



Evaluation of the Cash Consortium in Southern Somalia

**Oxfam GB and Horn Relief with
AFREC, Development Concern and WASDA**

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Executive Summary

Introduction & Objectives

In response to the humanitarian emergency of 2006 in southern Somalia, a consortium of five agencies – Oxfam GB, Horn Relief, AFREC, WASDA and Development Concern – implemented the Emergency Drought Response Action (EDRA) programme. This was a cash-based intervention using an innovative approach with communities previously developed and implemented by Horn Relief in the more secure north of the country. It also involved a cross-border dimension with Oxfam GB working through two Kenyan-Somali NGO partners.

This evaluation aims at reviewing the rationale, strengths and weaknesses of this work by focusing on four related aspects:

- the Consortium
 - how well it worked as a co-ordinating system
- the Approach
 - a community based approach which stressed transparency, public participation and pro-active advocacy within the clan system in order to target the poor
- the Commodity
 - the household, market and security implications of using cash
- the Micro-projects
 - how they were selected and what was their value

Scope and Methodology

The evaluation was comprehensive in scope but did have some serious limitations, particularly in terms of access to the field. The team leader could not travel to Somalia due to security restrictions. Heavy rains entailed further restrictions which resulted in only one of the three district-sites being comprehensively covered. However this district, Afmadow, received about sixty percent of the transferred cash resources and had two of the four implementing agencies working within it. Another project area, in Gedo region, was visited but less villages than planned could be covered. The third project area, Badhade district where AFREC was working, was not visited at all due to poor road conditions and resultant inaccessibility.

However, given some of these restrictions the evaluation had some advantages. A month prior to the evaluation, and as part of the evaluation contract, two of the team members

had been involved in the design of a post distribution monitoring and impact assessment survey. This built on a previous such survey conducted by OCHA in 2004¹. The experience developed through the Overseas Development Institute's cash learning programme was also drawn upon for the survey design². The survey was completed approximately one week before the evaluation team started working together in Nairobi and the results were drawn upon for this evaluation.

The evaluation team was also able to organise and facilitate a two-day workshop in Garissa, Kenya, attended by all of the consortium members, to further explore pertinent issues.

Finally, the evaluation team was able to mobilise two other international agencies to assist with the evaluation, one contributing to the market analysis and the other conducting a discrete field-based inquiry of impressions of the projects according to a simple check-list prepared by the evaluation team³.

Programme Description

The project goal was to:

- Contribute to improving the food security and livelihoods of drought-affected communities in South Somalia

The project objectives were:

- Emergency cash based intervention to improve the purchasing power and livelihoods of 16,260 target households, and to develop infrastructure through micro-projects, in the drought affected communities of Lower Juba and Gedo Region of South Somalia

The Consortium

The consortium is divided into two linked components:

- Oxfam GB implementing through its two Kenyan-Somali NGOs, out of Wajir, Kenya, working in Gedo and Lower Juba;
- Horn Relief receiving funds from donors and Oxfam GB as well as implementing directly and through a local partner, AFREC, both in Lower Juba.

Cash Relief and Cash-for-Work

In detail the essential activities comprise:

¹ Narbeth, S. 2004. *Emergency cash relief to drought affected communities in Sool plateaux*. Post-distribution survey findings. OCHA.

² One and a half day's working time was paid to the cash-learning focal person, a position that had finished several weeks prior to the evaluation.

³ FEWSNET consolidated relevant price data, conducted interviews with Garissa based traders prior to the Garissa workshop and helped to facilitate a discussion of their market findings at the Garissa workshop. It was agreed that the agency conducting the discrete inquiry would remain un-named. The agency is a well respected international organization with a well informed Somali network, not implementing humanitarian interventions.

- a) A community based registration process relying on public participation, transparency and pro-active engagement with the clan system in order to advocate for targeting of resources to poor pastoralists and minority groups
- b) an initial one-off cash relief distribution of \$50 per household in June 2006 to a planned 16,260 households
- c) secondly, four monthly distributions within a cash-for-work framework for 8,900 households consisting of:
 - o 90% of beneficiaries receiving \$55 per month as cash-for work
 - o 10% of beneficiaries – the most vulnerable and labour poor households – receiving cash relief of \$55 per month
- d) the identification and implementation of a range of drought mitigation micro-projects as part of the cash-for work component

KEY FINDINGS

Rationale for the Cash Response – Needs Assessment and Analysis

Both Oxfam GB and Horn Relief were guided by the analysis of the Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia, a widely respected food security information system. Initially Oxfam was able to build on its long presence across the border in North East Kenya to confirm the FSAU’s analysis and quickly mobilise water interventions through its partner agencies. This enabled the partners to gain credibility and access to communities in southern Somalia and assess the feasibility of cash-based responses.

Horn Relief responded to the FSAU alerts by conducting a joint assessment with Mercy Corps of needs and operational possibilities in southern Somalia.

Following the initial alerts by the FSAU both agencies were pro-active in engaging the FSAU and FEWSNET to develop more specific cash-based information and analysis – the functioning of the market, the appropriate size of cash transfers and labour rates. This information was complemented by their own discussions with traders on the ground.

In following the FSAU’s analysis both agencies were targeting areas of southern Somalia judged to be in a state of ‘humanitarian crisis or acute food security and livelihoods crisis’, poorly covered by other humanitarian actors, unknown to themselves and generally perceived to be difficult, remote and insecure operating environments.

Although limited in availability, the health and nutrition data, combined with the FSAU-FEWSNET analysis did confirm that this was a serious humanitarian crisis. However, the timing of the cash projects was relatively late for maximum impact, the first distribution coming in June 2006, one to two months after the rains and two to three months after the first food aid distributions arrived⁴. This was partly explained by the fact that the agencies were moving in to new areas and partly due to delays in obtaining funding.

⁴ It is worth noting that food aid in Somalia is generally not well targeted at the household level and arguably has as important an impact on the market, in terms of lowering prices, as it does on reaching the household level.

Relevance and Appropriateness

In terms of moving in to new (for the respective agencies) and poorly serviced geographic areas, in a state of ‘humanitarian crisis’, with an innovative working approach and a relatively new commodity (cash) Oxfam and Horn Relief (and partners and donors) deserve particular credit for initiating and managing what many would see as a high risk strategy. The risk was largely taken by the Oxfam family with Oxfam GB providing approximately half of the resources (see box 6). In doing so, in a public manner of which this evaluation is one example, the consortium have clearly demonstrated the possibility of working in ways much more locally sensitive and appropriate to a politically complex and insecure environment, as well as with a commodity many actors were unsure about for the southern Somalia context.

It is worth stressing that the implementing agencies on the ground were all manned by ethnic Somali staff. Notably, the Consortium interventions have been progressing in a largely uninterrupted manner, relatively unaffected by the security restrictions and evacuations that affect international staff of other organisations.

The cash itself has proven to be highly appropriate as a commodity to save lives and livelihoods, in particular by re-opening credit lines and supporting trading systems. In addition, the use of the *hawala*⁵ system, through Dahabshil, to manage and distribute the cash, delivering it directly into people’s hands, has proven very successful.

While it has been more difficult to comment on the technical aspects of the micro-projects, it appears that the projects have also been valued for their relevance and appropriateness by communities on the ground who had a major say in their identification. The micro-projects have included a mixture of drought mitigation and infrastructure rehabilitation objectives.

Results Achieved

In areas generally identified to be in a state of humanitarian crisis and with few other interventions, the Consortium successfully transferred \$807,900 to 16,158 households as a one-off \$50 free distribution and \$2,056,384 to 9,298 households in four monthly payments during the cash-for-work component⁶.

In terms of targeting, while the initial cash-relief distribution was not the focus of the evaluation, for practical reasons, it is thought to have involved a fairly blanket level of coverage largely due to the limited time to prepare for this first distribution. However, the evaluation research and the post-distribution monitoring and impact survey findings both strongly suggest a high level of targeting to poor pastoral households and other poor groups for the cash-for-work phase. For example, in Lower Juba, 67% of households

⁵ *Hawala* is the collective term for the informal banking and money transfer system in the country.

⁶ 10% of the cash-for-work phase was in the form of cash relief to the most vulnerable in the community. A very small additional amount of cash was paid to skilled workers working on the micro-projects.

survey were classified currently as drop-outs or destitute⁷ and 60% claimed their major source of income before the drought was livestock and livestock products. An additional, 28% claimed to rely on bush products or wage labour, both typically activities of the poor.

While the impact of the programme is difficult to fully disentangle from the impact of the rains that started in April and food aid which started in March, the benefits for households and the local economy appears to have been profound. The strong indications are that households used the majority of their money on improving their access to food, including diversifying their diet, by depositing their money with local traders and shop-keepers and thereby re-opening their credit lines. Households were also able to reduce sales of their remaining animals and were able to reduce reliance on typical coping strategies, such as daily labour, bush product collection and sales and household migration⁸. In addition the cash distributions revitalised the local economy particularly through the re-opening of credit lines, which had started to collapse.

Certain judgements and comparisons about project impact are difficult to make due to the lack of available data and information. Health and nutrition data in the project areas for example is very limited and was only found for the period before the project started (see Box 1). Also, targeting levels for other humanitarian interventions, for comparative purposes, are thought to be very limited although an extensive search was not undertaken.

For the June one-off cash distribution a relatively high percentage of women were registered as beneficiaries, between 41% and 91%, depending on the agency. For the cash-for-work phase the proportion of women reduced to between 27% and 39% (see Box 11, page 49) for the three agencies working in Lower Juba, although remained at over 50% for Gedo.

A variety of micro-projects were developed of which the vast majority are complete, as reported by the agencies. Road clearance was by far the predominant project type with over one thousand kilometres cleared of bush. Water point rehabilitation, latrine construction, school room rehabilitation, airstrip clearance, social hall rehabilitation and rubbish clearance were other project types that were undertaken. Water point rehabilitation projects undertaken were less than expected and explained by the implementation of emergency water projects prior to the implementation of the cash-for-work programme. Micro-projects all fell under the general project objectives. The quality of the work is thought to be fine and has generally been supported by the use of water engineers. However, relatively few project sites were visited.

Critically, the working approach implemented, 'using the clan system in a positive way', demonstrated to communities as well as local and international organisations that

⁷ Drop outs are considered as households temporarily having dropped out of the pastoral system by giving their remaining livestock to viable pastoral relatives to look after until they are able to regain animals and return to their pastoral livelihoods.

⁸ For which there would have been increasing competition and decreasing returns as a result of the drought.

alternative and perhaps more appropriate and context sensitive means exist to work in southern Somalia.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

By most accounts saving livelihoods is as important as saving lives in emergencies. Although the first cash intervention was late in having the maximum impact – a more appropriate time would have been in March and/or April at the peak of the dry season and very beginning of the wet season when animal deaths are highest, peoples’ workloads are heaviest and nutritional status is most compromised⁹. This is partly due to the relatively late submission of proposals and the late and limited donor funding.

Having said that once the cash arrived, it appears to have complemented the food distributions and resultant low food prices very well, allowing a level of flexibility in the use of the cash, for example by diversifying the diet, probably not found in other areas.

The experience of using Dahabshil to distribute the cash has been mixed. In some respects this has worked well, for example with no allegations or evidence of corruption, taxation or unusual security concerns. The potential inflationary impact of significant cash injections has also been minimised as a result of the use of a *hawala*. However, Horn Relief in particular has had serious problems with regard to communications, information sharing and planning with Dahabshil resulting in a decision to change *hawala* for the last distribution. This does highlight the potential difficulties of working closely with *hawala* whose internal structure and systems are not well understood by others.

With 65% of the overall project budget going directly in to the hands of communities this project is likely to have been unusually efficient in the direct transfer of resources in the Somalia context. Some reflections and comparisons between food aid and cash have been made (see box 11, page 48 and section 5, page 55).

The effectiveness of the micro-projects is more difficult to judge but they have generally built on and reinforced existing strategic and ‘in-use’ structures.

The delay in the implementation of the photo ID registration system has been one of the most notable weaknesses in project implementation. This would have further improved targeting in some areas and the lack of planning and practice for its use was a serious short-coming. However, for the programme as a whole this limitation has not had a major

⁹ Household members are usually divided between managing large stock and small stock, and walking extensively every day to take animals to pasture as well as obtain water for livestock and household consumption. Female livestock are usually producing little milk at this stage contributing to the strain on the household.

detrimental impact on this occasion, due to other factors described within this report, but is recommended for future programmes.

Project monitoring, although well planned for, could have been improved in many ways. A monitoring and evaluation framework was developed, a project baseline and two post-distribution monitoring surveys¹⁰ were implemented and sitrep and financial reporting formats were provided and implemented. However, the monitoring and evaluation framework was not fully implemented and was too ambitious for the operating context, the baseline and first PDM survey had limitations in their content and methods and project reporting lacked detail. In addition, several opportunities to improve monitoring were missed, such as through the development of cross-consortium monitoring processes and individual household level monitoring.

Coordination and Management

The coordination of the Consortium with other coordination forum (SACB / UN Clusters) in Nairobi has been good.

The coordination within the Consortium has generally been good, although most effective at the Nairobi level and through the four consortium meetings in Garissa, Kenya. In particular the evaluation team noted that the consortium of five agencies actually worked well as a strong peer-level partnership. Coordination has been more limited at the day-to-day field level and the cross-consortium level and would have benefited from improved such mechanisms.

The management of the individual projects by the different agencies has generally been good. All projects-agencies adopted almost the same project structure and all recruited excellent staff in to the two key field-based management positions.

Sustainability

Sustainability is problematic in such a short-term emergency response intervention. However, the project has attempted to stress to communities its limited time-frame.

It is too early to comment on the sustainability of the micro-projects although the indications are that they have been built to a reasonable standard and are mostly located in centres where they will be used and maintained, given the limitations of the Somalia context.

¹⁰ The second of these was the one that the evaluation team supported, an indication of the weaknesses in the previous efforts.

Box 1. Key Conclusions – why did it work?

The evaluation team were surprised at the relatively positive level of success found. However, when compared to the equivalent surveys and evaluations in northern Somalia, involving Horn Relief and Oxfam GB¹¹ this is slightly less surprising. However, the evaluation team identified the following factors as crucial to the overall success of the projects:

- * Strong partnership dynamics
 - good coordination and peer level relationships
- * Strong staff in key leadership and field positions – all agencies
 - strong, competent, motivated staff
- * Strong beginning
 - three-day joint training in May got all agencies off to the same start
- * New intervention
 - lack of familiarity with the area and the project type may have contributed to the pressure to perform well
- * Context specific/sensitive approach
 - few non-ethnic Somali in the field allowed largely uninterrupted implementation
 - strong ethnic Somali staff with international exposure and less or not part of long standing local power dynamics enabled good understanding of and engagement with the local clan and power dynamics
- * Use of a locally respected institution for the cash distributions – Dahabshil

RECOMMENDATIONS

Governance and the Political Context

The consortium has demonstrated an alternative way of working in southern Somalia, in particular by gaining the support of the wider public, attempting to use the clan system in a positive way, and not allowing themselves to be hijacked by gate-keepers. This approach could serve as a model to be explored further for wider replicability by other agencies in Somalia.

¹¹ Narbeth, S. 2004. *Emergency cash relief to drought affected communities in Sool plateaux*. Post-distribution survey findings. OCHA; Acacia Consultants. 2005. *DfID/Novib funded NGO consortium response to drought in Toghdeer, Sool, Bari, Nugal regions*. External evaluation.

Having said that it is also a time of great political uncertainty in Somalia. Political developments may mean the operating space and norms will change – public participation and transparency may become less possible. However, exploring ways of engaging with and re-enforcing positive Islamic principles of governance is an area the consortium can contribute to. AFREC, for example, mobilised local religious leaders to instil moral pressure on the Village Relief Committees to target the most drought affected, in line with project targeting objectives.

Given these potential restrictions a number of advocacy opportunities exist:

- 1) other international agencies in southern Somalia have already been showing interest in the approach of the Consortium, particularly for targeting purposes. The capacity of Oxfam and/or Horn Relief to meet this demand and explore and promote these areas was not investigated fully by the evaluation team but should be assessed.
- 2) the approach is thought to be of interest to other agencies working to develop and support civil society and governance in Somalia. The interest in this area and capacity to support it should be assessed.
- 3) the staffing strategy – in particular the use of strong ethnic Somali staff from Kenya – of the agencies demonstrates a way to improve humanitarian access to Somalia. This issue should be followed up with UN OCHA

This evaluation has had its limit in terms of how far it has been able to uncover details on how the project has appeared to interact positively with the clan structures and systems in order to target the poor and minorities. Further research into the dynamics of Somali social support mechanisms, the re-distribution of resources, the status of minorities and the resultant implications for operating norms and targeting by international agencies would be welcome.

Rebuilding and supporting pastoral livelihoods

The majority of the project beneficiaries are cattle pastoralists who have lost a significant proportion of their animals. The cattle pastoral economy in general has suffered very high livestock losses. Recovery of pastoralists takes time, as they must wait for new births of their livestock, which in this case will occur from the next *Gu* season in April/May 2007, and will be accompanied by a surge in milk production. At this point there will be a clear sense of the recovery and confidence of the pastoral economy.

Livelihood gains to date thus need to be consolidated and sustained. Different interventions may support this – re-stocking, continued cash-for-work, employment generation, micro-credit, pastoral education, livestock health programmes – and should be quickly explored.

Pastoral debt dynamics are not well understood in Somalia. For example, how debt levels change between ‘normal’ and severe drought periods and therefore how the cash interventions may have affected structural debt compared to immediate drought induced debt is not clear and deserves further research.

Cash in southern Somalia

The use of cash for humanitarian interventions can clearly work in southern Somalia however this is still a new and sensitive area. Great caution is required in terms of replicating this type of work. It is not clear how sensitive the relative success of this intervention was to the factors mentioned above in Box 1 above. Different scales of cash interventions and implementing modalities may have different results.

Dahabshil in this case was a crucial partner yet is an unclear organisation in terms of its inner workings. Many lessons were learned in terms of this relationship. A close working relationship needs to be developed with organisations such as Dahabshil, particularly if they are undertaking the actual cash distribution, in order to manage the risks associated with working in Somalia. Furthermore, training at the start of such projects for the money transfer companies is needed to ensure clear understanding of the objectives and distribution plan of similar projects.

Both of these areas deserve further exploration if other agencies are to consider working with cash in similar ways to the Consortium or if larger-scale interventions are to be considered.

Some reflections and comparisons between food aid and cash have been made (see box 13, page 50 and section 10, page 57). This is another area for further research.

Partnerships with Somalia NGOs

Questions have rightly arisen for Oxfam over its choice of Kenyan NGOs. In practice this strategy has worked well and has been well justified to the evaluation team. In recognition of this issue Oxfam are already recommending credible Somali NGOs and therefore potential partners to be registered to the Oxfam contracting system. However, the greater exposure, experience and capacity of some Kenyan Somali NGOs does raise interesting issues for their potential role in supporting Somali NGOs. In Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba there is potential to explore these potential relationships further.

Acknowledgements

This evaluation involved inputs from a wide range of actors both in Somalia and in Kenya.

In Somalia communities were visited in Geriley, Afmadow town, Qoqani, Tabda, Del buyo, Hawina and Doble, where people patiently agreed to talk to us, sometimes at length and in to the evening.

The staff of all five agencies, Oxfam GB, Horn Relief, AFREC, WASDA and Development Concern, were fully co-operative and engaged with the process and content of the evaluation.

Time was also taken from a number of other agencies and individuals in Nairobi, including ASEP, Interpeace, OCHA, FSAU, FEWSNET, WFP and Dfid.

To all of them we owe our gratitude.

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Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre le Faim
COSIC	Council of Somali Islamic Courts
CfW	cash for work
Deyr	secondary rainy season
FSAU	Food Security Analysis Unit
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
GBP	Great Britain Pound sterling
Gu	main rainy season
ICBT	Inclusive Community-Based Targeting
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
OCHA	Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
WFP	World Food Programme
VRC	Village Relief Committee

1. Introduction

This evaluation was conducted in the final weeks of an eight month-emergency cash intervention in southern Somalia, following a region-wide drought. The project is unusual for two main reasons:

- 1) it follows an approach and methodology used thus far only in northern Somalia and one that emphasises working publicly, transparently and pro-actively with the local Somalia clan system
- 2) it is the first time that there has been an independent study, widely disseminated, on the means and impact of cash interventions in southern Somalia

The evaluation and therefore the report herein is unusually long in its background, leading up to the findings. This was felt necessary as the project is fairly complicated, particularly with five agencies involved, a working approach to be assessed as well as the cash relief, cash-for-work and micro-project components.

2. Background

2.1 Southern Somalia

Many areas of southern Somalia have been in a perpetual state of actual or near humanitarian crisis over the last fifteen years, since the collapse of the central government. An almost complete lack of basic social services and infrastructure is exacerbated periodically in different locations by the impact of drought, floods, market shocks, disease and conflict.

General comparative health and welfare indicators include the following:

Table 1¹²

Human Development Index		Human Poverty Index	
Somalia	0.299	Somalia	66.2%
Eritrea	0.446	Eritrea	41.8%
Ethiopia	0.359	Ethiopia	56.0%
Kenya	0.489	Kenya	37.8%

Competition for access to resources and political control amongst a variety of local actors usually makes it very difficult for agencies to gain access to certain population groups and ensure equitable distribution of resources. In the last one to two years access to southern Somalia has changed significantly, with the rise of Islamic groups and the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (COSIC). While the courts have improved security in many areas for the general Somali population, the threat from as yet uncontrolled Islamic militia has made non-ethnic Somali international presence more difficult. In theory this

¹² UNDP/World Bank Socio-Economic Survey for Somalia, 2002. Data for Somalia is very unreliable and the recent UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment often refers to 2001 and 2002 data.

has made the possibility of strong project supervision and monitoring more difficult, albeit given that emergency project monitoring is generally of a poor quality.

Humanitarian responses in southern Somalia, as in many similar contexts, is dominated by the provision of food aid. WFP, CARE and to a lesser extent ICRC are the major actors in this arena in Somalia. Food aid has become a significant resource over the years in the country and its positive impact as a resource transfer contrasts with the logistics costs, insecurity and targeting problematic associated with it. Food aid was the major humanitarian resource provided in the 2006 emergency.


As elsewhere in the humanitarian world, cash is being increasingly tested for its complementarity and/or substitution for food aid.

2.2 The 2006 Horn of Africa Crisis

2.2.1 A Regional Dimension

The crisis of direct concern to this evaluation was the south-western Somalia aspect of the regional drought-emergency that affected neighbouring Somali areas of southern Ethiopia and northeast Kenya (See Map 1) along with western southern Somalia. The manifestation of emergency conditions in southern Somalia was the direct result of the failure of the secondary *Deyr* rains of late 2005, although this had been building up after several poor seasons. The red coloured areas in the map highlight those facing a humanitarian emergency as defined by the FSAU.

Map 1. Regional Crisis. FSAU, 2006. ¹³




¹³ Somali Cross-border Food Security Situation Analysis: Post Deyr 2005/6 Projection, January 2006 through June 2006.

MAP 2. Post Deyr Situation Analysis. 2006.

**2.2.1 Southern Somalia
Dimension – Gedo and Juba Valley**

In southern Somalia the focus of the drought/crisis was in the western regions of Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba. See Map 2. The failure of the *Deyr* rains and resultant early warning signals were first raised in November 2005,

The humanitarian crisis highlighted in Map 2 in January/February 2006 was predicted to continue until at least June 2006 when the impact of the *Gu* rains would materialise.



The preliminary assessment results were presented through the SACB in early January and the final report was disseminated in February.

The main indicators of a humanitarian crisis by early 2006 included (FSAU, 2006):

- Failure of *Deyr* rains (several poor seasons)
- Most severe impact on pastoralists in general and cattle herders & the cattle-based economy in particular:
 - Very high reliance on livestock
 - 20-30% cattle deaths (Jan/Feb; up to 50% by June)
 - 60-70% decrease in cattle prices from normal levels
 - Dry cattle in poor condition – little benefit
 - Very high levels of cattle migration
- Collapse of credit system (credit based on livestock collateral)
 - Pastoralists work on a seasonal debt/credit basis, borrowing in the dry season and paying back after the rains when their animals have greater value.

Significantly, over \$230,000 was raised by Somali civic actors primarily in Mogadishu and the diaspora and distributed in various forms (water tankering and food commodities)


in affected areas of Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle. (Interpeace, 03/04/06).

- Scarcity of water with an estimated 50% of strategic boreholes not functioning

In the rural areas of Gedo and Lower Juba there are limited remittances, unlike elsewhere in Somalia.

Box 2. Nutrition Indicators . (FSAU, 2006)

There are a limited number of agencies in Lower and Middle Juba and some parts of Gedo. This chart indicates the malnutrition levels in some of the areas of concern. The question-mark for Gedo refers to the fact that Bardheere district, one of the project sites, was not specifically



considered as part of the analysis for the malnutrition figures. However, these figures and other indicative health information suggested a serious humanitarian situation in general in Gedo region and the Juba Valley, particularly from January to April/May 2006.

Box 3. Sustained Humanitarian Crises in Gedo & the Juba Valley

It is worth mentioning that while the above conditions were developing in Gedo and L Juba, two specific areas within the two regions have been highlighted as being in a sustained status of humanitarian emergency for several years. These are the northern triangle of Belet Hawa, Luuq and Dolo in Gedo and the riverine area of Lower and Middle Juba. Neither of these areas were targeted by the Consortium - the northern triangle is well covered by other humanitarian actors and the riverine area contains a discriminated against minority group and can be judged socially and structurally vulnerable and not specifically threatened by the drought in question.

2.3 Developments leading to the Cash Response

Of the consortium under evaluation Oxfam GB were the first to respond to the drought induced crisis, due largely to their historical and current presence in Wajir, Kenya. By January Oxfam GB and partners were conducting emergency water interventions in border areas of Kenya-Somalia from their main base in Wajir. In order to respond quickly the Somalia team at Oxfam GB used the recommendations of Oxfam GB Kenya to identify appropriate local partners from the Kenya side that could work on the Somalia side. The regional manager for Oxfam GB, himself an experienced and widely respected Kenyan Somali consulted across the Somali network to cross-check which partner

organisations could work effectively in Somalia – this included elders from Wajir and Garissa and the Somali diaspora in Nairobi.

Oxfam responded through their local partners, WASDA and Development Concern, in many of the areas of Gedo and Lower Juba that would later be areas for cash interventions. It should be noted that Development Concern at that time were a one-man team as the organisation had had a break in funding. Oxfam supported the expansion of Development Concern during the water interventions and continued this for the following cash interventions. WASDA in contrast was an established Kenyan NGO with funding from different sources and with different activities.

Box 4. Alternative Ways of Working

An important background to the intervention of Oxfam in Somalia is a concept note developed in 2004 outlining alternative ways to working in a highly insecure, politically complex and changeable environment, as a result of Oxfam’s withdrawal from Somalia¹⁴. The note argues that to avoid some of the common constraints of working in Somalia – high administrative costs, difficulty of planning in such a changeable context, the numerous levels of ‘gatekeepers’ including the national staff of agencies, the difficulty of reaching the most vulnerable due to the level of control exercised by the stronger clans – a more locally appropriate approach and way of working was required.

In addition, Horn Relief, have long been implementing an alternative way of working within the Somalia context, stressing transparency through public meetings, a focus on women and minorities and a pro-active engagement with the clan system.

In January/February following operational assessments Oxfam in partnership with WASDA and Development Concern were addressing water needs in the peak of the dry *Jilaal* season in areas of Gedo and L Juba of southern Somalia, as well as Wajir in Kenya. Water trucking and well and borehole rehabilitation were the main activities.

In conjunction with the water interventions Oxfam GB started to investigate the possibility of other interventions, cash responses being prominent. Other agencies were also looking at operational and response possibilities in recognition of the drought emergency at the time. Different agencies had different interests and programme possibilities in mind.

At this time Horn Relief and Mercy Corps had conducted their own assessment of needs and programme possibilities in Lower Juba and Gedo. Save the Children UK was also investigating the possibility of a response.

Oxfam GB and Horn Relief started to talk in February/March about other needs in the Gedo and Juba areas and about the possibility of cash-based interventions. Horn Relief and Oxfam GB had already been implementing cash interventions in northern Somalia.

¹⁴ Outline proposal: *Alternative approaches to working in conflict-prone areas, with specific reference to the south of Somalia*. Internal document. Oxfam, 2004.

The two agencies consulted extensively with the FSAU and FEWSNET, the two primary sources of food security related information on Somalia, to explore the suitability of conditions for a cash response.

While Mercy Corps and SC UK dropped out of the group, Oxfam GB and partners and Horn Relief in collaboration with AFREC, determined that a cash response was appropriate and began soliciting funds accordingly. After shrinking the proposed projects in response to limited funding options, the Consortium eventually obtained financing from SIDA, the Humanitarian Response Fund and most importantly, the Oxfam network (Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib, Canada and Australia) and began the projects in May.

3. Cash Interventions

3.1 Project Summary & Funding

Box 5. Project Objectives and Planned Outputs

Goal/purpose:

Contribute to improving the food security and livelihoods of drought-affected communities in South Somalia

Objectives:


Emergency cash based intervention to improve the purchasing power and livelihoods of 16,258 target households, and to develop infrastructure through micro-projects, in the drought affected communities of Lower Juba and Gedo region of South Somalia

Outputs:

- 1) 16,260 vulnerable households benefit from improved income from cash relief in Afmadow, Badera, El-wak and Badhade districts by June 2006
- 2) 8,903 vulnerable households benefit from improved income from cash for work projects that benefit the wider community in Afmadow, Badera, El-wak and Badhade districts by November 2006.
- 3) Oxfam GB/Horn Relief and local partners learning and experience of cash based programmes is improved and strengthened, as well as shared with others, in co-ordination with agencies working on similar interventions in South Somalia

Funding ultimately came from a number of different sources. As shown in Box 5. The total value of the cash projects was 2,617,246 GBP, equivalent to US\$4,834,053 at June 2006 prices. Notably, about half of the project funds came from Oxfam GB's own sources which include the public appeal in the UK at the time.

Box 6. Consortium Funding Sources



3.2 The Basic Consortium Structure and Approach

The consortium consisted of Oxfam as the primary recipient of funds, implementing through its two partner Kenyan NGOs, WASDA and Development Concern. In addition, Oxfam gave a grant of 759,000 GBP to Horn Relief. Horn Relief was the secondary recipients of funds, obtaining money from three sources in addition to Oxfam. Horn Relief also implemented directly as well as funded a Somali Local NGO called AFREC.

The agencies operated on the ground as indicated in the following diagrams.

Fig 1. Areas of Operation – Regional Overview

Oxfam operated out of Nairobi. Its implementing partners operated out of Wajir, Kenya, in two border district-areas of Gedo and one district-area of Afmadow in L Juba.

Horn Relief operated out of Nairobi and in Afmadow district, L Juba. AFREC operated in Badhade district, L Juba.

- Oxfam**
- WASDA (Afmadow)
- DevCon (Bardheere, border)
- Horn Relief**
- HR (Afmadow)
- AFREC (Badhade)





Fig 2. Areas of Operation

The map alongside shows more closely the operational areas in relation also to areas highlighted by the FSAU as being in a state of humanitarian crisis.



3.2.1 Brief Agency and Area profile:

Lower Juba

WASDA and Horn Relief operated in Afmadow district while AFREC was in Badhade district. Lower Juba in general is noted for having few agencies on the ground. It is distinct from the rest of Somalia in terms of its environmental resource base. It has higher rainfall than other parts of the country and has thick forest and bush-land in many areas. It is therefore one of the most suitable environments for cattle production although there are tsetse fly problems in some areas.

The region is also very complicated and heterogenous in terms of clans and clan dynamics. One of the results of this is the multiple actors – local administration, militia, elders – that represent themselves or the different clans and sub-clans making it a difficult environment to work in.

One of the largest livelihood groups in Lower and Middle Juba is the cattle pastoralists. The region has strong links to Kenya, in terms of clans and cattle marketing. Agro-pastoralists, riverine irrigated farmers and coastal groups are also found.

The lack of agencies means that health indicators and other agencies and means to cross-check FSAU analysis are limited.

Gedo

Only Development Concern was operating in Gedo, in the Kenya-Somalia border areas of Bardheere and El Wak districts. Gedo has long been recognised for its particularly difficult local political and security dynamics. The northern triangle of Dolo, Belet Hawa and Luuq is an area highlighted as being in a sustained humanitarian crisis with

consistently poor health indicators. Agency presence is relatively good in these areas but very poor in the border areas where Development Concern was working.

The natural environment in Gedo is completely different than further south in the Juba's. A harsh environment and water scarcity are dominant features and highly mobile camel and goat pastoralism is the prevailing rural livelihood basis, a complication for project implementation, discussed later in the report.

The remoteness of the project sites has meant that traditional leadership is fairly strong.

Consortium Partners and Implementing Agencies

Oxfam GB – well established international NGO with global experience in cash and long-standing presence in North East Kenya (Somali region)

WASDA – well established, Kenyan Somali NGO, with recognised strong internal systems. Previous work experience across the border in Somalia, where it has strong clan-based relations

Development Concern – built up by Oxfam for the purpose of the water and then cash interventions.

Horn Relief – established international NGO, registered in Kenya, the USA and UK, although effectively only implementing in Somalia. Strong experience of cash interventions in northern Somalia

AFREC – established Somali NGO with an office in Nairobi and working out of Kismayo in Lower Juba. Diaspora support with board level leadership. Partner to several international organisations working in Somalia. No previous experience of cash interventions.

Dahabshil

Although not part of the Consortium as such Dahabshil was a critical partner in the project. After discussion with two *hawala* in the area Dahabshil was the only company who was willing to conduct the work. This was partly based on the fact that Dahabshil had had a positive experience in similar projects in the north, and had also developed an exhaustive network for cash distribution in the region.

4. Scope and objectives of the evaluation

4.1 Rationale for the evaluation

The consortium cash interventions are novel in both the approach and the commodity utilised, in southern Somalia. The Horn Relief participatory and transparent approach (Inclusive Community-Based Targeting, explained further below) is being used in the more secure northern Somalia but had not prior to this work been used in the far more

insecure south. In addition while there have been some cash projects in the south, including by ACF, ICRC and CARE, there is little information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of these interventions. This is the first comprehensive, independent evaluation of such work in southern Somalia.

This is a real-time evaluation of a short, seven month emergency intervention, conducted close to the end of the project cycle.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation is contained in Annex I. An extract from the ToR is contained below:

Purpose

The main purpose of the evaluation is to enhance learning and support management at an organisational level, but particularly a country level, in improving the performance of humanitarian action.

Overall Objective

The evaluation should make particular reference to the timeliness, adequacy, effectiveness and co-ordination of the response. The evaluation should also provide an assessment of the effectiveness of resource mobilisation and make recommendations for improvement.

Specific Objectives

- To analyse the background of the response, looking at how the decision to intervene was made, whether or not the intervention was timely, whether or not the design of the intervention was appropriate to the context, whether or not the intervention was adequate compared to the needs and looking at the effectiveness of programme implementation.
- To analyse the effectiveness of resource mobilisation and co-ordination.
- To analyse both the positive and negative impact of the programme.
- To analyse the existing/current needs of the affected population and recommend future actions/strategies to protect and avoid further degradation of livelihoods, as well as, actions to help strengthen resilience of communities to similar future shocks.

5. Methodology for the Evaluation

The methodology involved a combination of over one hundred interviews by the evaluation team complemented by a quantitative post-distribution household monitoring and impact survey (247 household interviews) which the evaluation team had designed and guided but not implemented.

The methodology for the evaluation was complicated by the uncertain access to project areas during the one to two months prior to the start of the evaluation itself. Planning was based around two main scenarios, a) good access, essentially meaning that the international/s consultant could travel to the project areas, b) poor access, essentially meaning that the international consultant/s could not travel in to the country at all. In the build up to the evaluation it was decided that scenario b) was more likely and therefore to

recruit one international consultant and two Kenyan-Somali consultants who would be able to travel in to the country.

The team leader has extensive experience of working in Somalia in the field of food security and livelihoods analysis, and has an extensive network of contacts working on/in Somalia. The Kenyan Somali consultants, a man and a woman, are both experienced consultants, with a background in evaluations, pastoralism and conflict analysis.

Prior to the evaluation proper, and as part of the evaluation itself, the team leader and one of the consultants were asked to input in to the design, training and analysis of the second and final post-distribution monitoring (FPDM) survey. This input was requested due to challenges faced by the Consortium in the implementation of the first PDM. A link was made to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to help in the design of the FPDM due to the considerable learning work it has been doing related to cash interventions since the tsunami.

The FPDM survey was designed and conducted as a statistically valid (not representative) exercise with purposive site selection and random household identification. It consisted of a structured household questionnaire complemented by semi-structured focus group discussions. It was based on a previous PDM survey conducted by OCHA of the Horn Relief cash intervention in the north. The survey included a significant component of impact analysis and complemented the evaluation team's research questions.

The FPDM was conducted over about ten days, in each of the project areas, by eight senior staff of the implementing agencies, each working as pairs not in their own project areas (to avoid bias). 247 structured household interviews and approximately 50 focus group discussions were conducted, following a 2-day training in Nairobi.

The evaluation team worked together in the first week to review project documentation, develop checklists for different interviewee groups and finalise the timetable for the field work. The timetable had to be finalised just prior to fieldwork due to the uncertainty caused by security and weather factors.

Finally, fieldwork was conducted in the following areas:

- ***Afmadow district in L Juba***

Fortunately, as it turned out, access was best in this district which was also the largest of the three project areas in terms of resources and agency presence. Approximately 60% of the cash resources went into this district, through WASDA and Horn Relief. The consultant spent seven days Afmadow town, Qoqani, Tabda, Del buyo, Hawina and Doble town in this district conducting approximately sixty interviews.

- ***Geriley village, Gedo region***

Unfortunately heavy rains limited movement in the project area of Development Concern. Approximately ten interviews were conducted in this village. Several key

informants and actual beneficiaries of the project from neighbouring villages were also found and interviewed in Geriley (and Wajir).

- ***Badhade district, L Juba***

This implementing area of AFREC was not visited at all due to the rains and resultant difficulties in transport. The senior staff of AFREC including the two project managers based in the field were interviewed in Nairobi and were part of the Garissa workshop.

In Nairobi the team leader conducted a range of interviews with different information provision and operational agencies. In addition, a well respected international organisation with a well developed information network agreed to conduct some informal and discrete inquiries about the project approach and impact. It was agreed not to name the agency in this report.

Immediately following the fieldwork a two-day workshop was held with all of the key field based and Nairobi based staff of the five agencies, as a form of peer review and lesson learning exercise. A mixture of group work and individual agency discussions were conducted in order to cross-check evaluation findings to date.

FEWSNET, who specialise in market and climate information and analysis kindly contributed to the evaluation, focusing on the impact of the cash intervention on the market.

In total the evaluation team itself conducted over 100 interviews¹⁵, the majority in the field, including with many beneficiaries. These interviews were complemented by the Garissa workshop, the inputs of FEWSNET and some discrete monitoring.

Field interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with the following groups:

- Project staff
- Traders
- Dahabshil agents
- Village Relief Committees
- Elders / Local Administration
- The IUC
- Individual households

The schedule of the evaluation team and people met is contained in Annex II.

6. Programme Description

The Consortium

The programme was designed to be implemented in almost exactly the same way by each of the four implementing agencies.

¹⁵ These interviews are of course separate from the final post-distribution monitoring survey process.

The Cash

The first component was the one-off \$50 cash relief distribution. This was planned to be distributed to just over 16,260 households in total, across the project areas. A process of community mobilisation, described below, was undertaken to form Village Relief Committees and to identify beneficiaries. The \$50 was calculated with FSAU and FEWSNET in order to be able to buy a food basket.

Following the cash relief distribution, and based on impressions from the field about the needs and capacity and potential to switch from free distributions, the beneficiary numbers were reduced, to 8,903 households as part of switching to a cash-for-work programme. As well as reducing the beneficiary numbers micro-projects were identified. The cash-for-work component involved a payment of \$55 dollars to the bulk of the vulnerable but not labour poor households. This was based on a 22 day working month at \$2.50/day. A small number of supervisors were paid \$3/day. Meanwhile, a free cash allocation was provided to ten percent of the total allocations representing the most structurally vulnerable households – elderly, disabled, female headed households, others not able to work.

Brief Description of the Process

In order to identify beneficiaries the following steps were undertaken (see box below for an explanation of the Inclusive Community-Based Targeting approach):

Cash Relief

1. Settlements were identified where distributions would ultimately take place based on vulnerability data obtained from a rapid assessment as well as FSAU/FEWS vulnerability mapping
2. Public meetings were held in the various settlement sites explaining the project, including the resources available (allotments per village) and the need and criteria to form a Village Relief Committee and the criteria for cash beneficiaries
3. Communities would then nominate Village Relief Committees over the following days
4. These VRC's would then be presented back to the public for verification and changes made if objections were raised
5. The number of beneficiary slots per settlement would then be made public and the VRC's asked to identify individuals who would receive the cash
6. The beneficiary lists would then be compiled, made public and screened to see that beneficiaries were appropriate to the criteria and no objections made. As part of the public meetings and screening process the staff of the agencies were required to identify appropriate key informants and intervene if necessary, in order to make sure that the VRC's and beneficiary lists were compiled fairly.

Box 7. The Inclusive Community Based Targeting Methodology (ICBT)

This community-based targeting approach was initially developed by Horn Relief in 2003 to ensure proper targeting in the Oxfam Novib-funded Emergency Cash Relief Program (ECRP), designed to respond to the 2002-2003 drought in northeastern Somalia. An external evaluation conducted by OCHA of the program in question indicated that the ICBT resulted in 97% of the beneficiaries targeted being the most vulnerable in the community. The ICBT emphasizes transparency, empowerment, and community participation as key principles of effective targeting through:

- The preliminary identification of beneficiary selection criteria based on various vulnerability indicators such as assets ownership, household size, gender of the household head, membership in a minority clan, etc...
- The public election of a representative Village Relief Committee that assumes the responsibility of compiling a preliminary beneficiaries list based on the above mentioned criteria
- The vetting of the initial beneficiary list by national staff, CBOs, religious leaders, as well as key informants through random field visits and informal discussions
- The reading of the lists in public places to allow the community to participate in the vetting process
- The finalization of the registration list which in the case of cash-based interventions, is forwarded to the money transfer company responsible for disbursing the cash to beneficiaries

Revision of the list occurs throughout the process until it is finalized. It is mandatory that all staff, including senior management level staff, undergo a training on the ICBT methodology before implementing any cash project activities. This methodology has been utilised by Horn Relief in targeting for other non-cash based humanitarian programming – i.e. restocking of pack camels and currently in targeting for distribution of non-food items in response to the floods in Lower Juba.

Cash-for-Work

1. Shortly after the cash relief component was finalised the cash-for-work component was explained including the criteria for the micro-projects and for the beneficiaries who would conduct the work and receive the payment. Significantly less resources were available for this stage
2. Again the VRC's were required to identify micro-projects and these were then discussed and ranked with project staff according to the criteria and feasibility of the different projects identified.
3. The VRC's were then required to identify people/ work groups who would do the work

The criteria for the selection of the project to benefit from the CfW were:

- Contribution to drought mitigation
- Improve and/or protect food security/livelihoods

- The projects should be identified by local communities
- The micro-projects should be relevant to the needs of the local communities in terms of usage and
- The identified projects should be sustainable
- The projects should be environmental sustainable and use low cost technology

In both cases – the cash relief and the cash-for-work - the list of beneficiaries was passed to the Nairobi level of Oxfam and Horn Relief, as a payroll, who passed them on to Dahabshil in Nairobi. A money transfer was then made to Dahabshil (in Djibouti and Nairobi), who then transferred the cash to the different project sites for final distribution.

7. Findings

7.1 Rationale and Resource Mobilisation

7.1.1 High needs and poor coverage

The Consortium clearly focused on moving in to new areas of operation that were both highlighted as in a state of ‘humanitarian crisis’ by the FSAU and that were particularly inaccessible and under-covered by other agencies. This was slightly easier for Oxfam as it was implementing through its partner agencies across the border in Kenya.

For Horn Relief this was a deliberate and bold move in to a completely new operational area, in contrast to its operations in the north where it is much more familiar with, and in fact part of, the local social/clan dynamics¹⁶. A senior Somali expert interviewed for the evaluation commended Horn Relief for its cross-clan initiative in this respect. Through AFREC, Horn Relief was also able to quickly link up with a credible local partner, where there are few, and expand its area of operation.

Where food aid response tends to be the dominant response to emergencies in Africa, driven by available resources and capacity to intervene, emergency cash interventions are still relatively new and appear to demand a higher level of analysis than for food aid. In this respect Oxfam and Horn Relief had the advantage of the well established FSAU and FEWSNET on hand and worked closely with them to check the key project requirements, such as the supply of food in the market, the ability of traders to respond, appropriate monthly cash amounts and daily labour rates.

A focus on the cattle pastoral livelihood group also made sense as this was the group most affected by the crisis and who have the greatest overall impact on the wider economy. Inclusion of the camel pastoralists of the border area in Gedo, comprising about 22% of the cash resources distributed served to address a remote part of southern Somalia poorly served from within the country and seriously affected by the drought.

However, in terms of the actual severity of the crisis it is not clear to what extent lives would have been lost in the absence of the cash interventions. By May, the time of the first cash intervention, the Gu rains had already arrived as had food aid¹⁷. Asset loss was certainly very high, particularly for cattle, the main asset in Lower Juba. Migration was high and there were a wealth of other indicators indicating high levels of distress amongst the community. Health and nutrition indicators were very limited although do highlight that the situation was very serious and deteriorating in general in the two regions of concern (see Box 2).

¹⁶ Horn Relief had also responded to the tsunami by working with a similar cash programme in Bender Beyla.

¹⁷ Food aid is generally is not well targeted at the household level and arguably has as important an impact on the market, in terms of lowering prices, as it does on reaching the household level.

7.1.2 Timing and Commitments

However, in terms of timing both Oxfam and Horn Relief were relatively late in deciding on a cash intervention and getting proposals to donors. DfID, globally the major donor for cash-based interventions in emergencies was already discussing funding for emergency interventions with agencies such as WFP in late 2005. Proposals for the cash interventions were submitted in February/March. This may well have restricted the funds available for cash from them.

While Oxfam did respond to the drought through emergency water interventions, with its partners, in a timely manner, a level of delay was explained for the cash interventions as the areas targeted were essentially new areas of operation for Horn Relief and Oxfam, not planned for in advance, and that required some preparation due to the pioneering nature of the project.

The peak time of stress for pastoralists is at the end of the dry season and beginning of the wet season. Animal deaths and energy requirements are highest at this time. Cash relief distributions at this time would probably be most effective. Cash-for-work is thought to be most feasible after the rains when people are most settled. These timing issues need further exploration. The consortium attempted to address the late start to the intervention through the large one-off cash grants as its first activity.

Other potential donors for cash based interventions in southern Somalia are likely to have adopted a risk averse attitude, being unsure about the possibilities of success for an un-tested commodity in such an unpredictable security environment. Many donors are either reluctant or still exploring cash-based interventions in emergency contexts.

Perceptions of the quality of the Consortium members, particularly the use of largely Somali NGOs may have contributed to a reluctance to release funds.

7.1.3 Geographic and financial coverage

The initial plans and proposals for cash programming were significantly larger than actually distributed due to the limited funding available. This may have been a blessing in disguise given the un-tested aspect of the project in the areas of concern.

Given the lack of reliable population figures, up to date household economy baseline information¹⁸ or other economic data on the project areas it is difficult to ascertain how the cash interventions compare in scale to normal household and regional economic activities.

¹⁸ The only available household economy baseline information is at least five year's out of date and is not of the livelihood groups targeted by the projects, although they are in the same regions – the Dawa Pastoral in Gedo and Juba Agro-pastoral in Lower & Middle Juba. The poor (bottom 25-35% of the population) Dawa pastoralist then, was estimated to earn about \$450/year, and the middle group (40-50% of the population) an estimated \$1,250/yr. The middle (50-60% of the population) Juba agro-pastoral household then, was estimated to earn about \$636/yr.

In the time available the project did a good job in terms of coverage in the districts targeted.

7.2 Programme Design and the Consortium Approach

7.2.1 The Consortium

The consortium aspect of the programme design was highly appropriate. Prior to the formation of the final implementing consortium Oxfam GB and Horn Relief were encouraging other actors to join, partly in order to dilute potential cash distributions and avoid pull factors from areas not receiving support. Other agencies such as Mercy Corps and Save the Children UK, who were part of the initial operational assessments eventually dropped out and the final group of five remained.

The consortium built on the experience of the Horn Relief led cash consortium in the north. This was critical as Horn Relief had the experience of implementing cash programmes in Somalia. The consortium approach also allowed like minded agencies, particularly Oxfam GB and Horn Relief, to come together to direct and implement the same projects in essentially the same way among the four implementing partners, in a situation where many of the field-based staff had limited or no experience of southern Somalia, cash or the new approach being used.

One of the key illustrations of the positive coordination within the consortium was the initial three-day training in Afmadow, conducted in May just prior to the start of implementation. This training was led by Horn Relief, utilising its experience and served to get all of the implementing agencies 'on the same page' in terms of the practical means of project implementation, as well as the problems they would face. This was critical to the success of the project.

The consortium also met every six to seven weeks during project implementation. Although slightly less than the monthly meetings envisaged, these two to three day meetings, held as close to the field as possible, in Garissa, Kenya, were important forum for information sharing and learning between the agencies.

The different agencies involved in the Consortium may also have served as a self-checking monitoring mechanism to some extent – if there had been serious problems in implementation, particularly around corruption or poor targeting, it is likely that this information would have easily been picked up by other consortium members and transferred to the relevant managers. Agencies could not really veer far from the general implementation modalities.

Coordination within the consortium was particularly good at the overall project management level. Communication between the project manager of Oxfam and the executive director of Horn Relief was almost daily. Both of these managers also maintained regular contact with their respective colleagues in their partner/implementing agencies.

Oxfam GB, Horn Relief and to a lesser extent AFREC also linked up well with the different Nairobi level coordination meetings such as the OCHA facilitated Livelihoods Cluster meetings.

The consortium in fact worked on a strong peer level partnership basis, rather than within an overly formal or hierarchical structure. In contrast, the three theoretically weakest agencies – WASDA, Development Concern and AFREC – were all strong in voicing their opinions and were listened to by the lead agencies. For example all agencies fed in to the design of the monitoring and evaluation framework, the criteria for the cash-for-work as well as debated detailed implementation modalities.

Some examples of appropriate coordination include the negotiations, commission setting and Memorandum of Understanding established with Dahabshil. Attempts to link up road clearance cash-for-work micro-projects in neighbouring project areas were undertaken. WASDA and Development Concern were also able to, and did, meet regularly in their Wajir offices, in order to share information and ideas as the project progressed.

Amongst the weaker areas of the consortium relationship was the missed opportunities for sharing human resources. In particular, the Oxfam engineer in Nairobi was only used with the Oxfam partners, while a Horn Relief officer with skills in environmental impact assessment was only utilised by Horn Relief.

In addition, at the Nairobi level, the consortium lacked a key focal person or even focal group. The formation of a cross-agency monitoring group at the field level may well have been useful for joint monitoring visits to all of the project areas.

Given the remote-control nature of the projects more emphasis on alternative monitoring mechanisms within the consortium, and external to the consortium, would have been wise. Weaknesses in monitoring are discussed further below.

Although communication overall was relatively good, it tended to be too vertical within the two sub-groups, and less horizontal, particularly at the field level. For example, WASDA and Horn Relief, who were working in the same district did not have very much day-to-day contact, which would have been useful for security and other purposes. In addition, Horn Relief, as the implementing partner of AFREC, working in a neighbouring district, visited that area only once. This was certainly less than ideal and occurred as a result of three factors: an underestimation in the workload of the Horn Relief management staff; a security incident leading to an evacuation at the time of the planned first monitoring visit; difficult road access.

The delayed ID registration was a particular failure of the consortium approach. Training and demonstrations on how to use and implement ID registration should have been done in the first three-day training workshop in Afmadow.

7.2.2 The Oxfam GB cross-border / use of Kenyan NGO approach

The Oxfam GB cross-border approach worked well in enabling it to obtain access to under-covered, remote and insecure environments through its partner implementing organisations.

Both agencies were initially chosen by Oxfam GB to undertake the emergency water interventions in Gedo and Lower Juba. These proved extremely useful in establishing trust and credibility with the local communities prior to the cash interventions which came later and were not initially anticipated.

While questions have rightly been asked about the need or value of using non-Somali NGOs to access Gedo and Lower Juba, the fact is that in order to act quickly, and given the important, sensitive and pilot nature of the cash interventions, Oxfam had to link up with agencies it had had a previous relationship with (for contractual reasons) and that it could trust. Time and trust was of the essence.

The choice of WASDA was straightforward. WASDA has a good reputation, recognised internal systems and had worked across the border before. WASDA also has a long-term strategy to work on a cross-border basis.

The choice of Development Concern was more difficult and contentious although ultimately the evaluation team was satisfied that the choice was made for good reasons (see Box 7). However, Development Concern faced more operational problems than the other implementing agencies and in fact was built up from a one-person organisation (due to previous funding difficulties) by Oxfam. The Oxfam Regional Programme Manager, a widely respected and highly experienced Kenyan-Somali, used his extensive network and knowledge to assess all possible options for potential partners in Kenya and in Somalia.

Box 8. Factors considered in the choice of Oxfam partners:

- Recommendations from Oxfam Kenya
- Clan perceptions and divisions on Kenya and Somalia sides
- Previous contractual relationships and contracting status
- Credibility, reliability and competency of agency staff
- Ability to implement quickly

Once chosen Oxfam GB had the capacity to provide the necessary support to both agencies. In the event, WASDA required relatively less support as it was recognised to be a well managed organisation. Development Concern in contrast required more support to develop stronger systems and staffing. Oxfam GB provided an appropriate level of support to both agencies.

Oxfam was also able to provide regular monitoring of its implementing agencies through regular field visits of its experienced Kenyan Somali staff based in Nairobi.

The experience of WASDA and Development Concern raises many interesting issues for the cross-border approach. It is acknowledged for example, that Development Concern had the most difficult job due to the highly mobile nature of the camel pastoralists in their implementing areas and the very difficult local clan dynamics. The key management staff of Development Concern were also of a different clan than those of the project areas, in spite of widespread advertising. This is in contrast to the other agencies whose senior field staff were generally from at least the major clan family/grouping in the area.

In spite of these difficulties Development Concern were the only agency not to use armed guards to travel with and instead used elders for protection, building on previous peace-building work in the area. Development Concern also argued that not being of the same clan actually gave them some advantages in terms of resisting some of the pressures that inevitably come working in such environments. Elsewhere in this report it is highlighted that staff not part of local clan and political dynamics (but of the same major clan family) may be an advantage in project implementation. The experience of Development Concern suggests that this relative neutrality may be achieved in different ways and may also depend on the particular local project context.

The evaluation team did feel that establishing a small field office in one of the project areas would have benefited Development Concern as the lack of such facilities limited to some extent their contact with the community.

As a result of this project the Oxfam strategy is to encourage registration of credible Somali NGOs with its Oxfam Novib partner in order to facilitate the use of Somali NGO partners in the future.

7.3 Project management

7.3.1 Staffing

All of the implementing agencies used very similar project staffing structures for implementation.

Recruitment itself comprised a mixture of open and transparent processes, advertising widely including through the SACB network and in Nairobi, and individual head-hunting to known strong candidates. This appears to have worked well with the two key senior field positions of each of the four implementing agencies containing well qualified and strong staff members. All of the staff members in these positions have been educated, and had exposure, outside of Somalia, mostly in Kenya but also in Sudan and Uganda. Most of the staff members are not from the local area, although fall within the respective clan system, and therefore are less part of the established power dynamics of the last ten to fifteen years.

Box 9. Recruitment and Staffing in Somalia.

Recruitment and staffing are key to successful programming in any organisation and are particularly so in Somalia. Transparent, clan neutral and balanced recruitment sets a

positive example from the beginning of a project and should limit potential tension or conflict that may otherwise result.

The majority of agencies working in Somalia do not do this well with the result that their national staff can become the first gate-keepers they have to deal with and are a negative rather than positive source of local tension and perception.

There were some minor staffing problems at the Nairobi level. Due to the departure of the Nairobi level project manager for Horn Relief (to study in the USA), the Executive Director of Horn Relief had to take up a full-time role in the project. Although this did not affect performance in this case, due to the priority given to the project, on other occasions, with other demands, this may not have been possible.

There were also some initial difficulties with the Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator sent as a Humanitarian Support Personnel (HSP) from Oxford, for Oxfam. Although this appears to have been recognised in retrospect as a problematic appointment, with the Oxford office having sent a relatively inexperienced person to fill the post, this has not had serious implications for the project, and the staff member in question has in fact grown considerably in to the job in the latter stages of the project.

In addition to the food security and livelihoods coordinator Oxfam GB were able to provide strong support at the Nairobi level through the Regional Manager, an Accountant, and an Engineer, the latter of whom was an experienced Oxfam Kenyan Somali staff member who visited the two implementing partners in Somalia monthly.

Horn Relief, in addition to the coordination and management role of the Program Officer and later by the Executive Director at Nairobi level, employed two senior managers, one an engineer and the other a highly qualified program manager who were based permanently in Afmadow. Both were Somali Kenyans but with combined international experience of over 20 years.

7.3.2 Transport & communications

No serious concerns have been noted in terms of transport and communication equipment for the consortium. It is assumed that previously mentioned lack of field-level communication is more a reflection of lack of agreed mechanisms than the equipment itself. However, AFREC did mention that communication was difficult in their area, particularly for e-mails and getting reports to Nairobi in good time. AFREC eventually received a V-Sat system from Horn Relief in the Badhade office, which improved communication.

7.3.3 Budgets

Budget levels have generally been fine across the consortium to achieve its objectives although these have not been investigated in details.

Appropriate contractual agreements and MoU's have been used across the consortium.

Financial management and accountability was not investigated by the evaluation team. OCHA and SIDA are due to conduct an audit of Oxfam GB and Horn Relief as part of its funding contributions.

The final accepted proposals were very much scaled down from the original and from the overall view the budget was adequate to implement the proposed activities. The areas where the budget was not adequate included the allocations of transportation and provision of water to workers when undertaking CfW activities in places far from the settlements. The result was that for example, in areas where WASDA was operational CfW beneficiaries had to use US\$5 each month to cater for their transport, food and water and thereby significantly reducing their earnings.

7.3.4 Security

Security management is critical under any circumstances in Somalia. The remote nature of the operation created some complications in security management as the basis on which the project was implemented was that international staff would not necessarily need to travel to Somalia. This means that the implementing partners are not used to making assessments on the risks to international staff of travelling to the field if/when necessary. It is therefore critical that different levels of security assessment are conducted, from national level to field specific level. Security assessments have been complicated in the last year by the rise of the Council of Somali Islamic Courts, adding a new dimension to security analysis.

Oxfam GB did mobilise an HSP Security Officer to conduct a security assessment just prior to the evaluation and to accompany the evaluation team to the field if necessary.

Overall the evaluation team judged that security was managed effectively.

However, in the planning phase of the evaluation the international team leader felt that not enough information was provided by the Oxfam and Horn Relief project managers, which resulted in some confusion and misunderstanding around the conditions under which Oxfam would have allowed the team leader to travel to the field.

The evaluation noted that Development Concern did not use armed guards in Gedo and instead travelled with elders who were their guarantee of security. The three other agencies implementing in Lower Juba felt that the context was different in their areas with a much high number of, and potential threat from local militias.

7.3.5 Monitoring and Reporting

Formal systems of monitoring did exist within the Consortium. A monthly sitrep format as well as monthly financial monitoring reports were provided and implemented. In addition, a comprehensive monitoring framework was developed for the project. A baseline survey and two post-distribution monitoring surveys were implemented.

However, the reporting of the different consortium members lacked a certain level of detail and seemed too often to be cutting and pasting from previous reports. Much more qualitative and quantitative information could have been captured.

The monitoring officers of Development Concern and WASDA were ultimately more involved in project implementation than in monitoring due to work demands. However, Oxfam was able to send an experienced Kenyan Somali staff member to the field on a monthly basis for technical support visits and monitoring.

Horn Relief was only able to undertake one monitoring visit to its implementing partner AFREC, due to work demands of the project managers and difficult road conditions, which is less than a minimally acceptable level. Horn Relief and AFREC did not have monitoring officers appointed to the project. As Horn Relief had employed experienced technical staff and based them in Afmadow, it did not feel it required a technical person to monitor activities. However, due to work demands and later road conditions, these staff persons were not able to undertake more monitoring visits to AFREC areas.

The monitoring framework was not implemented and in retrospect has been recognised by some in the Consortium to be too comprehensive and ambitious. The quality of the baseline survey and first post-distribution monitoring survey had weaknesses in terms of the quality of information contained and the ability therefore to comment on project impact. More attention needs to be paid to the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative information. Over reliance on proportional piling methods and leading questions is problematic. Developing individual household case studies over the course of the project would have been potentially very interesting and useful to deepen the understanding of debt dynamics, the use of the cash and other areas.

Given the importance of the intervention, its pilot nature, the lack of information on the area, the high level of risk of failure, and the known Somali characteristic – oral strength in contrast to written weakness – alternative methods of monitoring and reporting could have been developed.

8. Implementation

By way of an introduction to the difficulties and issues of working in Somalia and trying to target the poor the following description is given:

Managing local power and clan dynamics

It is worth stressing that the successful management of often very complicated and tense local dynamics is critical to any agencies success in Somalia. It is only a minority of institutions (UN & NGOs) that do manage this process well. Actors & gate-keepers that agencies must deal with include the various clan-based representatives, local militia youth, local NGOs, *de facto* administrative leaders and elders. International organizations may well negatively play in to these dynamics if they or their staff become associated with or are biased to particular clans in the area. It is not uncommon when working in Somalia to hear stories about an agency becoming dominated by one clan or one individual. The resources of that agency,

whether in the form of further recruitment or project sites, may then be directed according to clan interests. This ultimately may fuel tension or conflict in an area.

The distribution of resources within the clan system is done on the basis of relative population size within the various clan families, as opposed to a pro-poor or vulnerability criteria. However, kinship networks are such that wealthier families within clan systems will automatically assist poorer members in difficult times. *Qaraan* is a kinship based system of support in difficult times. However, minority clans who traditionally ally themselves to major clans in an area, for protection, may well be discriminated against in the redistribution of resources that come in to the clan area.

The projects were trying to influence the clan system to distribute resources to the poorest members of the different strands of the clan system.

An example of the complexities of the clan distribution system is noted in Qoogani where a figure of fifty beneficiaries was allocated to the Aden Kheir section of the Rer-Abdille sub-sub clan who are part of the Mohamed Zubeyr sub-clan of the Ogaden. The Aden Kheir is further sub-divided in its Rer Ali, Rer Umar, Rer Samatar and Rer Ahmed sub-sections. The Rer Ali which was given twelve allocations then further divided these in to six slots for each of the Rer Said and Rer Aw Hassan families.

Individual Household Case Study 1

Mr Ali of Tabta village has a family of 6 children, his wife, his mother and a brother who all live with him. In the last 6 months the family have been joined by his uncle, father-in-law and one other relative after they lost their animals in the last drought. The household is therefore 13 strong.

Mr Ali earns his living using a donkey cart after he lost his animals in the recent drought. He remains with 5 cattle and 10 goats, which is not enough to sustain his family. He has left his animals with relatives while he settled in the periphery of town looking for alternative ways to cater for the family's upkeep.

His wife and mother have been registered as beneficiaries through the individual settlement allocations and not the clan allocations as they were deemed to have enough.

Both beneficiaries in the family pay 5 US dollars each to cater for the transport and water required to undertake the work activities. The family has been able to purchase 3 goats at 560,000 since the project started and also receives So. Sh. 10,000/per day from the donkey cart.

There is increased consumption of rice and pasta compared to previously and the family eats more regularly than before the drought. The family is also able to afford more clothes.

The family have repaid half of the 2m debt they had. Mr. Ali family has also received food aid from NGOs and WFP which has supplemented the income from the cash for work program.

This family was appropriately targeted by the project, given the number of animals and household size. However, given the two allocations and other assistance provided the family have been able to significantly reduce their debt and purchase some minor assets.

8.1 Transparency

One of the underlying principles of the consortium approach has been the stress on public meetings, open-ness and transparency. In this respect the resounding findings, representing many sources, are that all of the implementing agencies followed this principle. Community members themselves reported to the evaluation team that they were surprised and unfamiliar with this approach. Closed door meetings with elders or administrative leaders are the norm in Somalia with the public therefore often unsure of the nature of a project and their entitlements.

As part of the ICBT methodology, through the public meetings project staff were required to vet and screen both Village Relief Committees and the beneficiary lists for the cash interventions. This entails a more rigorous intervention by project staff than traditional community based targeting mechanisms. To enable the project staff to check that the public meetings and transparent approach were resulting in the selection of worthy VRC members and appropriate beneficiaries, further networking and investigations had to be carried out. This is necessary as it is not usually acceptable within the clan norms for one sub-clan or family to comment on the beneficiaries chosen by another sub-clan or family. This limits to some extent the benefits of a transparent approach and puts the onus on the project staff to also understand how resources have been distributed and to influence this process if necessary. The evaluation team finds that, within certain limits largely a function of time, these efforts were certainly carried out.

These practices in themselves are a notable achievement of the project and may be replicable in other types of projects. They demonstrate the successful transfer of a methodology developed by Horn Relief for cash interventions in northern Somalia to the more fragile south, and that are both context specific & appropriate.

Box 10. Example of Positive Clan Interventions

The Rer Osman sub-clan of the Mohamed Zubeir clan got 40 cash relief allocations though only had 28-30 households qualifying to be registered according to the project criteria. The Rer Hirsi sub-clan on the other hand as one of the larger sub-clans in terms of population were more needy and required more cash allocations. The local leadership tried to request the Rer Osman to give up some of their extra slots and they refused. A couple of days before actual payment some of the elders mentioned this to the WASDA team and they went to the Rer Osman and requested that they give them their extra slots as others were more needy. This was ultimately agreed and 8 of the Rer Osman allocations were transferred to the Rer Hirsi.

8.2 Targeting ... Cash for Work

However much open-ness and transparency are pursued as the basis of an intervention this is no guarantee of success, where success in this case would be determined by a reasonable level of targeting to poor pastoralists and minorities in the project areas.

The evaluation team findings were complemented by the second post-distribution monitoring & impact assessment. The FPDM survey refers only to the cash-for-work component of the project, not to the one-off cash relief distribution made in June.

Table 1 highlights that in Lower Juba of all of the randomly selected beneficiaries 64% were categorized as drop out/destitute and 16% as pastoralists currently. For Gedo, there is a much smaller proportion as drop out/destitute, at 30% but with 52% as pastoralists.

Table 1. Current Livelihood / Status

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i> ¹⁹	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i> ²⁰
Pastoralist	27	16%	40	52%
Farmer	3	2	1	1
Agro-pastoralist	11	7	2	3
Urban	17	10	11	14
Drop out (destitute)	107	64	23	30
Hunter	2	1	0	-

Table 2 highlights that 60% and 67% for L Juba and Gedo respectively of beneficiaries identified their primary source of income as livestock and livestock products before the recent drought²¹.

Table 2. Most important source of income before recent drought

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Selling livestock / products	98	60	50	67
Farming / agriculture	3	2	9	12
Business	9	5	6	8
Wage labour	18	11	7	9
Remittances	6	4	-	-
Bush products	28	17	3	4

¹⁹ Frequency refers to the number of respondents ticking the respective category.

²⁰ Percentages have been rounded up or down and so may not reach exactly 100%

²¹ Hunters and gatherers, who are primarily minority groups and also affected by the drought, were added to the targeting criteria upon the start of the project implementation itself.

<i>/ wild foods</i>				
<i>Other</i>	2	1		

Analysing Table 1 and 2, with the evaluation teams' own findings suggests the following:

1. The majority of beneficiaries were pastoralists before the project started
2. In Lower Juba, the current status of the majority of respondents is drop out or destitute, suggesting that many of the previously livestock dependent households are now benefiting from the project after having lost some or all of their animals
3. In Gedo, a smaller proportion of people have become drop outs, probably due to the fact that this is a camel area and camel deaths were much lower than cattle
4. It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the majority of those classified as 'currently pastoralist' are from the poorer echelons of the group as required in the targeting criteria

While the evaluation team considers these results to be very positive by Somalia and other relevant standards, there are several layers of complication that are explained further below.

Individual Household Case Study 2

The family of Mrs Halima consists of 9 children and 4 other relatives who stay with the family. Before the recent drought the family had 30 cattle and 10 goats. Now they remain with 2 heads of cattle and a donkey cart.

The family has shifted to town to look for an alternative income after the loss of their animals. The mother had been collecting firewood and building poles to sell in town before the project started. She was registered as a cash relief beneficiary at the onset of the program as a member of her Shirshora sub-clan within the Mohamed Zubeir clan. She was later also registered as a cash-for-work beneficiary.

She has no problems about the payment which she receives from the Dahabshil agent in Dobley. The main work she was involved in was improved sanitation in Dobley town.

When she first received the \$50 she bought a 90 kg bag of sorghum. She used the rest of the money to clothe the family – in the rural areas clothing is not important for the young children but in town she is forced to conform to the norms there. The first payment of \$55 was spent on funeral expenses after the death of her husband. The next payment was used for the family upkeep and the last payment was used to clothe the family for the Idd holiday as well as for household needs. There is more consumption of rice, wheat and pasta than previously.

If the program was not there the family would have thought of going to the refugee camps in Dadaab. The family had a debt of So. Sh 3.9 million up to the drought and has now re-paid half of that with the earnings from the programme and the sale of one cow.

In Lower Juba it is notable that 28% of respondents said that their main source of income before the project was wage labour and/or bush products, typically activities of the

general poor and not necessarily the pastoral poor. This suggests a certain urban or settlement bias that the evaluation team had also been pondering. Discussing this with the project staff revealed that it was difficult to separate the recent pastoral drop outs – those who had lost their animals in the drought – from the long-term poor and destitute who have come to survive on wage labour and/or bush products over several years. Once a family's herd size decreases to a level it can no longer survive on (or if they are completely lost) the family will give their remaining animals to family members who have more animals and move to the nearest urban settlement because 'nobody dies in town'. In town people may find work, be able to collect and sell firewood or construction materials and may benefit from kinship support or even external interventions. In Gedo this proportion, 13%, was much smaller as the project sites are small remote pastoral villages and settlements.

This structurally poor population group were certainly not part of the original targeting criteria and therefore were the single largest mis-targeted group by the project. However, they are a poor group, as categorized by their activities, who were significantly but indirectly affected by the drought due to the resultant contraction of the wider economy. In practice, it is difficult for communities on the ground to accept this distinction and target one group and not the other.

The evaluation team also found other cases of problematic targeting. For example, in a Horn Relief project site, a policeman (with 50 heads of cattle) and a nurse who did not qualify as a beneficiary under the criteria were both nominated by the people as they worked voluntarily and were thus considered worthy.

Box 11. Example of actual beneficiary identification process in Gerilley, Gedo

- Number of beneficiaries required are given to the VRC
- Criteria of persons to be selected as beneficiaries provided to VRC
- Criteria of micro projects were given, identified and ranked
- The VRC then divides the number given among the clans present (e.g. Talxa and Urmidig as main Marehan sub clans in Gerilley using as population as a guide)
- Each clan sits using the criteria provided to select beneficiaries
- Smaller sub-clans and minority clans are usually protected or fall under the larger clan and would be considered in that clan
- The list was then given to Development Concern who then put a number of people against a project
- A supervisor was placed for every 35 CFW beneficiaries
- Tasks and micro projects would also be distributed or shared in the same way

There were some cases of very vulnerable households who were entitled to the cash relief component within the cash-for-work but due to the limited allocation (10%) other clan members agreed to work for them.

In Gerilley, Gedo, after the first cash relief distribution the second cash allocation which targeted a smaller number of beneficiaries was described as much more difficult. This was because in addition to the reduced resources, people now saw that the project was

real and cash was available, whereas they had not been convinced originally. Also more pastoralists were returning to the area and wanted to be registered. This change and the inevitable resulting pressures were well-managed through the intervention of the Village Relief Committees.

Individual Household Case Study 3

Sheikh Abdi, a beneficiary in Tabta, and a local religious leader, has a household of 12 to look after, 3 of whom joined after losing their animals in the recent drought. Although the sheikh lost over 70 of his cattle he still remains with 30 plus some goats.

Sheikh Abdi did not benefit from the first cash relief component but has been registered as a cash-for-work beneficiary, in spite of exceeding the 10 cattle upper limit set in the project criteria. He does not do the labour as his fellow beneficiaries have agreed to excuse him and do it on his behalf. Sheikh Abdi's son is registered as a beneficiary for the cash for work. The son got the share from the slots allocated to his clan.

He has never experienced any problem in obtaining his money from the Dahabshil agent from Doblely who gives him his cash and a receipt. Like all the other beneficiaries in Tabta Sheikh Abdi has to pay \$5 out of the \$55 to cover the cost of transportation and water when the work gangs go to work in areas which are far away from Tabta.

The cash programme has allowed him to retain his livestock and keep his credit line open. Most of the money is spent on food, clothing and debt repayment. The family's diet used to consist of maize and sorghum but it has changed to taking wheat products, rice and pasta more regularly. He has also benefited from food aid - wheat, rice and vegetable oil from an NGO and from WFP.

This is an example of a poorly targeted household given the number of cattle owned. However, project staff argued that many people were relying on the sheikh – there were in fact four households in his compound – and that his cows were not productive.

8.3 Targeting ... Cash Relief

The initial June cash relief distribution to 16,158 households turned out to be a fairly blanket coverage due to the relatively large amount of resources/allocations. Further investigation would be required to work out the implications of this for population estimates, and whether perhaps resources were too concentrated in limited locations. However, the first cash relief distribution was fairly quickly implemented, with only about two weeks preparation period and with a high reliance on the clan system.

An elder on the VRC of Gerilley claimed that "...the first cash relief was easier to manage as people did not believe anyone would give cash as relief".

Due to the high level of migration at the time it is likely that some pastoral household would have been missed, although in theory, the clan system should work to identify them.

Box 12. Targeting Minorities

In Afmadow where Horn Relief was working the staff realised that a minority group called *Ribi* was left out of the registration for the initial cash relief program although they had an alliance and were affiliated to one of the Mohamed Zubeir sub-clan in the area. On discovering this the staff were able to add them to the register and organise payment for them themselves.

Individual Household Case Study 4

Nur has 10 members in his household in Qogani, Afmadow district. His main economic activity has been depending on the collection and sale of firewood, building poles and manual labour in the settlement.

Nur is a member of the Boni community who are hunters and gathers and considered a minority group in the area. They are incorporated in to the Rer Amadin sub-clan of the Mohamed Zubeyr clan within the larger Ogaden clan family under a *shegat* protective relationship.

Nur was registered as a beneficiary specifically as a result of being a minority as opposed to through the clan re-distribution system. The family did not benefit from the initial cash relief allocations as it was based on the clan distribution system.

The family has been able to access credit more easily where previously their status meant access was minimal and on strict repayment terms. The family has reduced its normal work activities and mainly relies on the income from the project. The family has also benefited from WFP assistance.

In reality pro-active advocacy within the clan system is a function of various factors including the strength and interests of local leadership in the area, the motivation and credibility of agencies on the ground, the presence of local militia as well as other factors.

For the organisations' staff to intervene to influence the registration and redistribution of resources according to project aims, using the clan system, the individual and collective clan leadership needed to be reliable and strong. In some places this would not have been the case and it would have been difficult to work within and influence the distribution of resources. This is an area that deserves further research to look in more depth at the actual practice and conditions under which this can be done, given the relative success amongst this consortium.

8.4 Photo ID Registration

The aim of the Consortium was to have all beneficiaries provided with photo-based identification cards. This did not happen for the first cash relief distribution due mainly to the very short preparation time for this first distribution.

The utilisation of the ID’s for the cash-for-work phase was also slow and problematic with mixed performances between the different agencies. The main cause of this slow implementation was the lack of training and demonstration in this subject during the three day preparation workshop in Afmadow in May. This process also takes some time which was problematic given the short timeframe for this emergency intervention.

Development Concern mentioned that using the ID system gave them a good opportunity to probe in to clan dynamics and resource sharing processes and therefore they would have benefited from having started it earlier. This may not be as relevant to the other areas as the context in Gedo was very different than for the other agencies.

The weaknesses in the use of the ID system are not considered to have been significant for disturbing the targeting process on this occasion, mainly because there were many other factors and pressures on the communities and agencies that led them to perform well on this occasion. These are mentioned elsewhere but include: a) the fact that it was a very new intervention, therefore ways to ‘beat the system’ were not known or practiced, b) the leadership, ability and credibility of the agencies and their senior staff on the ground was good limiting the motivation and potential to abuse the process, c) the registration and distribution mechanisms were divided between three different sets of actors – the Village Relief Committees, the project staff and Dahabshil – which made it more complicated to abuse the process.

8.5 Cash handling and Disbursement – Role of Dahabshil

The role of Dahabshil has been critical to the success of the cash interventions. As per the contractual arrangement Dahabshil took on all of the financial risks and logistical tasks in order to complete the distributions. To do this they were paid a commission of 7.5% of the overall monetary value of the transfer. This compares to the usual 2-3% charged to transfer money from point to point.

Dahabshil has been used previously by Horn Relief to physically distribute cash into the beneficiaries hands in other projects in northern Somalia and by Oxfam GB also in northern Somalia.

As the tables below illustrate this handing over of cash aspect of the project went very well with the vast majority of people – generally 90% or more – receiving a) the full amount of the money allocated, b) in the timeframe explained to them, c) in a convenient location.

Table 3. Did you understand clearly the timing of payments?

	<i>Lower Juba</i>		<i>Gedo (information not available)</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<i>Yes</i>	165	99		
<i>No</i>	1	1		

Table 4. Were you paid according to the timeframe explained by the project?

	Lower Juba		Gedo (information not available)	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Yes, all the time	157	94		
Half the time	6	4		
Rarely	5	3		

Table 5. Distance travelled to collect the cash?

	Lower Juba		Gedo (information not available)	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Within village / easy to work	150	89		
Within village / far to work	13	8		
Outside village / far to walk	4	2		

Table 6. When did you exchange the cash?

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Same day / next day	149	94	72	95
Some days later	9	6	4	5

Table 7. Where did you exchange the cash?

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Within village / easy to walk	137	91	59	94
Within village / far to walk	5	3	2	3
Outside village / far to walk	8	5	2	3

In general the work of Dahabshil was good, although there were some teething problems as well as continuing difficulties in the more remote Horn Relief operational areas. Issues raised by the Consortium and that were addressed by Dahabshil included:

- The need to deliver the cash in all locations within a narrower window
 - Dahabshil arranged distributions from four offices – Kismayo, Afmadow, Garissa and Wajir to improve efficiency
- A lack of communication and coordination between the various Dahabshil offices

- Field offices were not always informed of information received at the Nairobi level
- A preference to use large dollar denominations (\$50s) rather than smaller ones
- Individual payments (not \$100 shared between two beneficiaries)
- Receipts in triplicate as opposed to duplicate, in Somali and in English
- Simultaneous payments at multiple sites to improve efficiency, security and avoid people travelling between sites to try and claim false payments
- For Dahabshil to have sufficient transport and communication equipment so that it need not rely on project equipment
- To avoid delays by Dahabshil assistant staff who get paid on a daily per diem basis
- To have sufficient security in case of any potential crowd trouble

When visited by the evaluation team, Dahabshil in Nairobi appeared satisfied with the arrangements claiming both a profit and social motive, and were willing to continue working in this way.

The consortium had discussed involving Dahabshil in the preparatory training in Afmadow in May. This did not happen on this occasion but would be useful to try on another occasion.

* Since the main evaluation period Horn Relief has found it difficult to resolve some of the ongoing coordination difficulties with Dahabshil in their more remote, insecure and logistically complicated working contexts. The internal structure and systems of Dahabshil are unclear and the means of operation and influence from central levels appear to be different in different field locations. This experience now suggests that careful, context specific, planning and coordination is required with *hawala*, such as Dahabshil, where they are contracted to do more than their usual money transfer business.

Individual Household Case Study 5

Abdi Omar has a family of 4 children, his wife and 2 relatives who stay with the family. He suffered a stroke due to high blood pressure and has been bed ridden for 9 years. He remained with only 5 cattle after the drought. He was registered due to his vulnerability and the status of his health. The project brought him hope as he was disabled and was not able to cater for the needs of his family.

With the all inclusive cash relief cash disbursement of \$50 he paid his debts to local traders in town. The other payments have all gone into the family upkeep including food, clothing and other household priorities. If the program was not there he would have sold the remaining animals and would also have relied on his relatives for upkeep of the family.

Before the start of the project he had sold 7 animals to cater for the family needs. He had credit of So. Sh 640,000/- which was paid after receiving the first payment of 50 US

dollars. Mr. Abdirashid's family has also benefited from the food aid given by WFP and has received maize, vegetable oil, lintels and unimix which has supplemented the income from the program.

Mr Abdi Omar claimed a disruption in the first distribution of the food aid as the food was looted by the militia and the residents did not receive the food aid.

8.6 Cash, Security and 'Taxation'

One of the perceptions about cash was that it would be a very dangerous commodity to deal with and if not directly attacked when being transported would be subject to 'taxation' after being received by people.

While there have been several incidents that have affected the projects none have been directly caused by the project or as a result of being cash related.

No element of taxation, looting or corruption was picked up in FPDM survey of by the evaluation team.

Box 13. Perceptions of food aid and cash

It is interesting to contrast the very different modalities and perceptions surrounding food aid and cash aid. Food aid in Somalia is notable for its very bulky, visible presence and is often associated with an increase in tension as it is carried and delivered by highly armed transporter-contractors. It is also perceived as a free resource in to an area with often no clear acknowledgement or recognition of who it is supposed to be for. As such it may and does attract the attention of for example, local militia.

Although the scale is far smaller, cash is largely invisible and distributed by a respected, local organisation. The allocation of the resource is done prior to the resource being delivered, using the clan system and a highly pro-active field-based targeting methodology, ultimately that names individual beneficiary households.

Cash may also benefit, up to now, from its relatively new status in Somalia, whereas food aid has become part of the local war economy over the last fifteen years.

However, food aid also has positive perceptions as people comment on its wider impact, in particular by lowering food prices in the market and for being available to everyone.

This is not to say that one form is better than the other. In fact section 9 suggests that the two forms were in fact complementary and the conclusions of this evaluation also urge caution in terms of the potential scaling up or replication of the cash interventions.

Further research in to the comparative costs, benefits and risks as well as the complementarity of the two commodities would be of benefit.

8.7 Review and assessment of the quality of monitoring

Formal systems of monitoring did exist within the Consortium. A monthly sitrep format as well as monthly financial monitoring reports were provided and implemented. In addition, a comprehensive monitoring framework was developed for the project. A baseline survey and two post-distribution monitoring surveys were implemented.

Basic project reporting and monitoring was implemented. However, the reporting of the different consortium members lacked a certain level of detail and seemed too often to be cutting and pasting from previous reports. Much more qualitative and quantitative information could have been captured.

The monitoring officers of Development Concern and WASDA were ultimately more involved in project implementation than in monitoring due to work demands. However, Oxfam was able to send an experienced Kenyan Somali staff member to the field on a monthly basis for technical support visits and monitoring. Oxfam GB also sent the regional programme manager to randomly selected sites for project monitoring of WASDA and Development Concern in September.

Horn Relief was only able to undertake one monitoring visit to its implementing partner AFREC. This was explained by three factors: an underestimation in the workload of the Horn Relief senior project management team; a security incident leading to an evacuation at the planned first project monitoring period; difficult accessibility at times due to poor roads. Horn Relief and AFREC did not have monitoring officers.

The monitoring framework was not implemented and in retrospect has been recognised by some in the Consortium to be too comprehensive and ambitious. The quality of the baseline survey and first post-distribution monitoring survey had weaknesses in terms of the quality of information contained and the ability therefore to comment on project impact. More attention needs to be paid to the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative information. Over reliance on proportional piling methods and leading questions is problematic. Developing individual household case studies over the course of the project would have been very interesting and useful.

Given the importance of the intervention, its pilot nature, the lack of information on the area, the high level of risk of failure, and the known Somali characteristic – oral strength in contrast to written weakness – alternative methods of monitoring and reporting should have been developed. Some possibilities include the formation and use of a cross-consortium monitoring group or contracting independent consultants to make monitoring visits.

9. Impact Analysis

9.1 Household level impact

The impact of the cash distributions at the household level is most dramatically illustrated by the opening of credit and trade that the cash appears to have fostered. The pastoral economy works on a credit basis whereby items are taken on credit in the dry season and repaid after the rains. The credit system has a strong social dimension where there is an obligation by the trader to keep credit lines open, particularly to the strong clan-families where kinship relations can be drawn upon to collect debt.

Tables 8, 9 and 10 and the evaluation team findings clearly highlight the overwhelming role that the cash intervention played in re-opening the credit system. Upon receiving their cash dollars people immediately deposited them with their local trader, partly for safekeeping, agreeing the exchange rate at the time, and partly to enable them to immediately take food items from the shop.

Table 8. Who do you owe debt to?

	L Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Local trader	148	99	72	92
Family	1	1	1	1
Other	1	1		

Table 9. During the Project who did you give money to?

	L Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Creditors	130	90	64	85
Clan	4	3		
Family	10	7	10	13

Table 10. What did you spend the money on?²²

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Food	23	14	60	77
Gifts	5	3	1	1
Non food /HH essentials	3	2	17	22
Fuel	2	1	1	1
Debt repayment	130	77	75	96
Qaat	2	1	3	4
Transport	0	-	0	-

²² Percentages in this table do not add up to 100% as respondents could tick as many of the relevant boxes as they deemed relevant.

<i>Education</i>	3	2	7	9
<i>Livestock health</i>	2	1	4	5
<i>Human health</i>	8	5	6	8
<i>Water human</i>	5	3	16	21
<i>Water livestock</i>	3	2	1	1
<i>Clothes</i>	23	14	24	31
<i>Purchase of livestock</i>	2	1	1	1
<i>Savings</i>	0	-	1	1
<i>Others</i>	4	2	0	0
<i>Cigarettes / tobacco</i>	1	1	1	1

As table 10 highlights the most commonly described use of the money was to repay debt – 77% and 96% of respondents in L Juba and Gedo respectively. Upon further exploration this does not mean that people were entirely repaying their debt but that they were able to use that money and the guarantee of future payments to start taking items from the shop. A proportion of the money would have gone for debt repayment and a proportion for taking mainly food items. It is not clear what proportion of money was for debt repayment and what was spent on food. Discussions with the evaluation team suggest that the majority of the money was spent on food items.

The PDM survey that is referred to here was undertaken just before Eid, at the end of Ramadan, when there is an emphasis on purchasing new items of clothing in celebration. The survey also took place at the time of the fourth cash distribution (the third cash-for-work distribution) for most of the households. As such, the third most commonly mentioned use of the cash was for the purchase of clothes.

In reality households will have changed the pattern of use of the cash over the life of the project, for example with relatively more money being able to be spent on clothes towards the end of the project. Following individual households, as detailed case studies, would have been very valuable to see how patterns in the use of cash changed over the course of the project.

The evaluation team and the PDM survey found that the number of meals increased following the cash interventions as well as the diversity of the diet. Some rice, pasta and meat were occasionally purchased. As many of the recipients of the cash were previously rural pastoral households there was a certain urban influence – in terms of some consumption of rice & pasta as well as a need for clothes. A shift in eating habits from the pastoral – morning & evening – consumption pattern to an urban – 3 times a day – pattern also seems to have taken place.

There were some examples of new groups obtaining credit who had not obtained it previously such as minority groups.

Some reduction in typically poor, urban economic activities, known also as coping strategies in difficult times, was noted, such as a reduced collection & sale of bush products and daily construction labour which people mentioned they would have relied on if there was no project. People also mentioned they did not have to sell their remaining animals.

9.2 Gender registration and relations

According to table 11 in the initial blanket cash relief distribution a high percentage of women were registered as beneficiaries. For the following cash-for-work distributions a significantly greater proportion of men were registered. This is partly explained by the fact that more men were actually doing the work on the micro-projects.

Table 11. Gender of registrations

	<i>AFREC</i>		<i>Horn Relief</i>		<i>WASDA</i>		<i>Development Concern</i>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>June Cash Relief</i>	59%	41%	56%	44%	15%	85%	9%	91%
<i>Cash-for-Work</i>	61%	39%	73%	27%	66%	34%	26%	74%

Gender relations are reported to become generally more problematic in times of severe stress, as noted on some occasions by the evaluation team in this case. Typically divorce rates increase as the household struggles to survive economically.

There appeared to be no noticeable changes in intra-household resource management as a result of the cash intervention.

Table 12. Who decides how the money should be used?

	<i>Lower Juba</i>		<i>Gedo</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Man</i>	69	42	38	49
<i>Woman</i>	49	30	28	36
<i>Both</i>	44	27	7	9
<i>Depends on who earns it</i>	3	2	4	5

Table 13. Who collected money on the cash-for-work?

	<i>Lower Juba</i>		<i>Gedo</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Man</i>	83	54	38	54
<i>Woman</i>	56	37	25	36
<i>Other male</i>	7	5	6	9
<i>Other female</i>	7	5	1	1

Table 14. Who received money on the cash relief?

	Lower Juba		Gedo	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Man	10	59	3	43
Woman	5	29	3	43
Other	2	12	1	14

There are some apparent discrepancies between the registration of women highlighted in table 11 and the collection and receipt of cash reflected in table 13 and table 14. Lower Juba reflects the situation for AFREC, Horn Relief and WASDA. The proportions tables 11, 13 and 14 are generally in good correlation for the cash-for-work component but the initial cash relief component seems to be less closely correlated. The very high registration of women by WASDA in the initial cash relief phase does not appear very strongly in the overall proportion of women receiving cash in L Juba from table 14. Similarly the proportion of women receiving cash in the cash relief phase is lower than in the cash-for-work phase according to table 13 and 14 and in contrast to table 11.

In Gedo the correlation between the three tables is not as expected.


These discrepancies should be further explored by the project staff given time constraints by the evaluation team.

9.3 Market level impact



In spite of the apparent injection of large amounts of cash dollars in each payment period there was never any noticeable change in the exchange rate, or difference between project sites – Afmadow and Doble – and other comparable areas – Bardera or El Wak, as highlighted in the graph opposite.

A very interesting trend is noted for cattle prices where, in the project areas the price of cattle has surged from about June, soon after the cash projects started, compared to prices in the Bardera and El Wak markets at the same time.

Maize prices can be seen to drop dramatically from February / March, associated with food aid distributions, increasing again during the rainy season followed by further reductions. The price drops are not only a reflection of Somalia specific food aid distributions but also by distributions in neighbouring areas of Kenya and possibly also Ethiopia.



Timing of project start – June



Exchange rate stability

The lack of fluctuation in the exchange rates appears to be the result of Dahabshil drawing on existing cash in the local economy and supplementing it where necessary, thereby not increasing the money supply by the full amount of the cash transfer. Then, once handed over to the recipient households, most people immediately deposit their cash note with the local trader/shop-keeper, as opposed to exchanging it for Somali Shillings. The trader then transfers all of the notes he collects back to the main commodity supply markets, mostly Kismayo in this case, where the cash is absorbed in to one of the biggest markets in the country.

There was a slight difference in the exchange rates received in the two main project areas. In Badhade and Afmadow, Lower Juba, 95% of respondents received between 12,000 and 13,000 SoSh per US dollar. In Gedo region 83% of respondents exchanged for between 13,000 and 14,000 SoSh per US dollar.

The stability of the exchange rate and the consistency of rates received by households suggest that exchange rate losses were minimal in the project.

Cattle price rises

The cattle price rises in the two project specific markets are attributed to three main factors:

- High livestock/cattle deaths – up to 50%

Young and old animals were the predominant fatalities in the recent drought. Therefore prime breeding stock remains which people are reluctant to sell if at all possible.

- Cheap food in the system

There has been cheap food in the system as a result of the large distributions of food aid throughout the region – Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. This has reduced people's need to sell livestock to buy food.

- Cash in the system

The cash projects have directly benefited many households and indirectly benefited the local economy and kinship support systems and when combined with the food aid appear to have dramatically reduced the requirement to sell cattle, in turn contributing to the increase in prices.

10. Cost Effectiveness & Efficiency

There are different ways to compare the relative costs of food and cash and comparisons are often difficult as conditions, influencing factors and implementing modalities are usually not the same for both interventions, as is the case in Somalia. Attempts are increasingly being made to try and understand these differences and this is described for the Somalia case below.

In the case of the cash distributions a very simple breakdown describes the cost of transferring the cash. Sixty five percent of the overall project resources were in the form of the actual cash handed over to beneficiaries. Therefore, thirty five percent of the project resources were spent on the different means of transferring those resources. These included the 7.5% commission to Dahabshil and the various staffing, administrative and other overhead costs associated with starting up and implementing the projects²³.

The costs associated with the food aid were described by WFP in the following table:

<i>Costs</i>	<i>Metric tonnes</i>	<i>US \$ per MT</i>
Food value	MT	244.2
External transport	MT	71.59
ITSH (internal transport, distribution & storage costs)	MT	214
Partial direct support costs	MT	60
Total		589.79

The external value²⁴ of the food aid plus all associate transport, administration, staffing and overhead costs are given as \$589.79.

The food aid ration size per person was 19.9kg and per household of six therefore 119.4kg. This comprised:

<i>Food items in WFP ration</i>	<i>Quantities in kilogrammes</i>
Cereals	16.67
Pulses	1.8
Vegetable oil	0.6
CSB	0.83
Total per person	19.90
Total per household of six	119.4

The total value of the food aid ration delivered by WFP was \$11.74 per person per month or \$70.44 per household. This is calculated as follows: $\$589.79 / 1000 = \$0.59/\text{kg}$. This is the cost per kilogramme of the food aid. For a ration of 19.9kg per person, the cost is therefore $\$0.59 \times 19.9 = \11.74 .

The value of the food aid ration at market prices in Afmadow was \$7.37 per person, therefore \$44.22 for a household of six.

<i>Food items in WFP ration</i>	<i>Quantities in kilogrammes</i>	<i>Price/unit</i>	<i>Total</i>
Cereals	16.67	\$0.3/kg	5
Pulses	1.8	\$0.81	1.46

²³ The other major material benefit of the cash projects were the micro-projects implemented.

²⁴ This is the value in the source market.

Vegetable oil	0.6	\$1.52	0.91
CSB	0.83	-	-
Total per person	19.90		7.37
Total per household of six	119.4		44.22

The above price of maize reflects a reasonable pre-food aid, drought related cost – it is a reasonable average of the pre-drought cost and is not significantly distorted by the impact of food aid distributions²⁵.

There is no market cost for CSB therefore the ration cost is not a full, true reflection all costs.

The cost of delivering cash by the Consortium was 35% of the overall project costs. Therefore the cost of delivering \$44.22 is \$15.78. The total comparative cost of the cash transfer is therefore \$60.

Therefore the cost of providing a WFP ration to a household of six is approximately 17.4% more expensive than providing the equivalent cash value. However there are many factors required to interpret this purely economic comparison:

- The targeting levels are very different in the two project types
 - In practice emergency food aid is not distributed according to strict criteria – it is more of a blanket level distribution with planned ration sizes likely to be diluted according to the population at the point of distribution
 - Cash is relatively well targeted to poorer individual households according to this evaluation
- Food aid has a wider benefit through its affect on the market, lowering prices
- The wider benefits of cash are less clear for example, by releasing the pressure on social re-distribution mechanisms. The benefits of re-opening the trading sector and stimulating the local economy have occurred but are difficult to quantify
- Food aid is distributed on a much larger scale than the cash interventions

11. Micro-projects

A variety of micro-projects were developed of which the vast majority are complete, as reported by the agencies. Road clearance was by far the predominant project type with over one thousand kilometres cleared of bush. Water point rehabilitation, latrine construction, school room rehabilitation, airstrip clearance, social hall rehabilitation and rubbish clearance were other project types. Water point rehabilitation projects were variable in number as the previous water interventions had included some water point rehabilitation activities. The micro-projects all fell under the general project objectives. The quality of the work is thought to be fine although few were visited.

²⁵ See graph of maize prices on page 54.

Table 15. Summary of Micro-projects

	<i>Dev Con</i>	<i>AFREC</i>	<i>WASDA</i>	<i>Horn Relief</i>
Road clearance	260kms	310kms	330kms	270kms
Water points*	10	2	1	10
Latrines	17	5	27	15
Schools / school rooms	3	13	6	
Airstrips	-	1	-	2

* these may be water catchments, deep or shallow wells or

In addition to the above WASDA rehabilitated a local dispensary, Horn Relief cleaned five rubbish sites, Development Concern rehabilitated two social halls.

In general micro-projects appear to have been identified with good participation of the community and undertaken according to project feasibility, basic environmental assessments and simple, local management and construction practices.

Difficulties that have been associated with the micro-projects mainly concern the appropriate timing and support costs on project sites given the pastoral context.

Micro-projects have often been at sites far from the households of the participants. For example, water point rehabilitation and road clearance work has been at locations 10-20kms away from people's homes. Different agencies have provided water and transport to the distant sites to facilitate people's participation. In some project sites, participants have camped out at the project sites, while at others they have been ferried back and forth on a daily basis.

The micro-projects and their daily work requirements has also interfered at times with pastoral households mobility patterns at times. In the *Hagai* season, after the *Gu* rains and before the *Deyr* rains households have to move their animals in search of water and pasture. The men usually move the larger livestock and so on some occasions have complained that they cannot carry on working at the project sites. If women or another household member are not able to substitute for an absent due to the nature of the work or competing activities a project may run in to difficulties.

Complications around pastoral mobility are very different for camel and cattle pastoralists, given the much greater mobility of the former.

On several occasions, clan or family members have agreed to conduct the work on the project in order to cover for the registered beneficiary who was unable to conduct the work him/herself due to for example, being elsewhere with some livestock.

Further research is warranted in this area to ascertain when certain types of work are more and less possible.

12. Key Conclusions

In following the FSAU's analysis both agencies were targeting areas of southern Somalia judged to be in a state of 'humanitarian crisis or acute food security and livelihoods crisis', poorly covered by other humanitarian actors, unknown to themselves and generally perceived to be difficult, remote and insecure operating environments.

In doing the Consortium introduced an innovative working approach for southern Somalia and a relatively new commodity (cash) and as such deserve credit for initiating and managing what many would see as a high risk strategy. The risk was largely taken by the Oxfam family with Oxfam GB providing approximately half of the resources (see box 6).

Both the working approach and the cash have proven to be appropriate and effective in responding to the humanitarian situation on the ground. The approach has demonstrated the possibility of working in ways much more locally sensitive and appropriate to a politically complex and insecure environment than is normally the case, and has worked well to promote the distribution of resources to the poorest in the communities. The cash itself has proven to be highly appropriate as a commodity to save lives and livelihoods, in particular by re-opening credit lines and supporting trading systems. In addition, the use of the *hawala*²⁶ system, through Dahabshil, to manage and distribute the cash, delivering it directly into people's hands, has proven very successful.

The timing of the programme was relatively late (at least three months), coming several months after food aid distributions had started as well as the rains that broke the drought. This also makes it difficult to fully disentangle the impact of the project from the impact of the rains and the food aid. However, the available evidence highlights that households used the majority of their money on improving their access to food, including diversifying their diet and by depositing their money with local traders and shop-keepers and thereby re-opening their credit lines. Households were also able to reduce sales of their remaining animals and were able to reduce reliance on typical coping strategies, such as daily labour, bush product collection and sales and household migration²⁷. The revitalisation of the credit system also benefited the trading system.

Project monitoring, although well planned for in overall terms and implemented well in some areas, lacked quality, capacity and innovation. The project baseline and first PDM survey had limitations in their content and methods. Project reporting often lacked detail. Several opportunities to improve monitoring were missed, such as through the development of cross-consortium monitoring mechanisms and individual household level monitoring. The investment in the second PDM survey, with the input of the evaluation team, and the relatively high investment in the evaluation itself has helped to balance, to some extent, the initial weaknesses in project monitoring.

²⁶ *Hawala* is the collective term for the informal banking and money transfer system in the country.

²⁷ For which there would have been increasing competition and decreasing returns as a result of the drought.

Key Conclusions – why did it work?

The evaluation team were surprised at the relative level of success found. However, when compared to the equivalent surveys and evaluations in northern Somalia, involving Horn Relief and Oxfam GB²⁸ this is slightly less surprising. However, the evaluation team identified the following factors as crucial to the overall success of the projects:

- * Strong partnership dynamics
 - good coordination and peer level relationships
- * Strong staff in key leadership and field positions – all agencies
 - strong, competent, motivated staff
- * Strong beginning
 - three-day joint training in May got all agencies off to the same start
- * New intervention
 - lack of familiarity with the area and the project type may have contributed to the pressure to perform well
- * Context specific/sensitive approach
 - few non-ethnic Somali in the field allowed largely uninterrupted implementation
 - strong ethnic Somali staff with international exposure and less or not part of long standing local power dynamics enabled good understanding of and engagement with the local clan and power dynamics
- * Use of a locally respected institution for the cash distributions – Dahabshil

13. Recommendations

Governance and the Political Context

The consortium has demonstrated an alternative way of working in southern Somalia, in particular by gaining the support of the wider public, attempting to use the clan system in a positive way, and not allowing themselves to be hijacked by gate-keepers. This approach could serve as a model to be explored further for wider replicability by other agencies in Somalia.

Having said that it is also a time of great political uncertainty in Somalia. Political developments may mean the operating space and norms will change – public participation and transparency may become less possible. However, exploring ways of engaging with and re-enforcing positive Islamic principles of governance is an area the

²⁸ Narbeth, S. 2004. *Emergency cash relief to drought affected communities in Sool plateaux*. Post-distribution survey findings. OCHA; Acacia Consultants. 2005. *DfID/Novib funded NGO consortium response to drought in Toghdeer, Sool, Bari, Nugal regions*. External evaluation.

consortium can contribute to. AFREC, for example, mobilised local religious leaders to instil moral values on Village Relief Committees, in line with project targeting objectives - to target the poor.

Given these potential restrictions a number of advocacy opportunities exist:

1) other international agencies in southern Somalia have already been showing interest in the approach of the Consortium, particularly for targeting purposes. The capacity of Oxfam and/or Horn Relief to meet this demand and explore and promote these areas was not investigated fully by the evaluation team but should be assessed²⁹.

2) the approach is thought to be of interest to other agencies working to develop and support civil society and governance in Somalia. The interest in this area and capacity to support it should be assessed.

3) the staffing strategy of the agencies demonstrates a way to improve humanitarian access to Somalia. This issue should be followed up with UN OCHA

This evaluation has had its limit in terms of how far it has been able to uncover details on how the project has appeared to interact positively with the clan structures and systems in order to target the poor and minorities. Further research into the dynamics of Somali social support mechanisms, the re-distribution of resources, the status of minorities and the resultant implications for operating norms and targeting by international agencies would be welcome.

Rebuilding and supporting pastoral livelihoods

The majority of the project beneficiaries are cattle pastoralists who have lost a significant proportion of their animals. The cattle pastoral economy in general has suffered very high livestock losses. Recovery of pastoralists takes time, as they must wait for new births of their livestock, which will occur from the next *Gu* season in April/May 2007, and will be accompanied by a surge in milk production. At this point there will be a clear sense of the recovery and confidence of the pastoral economy.

Livelihood gains to date thus need to be consolidated and sustained. Different interventions may support this – re-stocking, continued cash-for-work, employment generation, micro-credit, pastoral education, livestock health programmes – and should be quickly explored.

Pastoral debt dynamics are not well understood in Somalia. For example, how debt levels change between ‘normal’ and severe drought periods and therefore how the cash interventions may have affected structural debt compared to immediate drought induced debt is not clear and deserves further research.

²⁹ It is understood that Horn Relief and Oxfam GB have initiated an informal cash-learning group, including SC UK (Somalia and Kenya), ILO, CARE and ACF.

Cash in southern Somalia

The use of cash for humanitarian interventions can clearly work in southern Somalia however this is still a new and sensitive area. Great caution is required in terms of replicating this type of work. It is not clear how sensitive the relative success of this intervention was to the factors mentioned above in Box 1 above. Different scales of cash interventions and implementing modalities may have different results.

Dahabshil in this case was a crucial partner yet is an unclear organisation in terms of its inner workings. Many lessons were learned in terms of this relationship. A close working relationship needs to be developed with organisations such as Dahabshil, particularly if they are undertaking the actual cash distribution, in order to manage the risks associated with working in Somalia

Both of these areas deserve further exploration if other agencies are to consider working with cash in similar ways to the Consortium or if larger-scale interventions are to be considered.

Some reflections and comparisons between food aid and cash have been made (see box 11, page 48 and section 5, page 55). This is another area for further research.

Partnerships with Somalia NGOs

Questions have rightly arisen for Oxfam over its choice of Kenyan NGOs. In practice this strategy has worked well and has been well justified to the evaluation team. In recognition of this issue Oxfam are already recommending credible Somali NGOs and therefore potential partners to be registered to the Oxfam contracting system. However, the greater exposure, experience and capacity of some Kenyan Somali NGOs does raise interesting issues for their potential role in supporting Somali NGOs. In Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba there is potential to explore these potential relationships further.