

ERC overall documents
(2016) ERC narrative proposal, ECHO E-single form

Presentation of Ethiopia pilot and ERC activities in Fafan Zone
(2017) Notes ERC MPG Consortium in Ethiopia, meeting minutes (16–26 October 2017)
H. Hames (2017) Briefing Note, ERC Consortium – Increasing the Uptake of Multi-Purpose Cash Grants in Emergency Responses for a More Efficient and Effective Humanitarian Action
H. Hames (n.d.) Briefing Note – The ERC-funded Consortium for the uptake of multi-purpose grants: Ethiopia pilot
(n.d.) Draft MoU Ethiopia Pilot Budget
(n.d.) Draft MoU Agreement Between ERC MPG Consortium in Ethiopia and government
(n.d.) ERC Agency Operational Presence in Ethiopia, spreadsheet
(n.d.) ERC MPG Consortium Woreda Selection in Ethiopia
(n.d.) ERC Consortium Activities, Indicators, deliverables spreadsheet
(n.d.) Introduction to the Ethiopia pilot of the ECHO-funded Consortium for the uptake of collaborative, quality multi-purpose grants
(n.d.) Contact list of team leaders and enumerators – BNA and MSMA in Ethiopia
(n.d.) ERC-SAVE MSMA Ethiopia 2018: UNHCR Market Assessment Tools 1 to 10
(n.d.) MSMA Ethiopia – Training Slides Day 1 & 2
(n.d.) MSMA report Fafan Zone 208 v2
(n.d.) Timeline for Basic Needs Focused Response Analysis
(n.d.) Timeline for Response Analysis Task Team
(n.d.) Terms of Reference for Response Analysis Task Team

Frameworks, toolkits and guidance
(2017) Enumerator and questionnaire guidance – Basic needs and response analysis framework and toolkit pilot in Somali state
(2017) Guidance and Toolbox for the Basic Needs Analysis
CaLP (2018) CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework
(n.d.) Basic Needs Assessment and Response Analysis Framework & Toolkit Training Presentation – Modules 01 to 03
Ethiopia assessment reports

(2015) Ethiopia Livelihood Baseline Profile: Somali Region – Degahbur Agropastoral, Jijiga Agropastoral, Jijiga Sedentary Farming, Shinile Agropastoral, Harshin Degahbur Pastoral and Shinile Pastoral Livelihood Zone Profile

(2015) Somali Region HEA Baselines


(2016) IDP Multi-Sector Rapid Assessments Report – Resources-based displacement in Babile and Kubi Districts of Fafan and Erer zones

(2016) Physical and Socio-Economic Profile of Babile, Harshin & Kabribayah Districts

(2017) 4W CTP in Ethiopia matrix


(2017) Cash/MPG programming in Somali Region of Ethiopia


(2017) Somali Region: Fafan & Jarar Zone Administrative Maps

A. Thegeya (2017) Roll out of the Basic Needs Assessment – Somali region Ethiopia


FEG (n.d.) Overview and Summary of the Results of the 2015 Household Economy Analysis Baseline Update – Somali Region, Ethiopia


IOM (n.d.) R1-R7 Site List of Fafan Zone Somali Region


OCHA (2018) Partner Capacity Assessment – Cash Transfer Programming Ethiopia

(n.d.) Ethiopia National Integrated Food-Cash Relief Plan for 8.5m HRD beneficiaries and 4m PSNP public works clients to the end of 2017

Outputs from Nigeria pilot

(2017) Response Analysis for Jere, Konduga and MMC (Borno) – WASH, Shelter, Food Security and Livelihood & Inter-sector


# ANNEX 1.2 – LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Louise Gentzel</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Geneva</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Isabelle Pelly</td>
<td>Technical Coordinator</td>
<td>CaLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hannah Hames</td>
<td>ERC Consortium Coordinator</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Francesca Battistin</td>
<td>Humanitarian Cash and Markets Advisor</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Azim Noorani</td>
<td>Roving Cash Transfer Programme Advisor</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Louisa Seferis</td>
<td>Global Cash Advisor</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lily Frey</td>
<td>Electronic Cash Transfer Officer</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Justina Mwangangi</td>
<td>Capacity Building Officer East Africa</td>
<td>CaLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jo Zaremba</td>
<td>MSMA lead</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anne Craib</td>
<td>FSP lead</td>
<td>Kap Tower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kate Hirschboeck</td>
<td>M&amp;E team member</td>
<td>Tufts University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lindsay Gardel</td>
<td>M&amp;E team member</td>
<td>Tufts University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Agustin Orengo</td>
<td>Associate Humanitarian Officer in Field Coordination Unit &amp; Secretary of the CWG</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Michael Jacobs</td>
<td>Chief of Party, PRIME Project &amp; MC Consortium focal point in Ethiopia</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Abdillahi Farah</td>
<td>Alternative Livelihoods &amp; Financial Inclusion Advisor</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Theodros (Teddy) Eshetu Tefera</td>
<td>Country EFSVL Coordinator &amp; Co-chair of CWG Member of the Ethiopia Task Team for food security and cash</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Solomon Bekele</td>
<td>Cash specialist</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Praemeenah Poobalan</td>
<td>Cash Coordinator for WFP &amp; Co-chair of CWG; member of the Task Teams for food security and cash</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Alikemah</td>
<td>Food security cluster coordinator</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Calum McLean</td>
<td>Global Thematic Coordinator, cash and basic needs</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Tagel Wubetu</td>
<td>WASH Coordinator and Task Team member</td>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dr Abdelhadi Eltahir</td>
<td>SRH &amp; GBV Coordinator and Task Team member</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Yeshiwas Assefa</td>
<td>Livelihoods Coordinator</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX 1.3 – STUDY MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review question</th>
<th>Criteria to use</th>
<th>Already covered in the framework</th>
<th>How judgment will be formed</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To what extent is the ERC Consortium responding to the needs of humanitarian organizations in Ethiopia for quality CTP by promoting the inter-agency collaboration and uptake of MPGs? | Relevance       | Yes – in relation to Operational Model (OM) as part of open questions on enabling environment                                                   | • Perception of the consortium members in country on the usefulness of the ERC tools  
• Examples of how the tools have been contextualized and used to inform programming in country  
• Review of the level of capacity and acceptance around MPG in Fafan Zone  
• Rationale for the selection of Fafan Zone                                                                                         | • Interview with in-country consortium members  
• Interview with consultants leading the in-country assessments  
• Review of self-assessment done prior to/after the CaLP training  
• Pilot project document                                                                                                           |
| Has the ERC Consortium identified and then tackled in-country obstacles to inter-agency collaboration and uptake of MPGs? | Relevance  
Effectiveness  
Sustainability | To some extent – in relation to OM as part of open questions on enabling environment | • Selection of Ethiopia as a country pilot is documented and explained  
• Global consortium members can match ERC activities in country with the identified barriers to the uptake of CTP  
• Self-reported change in the perception of MPG by governmental representatives and consortium members in country  
• Self-reported willingness of the CWG members to adopt the results of the Response Analysis Option workshop  
• Commitment to collaboration in between consortium members at country level | • Interview with global-level consortium members  
• Interview with CWG members  
• Interview with country-level consortium members                                                                                     |

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40 This matrix is based on the CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework, and the study Terms of Reference.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review question</th>
<th>Criteria to use</th>
<th>Already covered in the framework</th>
<th>How judgment will be formed</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What technical and strategic assistance has been provided by the ERC Consortium to the (a) consortium members Ethiopia country office; (b) the broader humanitarian community in country; and (c) in-country cash coordination systems? | Effectiveness Connectedness | Yes – framework covers the influence that the OM has on the broader response and coordination | • Implemented activities against the pilot implementation plan  
• Effects of the ERC pilot on the humanitarian programme cycle  
• Self-reported level of confidence of the training participants to design and deliver MPG  
• Gain of effectiveness of the cash coordination structure that is attributed to the consortium by the CWG members  
• Examples of the ERC Consortium engaging with other CWG members  
• Level of knowledge of the CWG members on the ERC Consortium activities | • Tool 2, part 1 of the framework  
• Data collection with training participants |
| To what extent has the ERC in Ethiopia been able to learn from Nigeria pilot implementation for improved effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the consortium model? | Effectiveness Efficiency Accountability Coordination | Yes – core of the framework | • Examples of changes made to the consortium structure following the Nigeria review  
• Level of knowledge of the consortium members in country on the ERC Consortium activities  
• Perception from consortium members at global and country levels that there is a clear share of roles and responsibilities  
• Perception of CWG members on the appropriateness of the consortium members  
• Example of cost-saving through the use of shared resources across consortium members  
• Perception of consortium members of the resources needed and committed for the consortium management | • Nigeria review (section 4.2) will serve as a baseline, and compared to the findings in Ethiopia across the same key areas that have influenced aspects of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the ERC Nigeria pilot  
• Interviews with global-level consortium members  
• Interviews with country-level consortium members |
This case study forms part of CaLP’s evidence base on operational models for CTP. The study methodology is based on the CTP Operational Models Analytical Framework. It aims to review and map out how aspects of the Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC) MPG consortium model have influenced the uptake of MPGs in the consortium’s Ethiopia pilot.

Formed at the global level in 2015, the ERC MPG Consortium is comprised of five humanitarian response agencies: Save the Children (SC), Mercy Corps, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The study analyses how the barriers to the uptake of MPGs in Ethiopia have been addressed by the consortium. It reviews how the consortium model contributed to the uptake of MPGs, at the situation and response analysis stages of the programme cycle. It provides an analysis of the structure of the consortium and its relevance for the uptake of MPGs, and reflections on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ethiopia pilot.

The study concludes with recommendations for future models of collaboration for MPGs, and a call for inter-agency ownership of the valuable consortium tools. These recommendations contribute to the global knowledge base around operational models.

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